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ABSTRACT 
Khakpour, Masoumeh, M.Sc., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, October 2011. 
The Impact of Ocean Freight Rate Fluctuation on Wheat Flow 
Supervisor: Dr. R.S. Gray 
 
The global economy is increasingly defined by access to international markets, with reduced 
barriers to trade between many countries. Continued reduction in the costs of moving products 
both within a country and around the world is crucial for modern business to remain competitive. 
International trade in grain is no different, and presents its own unique challenges for study in a 
Canadian context.  
Ocean freight rates for grain have recently been very unstable. After a long period of low 
freight rates, capacity became limited in 2003 and 2004 more than tripling freights rates. 
Although freight rates have subsequently declined, the increasing dominance of containerized 
ocean traffic may perpetuate the recent instability in bulk freight rates. The impact of ocean 
freight rates on Canada’s competitiveness in the grain markets is poorly understood.  The theory 
for the flow of commodities over space has been well studied in the context of trade and while 
there have been a number of studies concerning the spatial nature of grain handling and 
transportation in Canada. However, to date there has been minimal effort to analyze ocean 
freight transportation prices and their impact on wheat flows from Canada. The purpose of this 
study is to analyze the impact of ocean freight rates on international competitiveness of Canadian 
wheat. 
To analyze the impact of ocean freight rates on Canada’s competitiveness a spatial, 
product-differentiated, equilibrium model of international wheat market is developed in this 
research that allows for two way trade and explains the linkages among the various locations of 
production and consumption. The model incorporates changes in ocean freight rates and the 
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geographical distances with non-homogeneous wheat originated from different wheat exporters. 
The model is used to examine the potential impact of changes in freight rates on Canada and 
other main players in world wheat market.  The model is a tool to compare the price and quantity 
changes and compare the comparative advantages and disadvantages that are created by changes 
in wedges due to freight rate fluctuation. The result implies that shorter geographical distances 
and lower freight rates do not necessarily result in increasing export to the regions with lower per 
unit freight rates. This is why before any decision making, it is reasonable to adopt such a tool 
that is capable of measuring the reactions to price changes that are associated with freight rates 
considering different demand and supply parameters. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction of this thesis details the purpose of the study, offers a justification 
for the study, defines the research objectives, and lays out the organization of the study.  
1.1. Background 
Today’s global economy is characterized by easier access to international markets for 
all countries and reduced barriers to trade. Once a country is open to international trade, 
domestic producers face strong competition created by global changes. In a competitive 
environment, the introduction of cost-reducing technologies, improved product marketing 
techniques, and, in particular, reduction in transportation costs both within the country and to 
the world market, are  crucial matters for producers. Any changes in transaction costs that 
affect the border price of a product will have an impact on the producer country’s market 
share. For many products, the transportation cost is an important component of transaction 
costs in trade, which creates wedges between domestic prices and foreign markets. 
While technological improvements have significantly reduced transportation costs 
over time, this downward trend has often been disrupted by significant changes in input 
prices and increasing demand. During the past decade, ocean freight rates increased 
significantly because of changes in fuel costs as well as increasing demand for bulk 
transportation for products such as iron and ore along some routes, besides the regular 
increasing demand in transportation services due to growing trade in the world. As shown by 
Hammels (2007), improvements in transportation tech
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trade. On the other hand, the growing rate of the trade has resulted in higher demand and 
transportation rates. It is important for trade parties to be aware of these ongoing changes. 
Depending on the type of commodity and the sensitivity of demand for the final product, 
there will be different reactions and strategies for minimizing costs or maintaining the market 
share. The grain markets are no exception in this regard. 
Grains trade on many major exchanges and are shipped around the globe. As such 
market dynamics are influenced by local, regional and global supply disposition. Among all 
factors affecting the worldwide grain market, the cost of transportation is known as one of 
the factors that greatly influence the competitive position of a region’s grain production. 
Transportation costs affect the arbitrage opportunities forgrain exporters and importers, 
which impact price paid by consumers and the prices received by producers, and 
consequently the global pattern of international demand and supply of grain. 
 The cost of transportation is critical for wheat, which is a bulky and a particularly 
widely traded commodity. Given the great distances between wheat exporting and importing 
regions, transportation often makes up a large share of marketing costs. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
a simple graphical journey of wheat from farm storage to the consumer. As shown, 
transportation and handling play various roles before the final product reaches the consumer. 
Whereas ocean transportation is an important intermediate level in the wheat trade, the cost 
of ocean transportation varies from region to region. In 2007, the ratio of the ocean 
transportation costs to total average wheat producing prices across the world varied from 
13% to 20% due to different wheat premium prices and freight costs. The question is how 
ocean transportation costs may affect the competitiveness of wheat from one region in 
another region. How do changes in freight rates change the global pattern of wheat trade? 
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Answering this question is particularly important for the countries like Canada, United 
States, and Australia with fewer land borders and more overseas importers.  
 
Producer 
Elavator
End user 
Domestic use
Figure 1.1 Wheat Supply Chain with focus on Transportation required 
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1.2. Problem Statement 
Western Canadian wheat farmers in particular face some of the longest inland and 
overseas distances to reach exporting regions. Ocean freight rates are a very important 
component of transaction cost and change in thiscost willaffect price level and the relative 
competitiveness in foreign markets.  
Despite the potential importance of these impacts, while a significant numbers of studies 
have addressed the barriers, policies, and logistics of inland wheat handling and transportation, 
very little is known about the size and direction of impacts ocean freight rate impacts. A search 
of the literature,(outlined in Chapter 3), was unable to reveal a single study that addresses the 
impact of changes in the ocean freight rate, in the context of a multilateral trade flows within a 
global market.  
Given the potential impact of ocean freight rates on Canada’s competitive position in various 
wheat markets, and the lack of prior analysis, there is an important need to develop an economic 
model that can be used as tool to anticipate the impacts ocean freight rate changes have on 
Canada’s competitive position in various export markets. This will allow Canadian grain 
marketers to more readily adopt their sales strategies to changing ocean freight conditions. 
 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
The primary objective of this study is to develop an economic model that can estimate the 
impact of ocean freight rate changes on Canada’s wheat export patterns, prices and sales 
volumes. Because Canada is not isolated from global market this will involve modeling the 
international wheat market along with the ocean transportation market, and the role of other 
players in determining trade patterns. Specifically, the model must accommodate both spatial and 
product-differentiated characteristics of wheat. The model must therefore incorporate changes in 
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ocean freight rates and geographical distances with non-homogeneous wheat originating from 
various wheat exporters. The model can then be used to examine the potential impact of changes 
in freight rates on Canada and other major players in the global wheat market.  
This research will first examine the structure of the operating ocean freight market and 
then construct an appropriate vertical model for wheat flow. While our focus will be on the 
Canadian wheat market, we will study the global wheat market and its reaction to freight rate 
changes as well. This theoretical framework will then be applied to a simulation of the global 
wheat market. The results will clarify how changes in ocean freight rates will affect the 
competitiveness of Canadian wheat in various regions.  
In summary, the specific objectives of this study are:  
1. To develop a spatial model of the global wheat trade market that allows for 
two-way trade and explains the linkages among the various locations of 
production and consumption. 
2. To identify the impact of freight rate changes, as an exogenous variable, on 
wheat flow and address the issue of model validation.  
3. To evaluate the impact of select rate changes on regional supply, demand, and 
trade patterns of wheat as an illustration of the performance of the model.  
 
1.4. Scope and Organization of Study 
Pursuing the objectives of the study, it is necessary to be familiar with the structure of the 
ocean freight market. Chapter 2 introduces some of the theoretical concepts that bolster 
understanding of ocean freight market specification and freight determination. 
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Chapter 3 will focus on trade studies and theories that cover commodity trade transaction 
costs with a focus on transportation costs as a base for the spatial wheat trade model. Chapter 4, 
describes the structure of the spatial wheat trade model, the process of parameterization, then 
simulates the impact of changes in the ocean freight rate on prices and quantities of the wheat 
produced, traded, and consumed across these regions. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results and conclusions of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRUCTURE OF OCEAN FREIGHT MARKET AND WHEAT FLOW 
2.1 Introduction 
Ocean freight transportation has an essential role in grain flow across the world. Because 
of the distribution of grain production and consumption across the world, it is one of the most 
important intermediate linkages between producers and consumers. Yet, grain producers and 
consumers are not the only users of ocean freight services. Recent trends in globally traded 
merchandise involve more and more competitors in the ocean freight market (OFM) on both the 
producer and consumer sides of the industry. As a result, the OFM is affected by reactions from 
all sorts of players, including both service users and providers. To follow the impact of ocean 
freight rate changes on grain, specifically wheat flow in this thesis, there is a need to examine the 
ocean freight market structure and its impact on the final product. 
The purpose of this chapter is to look into the ocean shipping market structure and the 
factors driving freight rates for seaborne agricultural transportation. To examine how fluctuation 
in ocean freight rates may affect wheat movement across the world, it is essential to understand 
how these fluctuations happen in the OFM, which player has more power in the market and 
which is more intense as regards to fluctuations. This requires identifying the market players, 
looking into consumers' and producers' motivations, opportunities, and decisions in the shipping 
industry, and analyzing the market structure of the ocean freight services to identify the parties' 
market power in price (ocean freight rate) determination. This knowledge of market structure 
provides key insights into ocean freight rate changes. It helps to develop understanding of the 
various exogenous and endogenous factors that affect the commodity, or in case of this thesis, 
 9 
 
wheat movement. Finally, knowledge of the OFM structure allows this thesis to construct basic 
assumptions for a trade-transportation model that explains wheat movement across the world. 
As Sussman (2000) mentions in the Introduction to Transportation, from the different 
shipping services within the OFM and variety of service users arise a complex industry. 
Consumers may choose between liner shipping or sending goods as bulk cargo depending on 
freight rates, parcel size, shipping routes, and specialized services offered along each route. Not 
all choices are available from all countries; some have a greater suite of options given terrestrial 
and airborne freight. However, ocean-going vessels still remain the most viable and efficient 
transportation option for large volumes of basic commodities and finished products throughout 
the global market, especially agricultural products, because of the distribution of commodity 
markets across the world. While consumers seek the most viable and efficient system of 
transportation considering the changes in ocean freight rates and other factors, service providers 
look for sustainability and maximizing their profit. Service users compete to obtain their 
preferred services on a specific route and producers maintain or increase their share in the route 
accordingly. These competitions have given certain characteristics to the demand and supply of 
ocean freight services and will be discussed in the coming sections of this chapter. 
This chapter is organized into five sections. Section 2.2 describes the basic definitions in 
the sector, including types of the services, followed by trade parties’ motives for choosing a 
specific type of grain shipping services. Ocean freight markets, supply and demand, and price 
determination are discussed in section 2.3. After describing basic market factors, this section 
focuses on the types of markets for services that are used to move bulk cargo, especially services 
used for grain and wheat movement. Section 2.4 outlines the relationship between the evolution 
of market power within the sector and the historical technological changes in the industry. It also 
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summarizes some of the regulations on ocean freight market during the past decades. Finally a 
summary of the chapter and the role of ocean service users in determining the ocean freight rate 
are discussed in Section 2.5.   
2.2 Basic Definitions 
This section of Chapter 2 addresses the basic definitions of necessary components of the 
ocean shipping industry used in this thesis. Cargo shipping types and various shipping services 
are briefly described, and their advantages, disadvantages, and specifications are compared. The 
motivation behind choosing one service versus another is explained.    
 
2.2.1 Types of Cargo Shipping and Shipping Services 
Ocean shipping includes a variety of services depending on the type of cargo. Combined 
passenger-cargo vessels, dry cargo vessels, bulk cargo ships, refrigerator ships, container ships, 
tankers, ore carriers, and various combinations of the aforementioned are examples of the vessels 
and services offered in the industry. The focus of this thesis is on dry bulk cargo vessels and 
services, as these are typically used for transporting grain. 
The bulk commodities traded by sea can be generally divided between dry bulk and 
liquid bulk cargo. All grains, dry edibles (alfalfa pellets, citrus pellets, livestock feed, flour, 
meal, peanuts, raw sugar, seeds, starches, etc.), iron ore, dry bulk mine (sand, gravel, copper, 
salt, etc.), wood chips, cement, and chemicals (fertilizer, plastic granules and pellets, resin 
powder, synthetic fiber, etc.), are all examples of dry bulk cargo.1Sometimes there is a need for 
                                                 
1  Liquid bulk cargos includes oil, liquefied natural gas, gasoline, chemicals, liquid edibles (vegetable oil, cooking 
oil, etc.) and  is not discussed in this thesis.  
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special services and containers to transport some cargo such as chemical and special-order 
grains, etc., while general vessels can be used for some dry bulk cargo shipping and the 
parcels2can be mixed.  
Various resources provide slightly different definitions for bulk cargo. Based on the 
United Nations (UN) definition in maritime transportation study, bulk cargo is “cargo that is 
unpacked (un-bundled or unbound) and is of the same or a similar kind of nature 
(homogeneous).” As per W. Stopford (1997), bulk cargo is “any cargo that is transported by sea 
in large consignment in order to reduce the unit cost”. This definition puts the ultimate objective 
of cost reduction as an end rather than the means by which the aim is achieved.  
The question is which criteria and specifications make a commodity suitable for bulk 
shipment. General cargo and bulk cargo are the main categories for the purpose of Parcel Size 
Distribution Function (PSDF). Bulk cargo consists of cargo parcels that are big enough to fill a 
whole ship while general cargo includes parcels that are too small for a ship and have to be 
transported with other cargo. Grain shipped from different location, as dry bulk cargo, has a very 
different PSDF and sometimes has to be transported as general cargo. As volume of trade flow 
increases and the size of cargo parcels grow, the industry will migrate to bulk shipment.  
Stopford identifies four characteristics for deciding between bulk and general cargo: 
cargo volume, handling characteristics, regularity, and stock: there must be a sufficient volume 
of cargo to justify a tailored shipping operation, the cargo must be physically suitable for bulk 
handling, the bulk shipping operation must be adapted to the overall transportation system, and 
finally the size of cargo parcel must be compatible with the stock held by the producer and the 
consumer. Service providers can apply the Parcel Size Distribution Function (PSDF) to manage 
                                                 
2Stopford (1997) defines a "parcel" as an individual consignment of cargo for shipment. 
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mixed cargos.  Since different sizes of parcels need different types of shipping operations, the 
PSDF determines which cargo goes in which ship. The PSDF depends on a variety of factors. 
Stopford identifies economies of scale as the most important decision making factor. However 
this is always subject to the availability of ships and transport infrastructure such as ports for the 
origin and destination. Figure 2-1 summarizes the cargo types and the appropriate shipping 
option for each.  
It is important to identify whether wheat is being shipped as general cargo or bulk 
because these two operate in different market structure.  According to Stopford, general cargo 
mostly operates under the liner regime while bulk cargo operates under both the tramp and liner 
system. Liner and tramps operate in different market structure and therefore impact the market of 
the final good and products in a different way. Modern ocean shipping, consisting of different 
type of vessels, can be divided into two major classes: liner shipping and tramp shipping. Based 
on the types of services offered and duplication along certain routes, tramp or liner service 
providers may turn to competitors on a specific route. Although consumers have the choice 
between tramp and liner services, they may rank one service over the other based on price or the 
quality of service. Some definitions and market characteristics of these services follow.   
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 Source: Maritime Economics, Martin Stopford, 1988, p 11 
Global Seaborne Trade 
Seaborne trade may be classified as bulk or general cargo depending on the PSD for each 
commodity 
Large Parcels 
(Over 2-3000 tons) 
Small Parcels 
(Under 2-3000 tons) 
Bulk Cargo 
Any individual cargo 
consignment sufficiently 
large to fill a whole ship. 
The main types are: 
Dry Bulk 
Bulk Liquid 
Specialist Bulk 
Owned Liner 
Vessels 
Charter Market 
Ships provide a pool of general purpose 
tonnage hired out to meet irregular demand 
General Cargo 
Any individual cargo consignment 
too small to fill a whole ship or hold. 
The main types are: 
Loose Cargo 
Containers 
Pallets/Flats 
Pre-Slung 
Liquid 
Refrigerated 
Wheeled Cargo 
The liner shipping industry 
provides transport for small 
cargo parcels on common 
carrier’s basis 
The bulk shipping industry  
provides transport for ship 
loads of cargo on one- ship 
one- cargo basis. 
Bulk fleets provide ships for bulk 
transport. 
The main types are: 
Tankers 
Bulk Carriers 
Combined Carriers 
Specialist Bulk Vessels 
 
Owned Bulk-
Tramp Vessels 
Liner fleets provide ships for the 
transport of general cargo. The main 
types are: 
Multipurpose 
Containers 
 
Global Fleet 
Many different type of ships 
Figure2-1 Global Seaborne Trade Chart: Bulk vs. General Cargo 
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2.2.2 Liner vs. Tramp Services 
The coming section will explain the definitions of and differences between liner and 
tramp services, and will explain the different types of services used to ship grain, especially 
wheat, across the globe. As implied in the last section, dry bulk carriers are flexible, and due to 
the economy of scale of services they provide, are capable of offering relatively low prices for 
packaging and handling. But bulk carriers are not the only desired made of transportation for 
grains. Grain is transported across the world in containerized vessels, as general cargo, and bulk 
cargo in bulk or containerized carriers. These cargo types and their operating markets are 
significantly different from each other. This section will demonstrate the justifications for 
selecting any of these services so as to build a set of assumptions for the theoretical framework 
for wheat movement. 
Fayle (1933) describes a liner service as one with “. . . a fleet of ships, under common 
ownership or management, which provides a fixed service, at regular intervals, between named 
ports, and offer themselves as common carriers of any goods or passengers requiring shipment 
between those ports and ready for transit by their sailing dates. A fixed itinerary, inclusion in a 
regular service, and the obligation to accept cargo from all comers and to sail, whether filled or 
not, on the date fixed by a published schedule . . .”  
In contrast, he defines a tramp ship as a “seeker” or a “general trader”, as one that “can be 
hired as a whole, by the voyage or the month, to load such cargo and to carry it between such 
ports as the charterer may require . . .”  
In short, liners are characterized by regular service along specified route. Unlike liner 
shipping, tramp ships are very flexible. Tramps do not have a fixed schedule or published ports 
of call and the shipping is arranged between the shipper and receiver, with transportation 
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operators offering vessels for hire to carry bulk (dry or liquid) cargo to any suitable port in the 
world. All types of carriers in ocean shipping services, may work under tramp or liner shipping.  
Like other ocean transportation service users, grain traders have the option of using liner 
or tramp services. Users select between liner and bulk services based on their requirements, 
cargo mass, timing, special services, and prices. They try to minimize their cost of transportation, 
subject to maintaining a standard level of transportation facilities to preserve the quality of the 
commodity. 
While grain exporters have a tendency to ship grain in bulk carriers, which are generally 
chartered on a per-voyage basis in the tramp market, there has been an upward trend toward 
transporting containerized shipments of grain. This increased attraction toward containerized 
shipping may arise from special features of container shipments such as easier handling and 
transportation, better or more appropriate port facilities, or specific needs like identity 
preservation. Moreover, market structure changes in the liner shipping industry in recent years 
have turned containerized carriers into a competitive mode of transportation for bulk carriers. 
Section 2.3 expands this discussion and examines the reasons behind this transformation, first 
showing how grain movers choose between container and bulk carriers. 
2.2.3 Container vs. Bulk Carriers 
Containerized or bulk carriers may be used to transport different types of grains across 
the world. One important characteristic of grain that separates it from a lot of other bulk 
commodities is its seasonal and uncertain nature. According to Stopford (1997), because of the 
yield uncertainty and unpredictable harvest fluctuations, it is hard to plan transportation ahead of 
time. He specifically uses the term “opportunist cargo” for grain because after other trade 
contracts are secured, grains have to be shipped using the ports and ships that are available. The 
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unpredictable harvest fluctuations of grains make trade prediction and, as a result, planning 
shipping arrangements difficult and complex task. The tramp option with no restricted schedule 
seems an obvious choice. 
Considering the type of cargo and transportation costs, hiring a bulk carrier may seem 
like the appropriate method for ocean grain transportation, in this case wheat movement. 
Looking into the supply chain of grain, after cost of production, transportation cost is the most 
important element that significantly affects the final price of the product. There is a general bulk 
option with a lower service price, and there is a more specialized option with probably a higher 
price but higher quality service: containerized shipping. What makes a service user choose the 
more expensive service?  
While the characteristics of grain transportation make the bulk carriers the appropriate 
mode for ocean transportation, there has been a trend toward containerized exports of 
traditionally bulk commodities. According to Reichert & Vachal (2003), during the past two 
decades the cost of hiring containers has decreased and their prices are becoming more 
compatible to those of bulk carriers along some routes. Reichert & Vachal studied the impact of 
identity preservation on grain movement and addressed the increasing demand for containerized 
shipments. In their research, animal feed and soybeans were the proxy for grain and were used as 
indicators for containerized grain exports. They picked these two grains because they represent 
more than 50 percent of all grain container exports. Their study is definitely among the works 
proving the increasing trend of the containerized. 
According to Vachal & Reichert, Identity Preservation (IP) is the most important reason 
for the accelerated trend toward using containerized vessels instead of regular bulk carriers. 
Farmers and consumers who are looking for more diverse or specialized products prefer to use 
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Identity Preserved products and wheat is not an exception among the grains. With evolution of 
technology and the emergence of Genetically Modified (GM) grain in the world market, this 
concept has become more important to some exporters. Generally non- GM wheat, the quantity 
and quality of protein, moisture content, and the quantity of non-millable material encourage 
some buyers to choose containerized shipment. While producers’ focus in the past has been to 
increase yields in order to increase income, another option has emerged. According to Vachal& 
Reichert, the producers now focus on providing the customer with a higher-value product. The 
containerized system has the capability of providing special packaging that commands a 
premium and may even offer higher profits to the producer, especially because of increased 
demand for more specified grain movement and IP facilities to control the quality of the product, 
ensure customer specifications are met, and decrease the possibility of vertical price 
discrimination because of quality differences. In the case of grain flow, especially wheat flow, 
the cost-benefit analysis requires more details, depending on the origin and destination of the 
commodity and special orders made by costumers, the choice may vary.3 
 Another advantage of containerized transportation is in minimizing the loss from poor 
handling, according to Prentice 1998. In the bulk system, handling and transportation from the 
farm gate to the consumer, involves loading and unloading the products at least four times during 
the transportation process. But in the containerized system, the grain is loaded into a container 
once and is not handled until it is unloaded at its final destination. The easy storage of containers 
in intermodal stations is another notable advantage of containerized transport. Eventually, ports 
with poor storage facilities can to be used due to the storage abilities of containers.  
                                                 
3 This discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The above motives have persuaded some shippers to consider containerized grain 
movements in lieu of the bulk system during the past few decades. Apart from necessities that 
forces a choice of ocean transportation method, the final decision between the bulk and 
containerized services still remain subject to the freight rates offered by the service providers. 
This part will be discussed further after reviewing the market characteristics of each service. 
2.3 The Market Structure of Ocean Freight Services 
The Ocean Freight Market (OFM) is one of the most important and costly intermediate-level 
processors in the grain/wheat supply chain and is a key component identifying the pattern of 
wheat flow from exporter regions to importer regions.  
The service offered by bulk and containers is different, but they also operate in different 
markets. Due to historical and technological changes, the markets of ocean shipping services 
have undergone major structural changes. While these markets have been affected by 
technological and regulatory changes, there has been some influence from consumers’ 
preferences, especially in recent years. This section of thesis will investigate and summarize 
these structural changes and explain the current market situation and outcomes. The result of this 
discussion will be used to build the base assumption about the ocean transportation market 
characteristics as the intermediate level of wheat supply chain and develop the final model based 
on this assumption.  
This section examines the market power that ocean transportation providers bring to bear 
on the final product. This requires recognition of the active elements of the market and their 
characteristics. The variety of service users on the demand side and the specific characteristics of 
the supply of shipping services make this different from the common supply and demand 
framework.  In this section supply and demand of shipping services and their effects on ocean 
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shipping rates will be briefly discussed, as will the process of price determination in the ocean 
shipping market before investigating the literature and historical origin of market structure 
changes. 
2.3.1 Ocean Freight Market 
The market elements of ocean freight services consist of the ocean freight service users 
on the demand side and ocean freight service providers on the supply side. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, there are different types of services offered in the ocean shipping industry. The 
focus of this chapter and thesis is on the services available for bulk cargo; as such ocean freight 
services refer to bulk cargo services unless otherwise specified. A simple competitive market for 
ocean freight services will be considered first, assuming that all the products and services offered 
for bulk cargo are homogeneous and the general supply and demand for the services will be 
described. Thereafter the active elements that affect demand and supply will be described and it 
will be determined how these factors work and whether it can be assumed that the services 
offered in ocean shipping the homogeneous or not.  
Supply and demand of ocean freight services are affected by several factors. Considering 
transportation as the intermediate processing level, the demand for these services is a derived 
demand and is highly dependent on demand for the final product; any factor that influences the 
final product demand affects the ocean transportation demand.  On the supply side, a change in 
policy or regulation of ocean shipping services supply, or even production factors like the price 
of oil and crew, affects the cost and may result in freight rate changes. This section categorizes 
factors affecting the ocean freight rate and determines how the ocean freight market is affected 
and how these changes of the intermediate level may affect the choices of consumers.  
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2.3.2 Demand 
In this context, ocean freight transportation demand is defined as the demand for bulk 
carriers along a specific route. We assume that the cargo size is large enough to necessitate 
hiring a bulk carrier. Ocean freight transportation is generally the intermediate processing stage 
of getting a finalized, raw, or intermediate material from its origin to its destination. As a result, 
the demand for shipping services is strongly affected by the factors that influence final product.4 
The demand for ocean transportation is derived from demand for the commodities carried, and is 
therefore affected by the elasticity of demand for the commodity itself, by the elasticity of 
substitutes for the commodity being transported, and by transportation competition for instance, 
competing shipping companies along the same routes or alternative routes, and also modes of 
alternative transportation such as air or rail transport. Sometimes the change in demand along a 
specific ocean shipping route may arise from changing freight rates along other possible routes 
or changes in the price of alternative modes of transportation.  
Wheat must also compete for services with other dry bulk cargo, including other types of 
grain as well as non-grain bulk cargo such as iron ore, cooking coal, steel products, bauxite, etc. 
Any change in the supply and demand of any of these major bulk commodities can easily affect 
the demand of shipping services for other bulk commodities and consequently affect the supply 
of shipping services available for grain; the demand for ocean transportation services is directly 
influenced by trends in the global economy and trade fluctuation. Many textbooks and time 
series show that when there is an increase in global trade, peaks in demand for seaborne 
transportation follows it.5 
                                                 
4We assume that the wheat in the importer region is the final product in the wheat vertical supply chain.  
5Stopford 1997, Bridgman 2003, and Hummel et al 2008 are examples of the above statement. 
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There are many examples of changes in the economies and trade flow of a region that act 
as the "primary driver" of changes in the dry bulk carrier market. For instance, in the 1990s 
Japan acted as the primary driver due to the increased demand for seaborne trade and growth in 
Japanese industrial production.6China has been the main driving force behind the recent increase 
in seaborne dry bulk trade and the demand for dry bulk carriers. Increased demand for bulk 
ocean cargo tends to increase ocean freight rates, which in turn affect commodity markets. 
Specifically in the grain market, where transportation costs make up a substantial part of grain 
production and supply costs, these fluctuations in freight rates and their effects are a matter 
worth investigation.  
In the case of global wheat transportation due to the distribution of origins destinations, 
and mass of cargo, ocean freight remains the most viable transportation method. Therefore, other 
shipping services are considered the main rivals to ocean shipping in this thesis and the impact of 
the alternative shipping modes is not considered. The demand side of ocean shipping services is 
quite competitive since there are many service users and they cannot influence the market 
individually. 
2.3.3 Supply 
Like the demand for ocean freight services, the supply side of ocean shipping services is 
very complex due to technological regulatory, and policy changes. Ocean shipping services 
offered along a specific route may produce one or several types of services, including liner 
shipping or tramp shipping, and can carry different commodities including dry and wet bulk 
shipping. After the technological changes in the ocean shipping industry in the early 1880s, 
coalitions and regulations have deeply affected the supply of ocean transportation services. In 
                                                 
6
  Web link last accessed in June 2011 :  http://sec.edgar-online.com/2005/05/17/0001047469-05-015066/Section24.asp 
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this section, however, the assumption is that there is no monopoly or oligopoly on the supply 
side of shipping services and the ocean shipping market is competitive along a specific route. 
Therefore, the supply of bulk cargo shipping services along a specific route consists of all bulk 
carriers available and able to carry bulk cargo. The supply of services will be discussed based on 
fixed and variable costs and accessibility of the route to other carriers, as well as historical 
changes and the impact of technological changes, policies, and regulations on the OFM.   
Just like the supply of other goods and services, production cost structure plays a 
significant role in the supply function of ocean shipping services, but it has some characteristics 
that are important to understand the market. According to Sussman (2000), supply for shipping 
services on a route is relatively price inelastic in the short run because the maximum available 
capacity of the world fleet is fixed and the entrance of carrier vessels from other routes tends to 
be limited. New entrants to specific routes are ships reentering a route after downtime (laid-up 
ships) or they may be new vessels added to existing fleets. Since the process of producing new 
vessels is time-consuming, only in the long run does the capacity of the world fleet change.  In 
the short run, as long as there are no laid up ships that can enter the market, the supply become 
inelastic.  
Stopford (1997) restricts the cost of supplying shipping services to three categories: 
voyage costs, operating costs, and capital costs. Voyage costs consist mainly of port charges and 
the cost of bunker (fuel). These costs are influenced by ship size and propulsion type. Operation 
costs are incurred regardless of whether the vessel is employed or not; these consist of crew 
costs, repair and maintenance, insurance, and administration costs. The last category is capital, 
which includes depreciation charges on the hull and interest expenses. For a bulk carrier, the 
capital expense is 50% of overall costs, voyage expenses are 30-33% of costs, and operating 
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costs are 17-20% of total costs. These costs can be termed economically as fixed and variable. 
Voyage costs and some operation costs that are flexible in the short run are considered variable 
costs, while the cost of buying a ship and its maintenance costs are fixed. The variable costs are 
eliminated when the ship is laid up. When there is not enough demand for shipping services, 
vessel owners lay up their extra vessels to avoid expenses; these ships will be used again when 
demand increases. 
According to Gregory (2000) the ocean shipping industry is often characterized by 
increasing returns to scale because of the fuller utilization of carrying capacity. The average unit 
cost can simply be reduced by expanding the scale of operations. Another characteristic specific 
to this industry is the mobility of the “plant” compared to most other manufacturing or services 
industries. This ease of movement results in producers’ sensitivity to opportunity costs along 
different routes and a desire to transfer to routes with more demands and higher prices. However, 
some regulations have prohibited ship owners from changing routes.7On the other hand, like 
other services there is no possibility of storing while there is extra capacity along the route. The 
ship has to "lay up" or change routes when there is not enough demand.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the supply and demand functions of the ocean shipping services 
explained above. As can be seen in the diagram, as quantity increases it moves from elastic to 
inelastic in the short run. Due to laid-up ships or the full use of the capacity of ships along 
similar routes, when the demand for shipping services increases from 0D  to 1D , both the price 
and service quantity increase. When the demand shifts to 2D , it reaches the point of no capacity. 
In this situation only the price increases. In the long run, new entrants will shift the supply 
forward resulting in a new equilibrium price. The increase in capacity in the long run is the result 
                                                 
7
 This will be further discussed in the "Policies and Regulations in the Ocean Shipping Industry" section. 
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of the current high rate and the expectation of higher rates in the future. When rates are below 
those required to yield a normal rate of return and if owners expect such rates to continue in the 
immediate future, some existing capacity will be laid up and there will be a backward shift in the 
supply of services. 
In the case of demand for global wheat transportation, demand for shipping services is a function 
of crop yield in the exporting countries, which will be more inelastic when shipments arelarge. 
Therefore, the consumer can decide on shipping services based on the freight rate and the trade 
situation up to the maximum crop yield point.  
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2.3.4 Price determination 
As Marx (1953) indicates in his famous book, “International Shipping Cartels”, the price 
of ocean transportation services, like other services, is subject to the forces of supply and 
demand. The freight rate is affected by any change in the balance of supply and demand of 
shipping services. For instance, the freight rate goes up when there is a shortage of transport 
capacity along a route. In such situations it is likely that the vessels available along the route will 
operate at full capacity, at full speed, and will minimize any avoidable time out of service for 
routine maintenance to maximize revenue. Laid-up vessels are brought back into service again. 
Whereas when there is an oversupply of ships, freight rates fall. The low-performance fleets and 
those that cannot cover their operating costs are laid-up and other fleets decrease their 
performance level for instance, they will reduce speed to conserve fuel. 
In order to determine whether ocean freight markets operate in a competitive market, and 
the factors causing market power in this industry, a historical review of ocean freight market 
(OFM) is useful. This history will help with understanding the current market structure of this 
industry. The following section briefly reviews the historical evolution of OFM. 
2.4 Ocean Freight Market Characteristics 
Liner shipping and tramp shipping, two different options for bulk movement, operate 
under different market regimes. Liners are active under the conferences, while tramps’ market is 
a more competitive one. It is important to be familiar with both of these markets since both of 
them are used in wheat movement. The definition and formation of the conferences are discussed 
in the coming section, followed by an examination of relevant regulations and market 
characteristics of tramp carriers and the charter market.  
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2.4.1 Historical Changes in Ocean Shipping Markets 
Bulk shipping has played a significant role in seaborne transportation from old ages to the 
present. People have always been looking for the best and most economical way of transporting 
commodities. According to Stopford (1997), 2000 years ago Romans used ships to carry grain 
from Africa. Because of the dependence of seaborne transportation on unpredictable and 
uncontrollable factors like wind and weather, and also a lack of communication services, the 
shipping industry could not offer regular sailing routes in the past. Changes in technology and a 
constant growth in trade have changed this. Technology has helped temper uncontrollable 
factors, and tremendous changes in communication facilities and services have turned the ocean 
shipping industry into a more viable mode of transportation for trade. Technological changes in 
the mid-19th century and the growth of trade precipitated the development of the bulk shipping 
industry that exists today.  
The invention of the steam ship completely changed shipping methods. Regular 
schedules, improvements in postal facilities, and the laying of transoceanic cables made it 
possible for traders to send goods to market with precision. This as Marx (1953) says “permitted 
an increase in the total volume of trade.” According to Marx, soon after the revolution in the 
ocean shipping industry with the introduction of steam ships, increasing economy ofscale 
encouraged shipping companies 8to use bigger vessels with greater capacity. They improved 
speeds and offered more reliable schedules such that ships could sail on advertised dates whether 
they were full or not. As a result, the potential profits from the industry attracted new players and 
shipping companies started to compete. Soon after these changes, the supply of shipping services 
                                                 
8
 Like all other transportation services, the ocean shipping industry is often characterized by increasing returns to scale because 
of the fuller utilization of carrying capacity, and at times the average unit cost can be reduced by expanding the scale of 
operations. 
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exceeded the demand and, according to Marx, “bitter cutthroat competition” followed as a 
consequence of this increasing supply. The freight rate decreased to unprofitable levels. 
Consequently some shipping lines failed, but their ships remained and the excess of supply over 
demand continued. The surviving shipping companies responded to this failure by combining 
their resources, making special contracts with large-scale traders, and forming organizations 
called “conferences” to eliminate the competition and its impact on the freight rate to remain in 
the business. 9 
According to Sjostorom (2004), the conference system spread rapidly and soon included 
most of the world’s liner routes. Some conferences covered traffic in both directions along a 
route and some in one direction only. They started to capture more shares and market power with 
certain rules and contracts. There have been several studies on the formation, nature, failure of 
the conferences.  
2.4.2 Conferences: Definitions and Theories 
This section reviews the definition of the conferences, the literature on theories that 
explain their structure, and the necessary market key points that help to understand the 
conferences structure. 
Marx (1953) defines shipping conferences, or rings, as “. . . agreements organized by 
shipping lines to restrict or eliminate competition, to regulate and rationalize sailing schedules 
and ports of call, and occasionally to arrange for the pooling of cargo, freight monies or net 
earnings. They generally control prices, i.e. freight rates and passenger fares. The nature of their 
organization varies considerably, depending on the market structure of the trade route. Some 
                                                 
9
  Conferences are organizations of shipping lines operating along a particular route. The U.K. Calcutta conference is usually 
described as the first conference (Sjostrom 2004). 
 28 
 
have been conferences quite literally, informal oral conferences, but many have employed 
written agreements establishing a permanent body with a chairman or secretary, and containing 
carefully described rights and obligations of the conference membership . . .” Marx’s definition 
of conferences shows the broad range of activities and realms of influence enjoyed by shipping 
service providers. Many researchers tried to address the essence and performance of the shipping 
conferences based on market structure theories. Monopoly, cartel behavior, oligopoly, and 
alliances are some theories for the market regime that conferences formed. Alfred Marshall 
(1921) argued that shipping conferences could act as monopoly because there were substantial 
economies of scale in the industry that led to a small number of firms.  
McGee (1960), Bennathan& Walters (1969), Fox (1992, 1994, and 1995),Clyde&Reitzes (1998), 
andPodolny& Morton (1999) investigated cartel behavior in shipping conferences. According to 
Clyde &Reitzes (1995) the regulation of world maritime transportation has caused conference 
cartel to fail. The coming paragraphs examine the definition of cartels to clarify this researches 
focus on conference market structure.10 
According to Carlton &Perloff (2004), a cartel is an arrangement among small numbers of firms 
to act as joint monopolists to control prices and increase profit. In a perfect competition situation, 
the output is allocated automatically based on demand and supply and a single producer or 
consumer can’t affect it. In a competitive market without collusion, each profit-maximizing firm 
produces outputs such that the marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue; in a cartel, the firms 
do not act individually. There is collusion among firms to set either the price or the quantity and 
participants are limited to the set price or production quantity. To establish a cartel, there should 
                                                 
10
There are other theories that have tried to explain the performance of conferences like categories of explanations arose largely 
as responses to the cartel model. Contestable market (Sjostrom 2002), destructive competition and its modern variant, the empty 
cores models are alternative explanations of why conferences exist. These theories are beyond the scope of this research. 
 
 29 
 
be incentives greater than those available to an individual make without cooperating, given the 
legal liability of joining a cartel11. The elasticity of demand and the cartel’s ability to set the price 
above the non-cartel prices a resourceof potential profits. The more inelastic the demand curve, 
and therefore the greater potential profits from higher price fixing, the more likely firms are to 
join or form a cartel. There are other factors that influence the sustainability and efficiency of a 
cartel by affecting this initial incentive. The formation of a cartel may seem reasonable in an 
industry like ocean shipping, but according to Dick (1996) a cartel’s longevity is dependent on 
the cost of self-enforcement and its value to members. This cost can be greatly affected by the 
number of cartel members and the entry of non-member firms and substitutes. When the number 
of participants in a cartel goes up, it is harder to monitor the members and as a result the cartel 
member control cost rises and cartel cheaters push the product price down. The price is also 
affected by the entrance of new firms to a cartel. According to Schmalenzee (1992), an increase 
in the level of profit in the industry may induce other firms to enter the cartel; increasing the 
number of firms in the cartel consequently will push the product price down in the long run. 
Changes in the number of firms in the cartel depend on the terms and conditions of entrance to 
the cartel. The cartel price also depends on the cartel’s market share compared to competitors in 
the industry. If the cartel has only a small share of the relevant market, which includes all close 
substitutes produced in other industries, it cannot influence the market price, even if all similar 
firms make a cartel and raise the price.  
As per Perloff& Carlton (2004), the other necessary basis for establishing a cartel is the 
ability to avoid charges of collusion. In some countries there are antitrust regulations for some   
                                                 
11
There are a number of text books and papers that address the issue of cartel organization and sustainability. In this part I have 
mostly use the definitions in the Perloff and Carleton (2004) industrial organization book. 
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industries that forbid establishing cartels, such as the Sherman Act in the U.S.  Large penalties 
reduce the incentive to form cartels.  
According to Carlton &Perloff, the third essential factor in the formation of a cartel is 
low organizational costs which depend on a number of factors: the number of firms in the cartel, 
market concentration, and the degree of differentiation among products in the industry. If the 
number of participating firms grows, the organization costs become larger given more complex 
negotiations. As the number of rivals increases, the lower the market concentration and power, 
and the greater the organizational costs of gathering information on rivals’ activities and harder 
challenges to gain a greater market share for the cartel, and more expenses to prevent cheating. If 
the firms engaged in a cartel produce similar products, supervision expenses and therefore the 
organizational costs decrease. When cartel member firms’ products are of varying quality and 
specifications, it is harder to agree on a relative price and avoid cheating when there is more than 
a single commodity and price. 
After the technological changes and increased capacity of vessels in the early 1880s, 
excess supply in shipping services pushed shipping rates down, causing many firms to fail. 
Conferences were a reaction to these trends, ensuring the survival of firms by increasing the 
freight rates and restricting or eliminating the competition. The new born conferences agreed to 
develop some barriers to restrict the number of firms in the cartel and prevent the falling prices 
that arise from competition from new entrants. The first key element of a cartel’s foundation, “its 
ability to increase the competitive price level,” was satisfied by historical structural changes in 
its shipping industry and firms’ moves to sustain the industry by creating entry barriers to 
conferences, guarantying cartel-level prices and long-run benefits for participants in the process.  
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In transforming shipping companies from competitive firms to conference cartels, 
conference members needed to investigate the punishment for forming a cartel. This cost should 
have been low relative to the expected gains. The anti-trust immunity law12 protected shipping 
cartels and assured their sustainability. As mentioned by Herman (1983)and Clyde &Reitzes 
(1995), since 1870 ocean carriers could enter into price-fixing agreements that were exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny and litigation in most of the world. As a result of this exemption, the potential 
costs of entering into collusive agreements, and expected punishment were lowered and another 
essential factor for cartel sustainability was guaranteed.  
Control over the number of entrants and detection of cheating in the cartel are other 
preconditions for the sustainability of cartel conferences. According to Stigler (1983), the 
primary issue for any monopolizing cartel is enforcement. In a cartel, each firm produces a 
restricted amount of output such that the marginal cost is less than the price, giving each firm an 
incentive to raise output above the agreed level and upset the cartel arrangement. “Enforcement” 
means to detect output increases and punish members that violate such restrictions.  A successful 
cartel should be able to detect cheaters and penalize them; individual members have a large 
incentive to cheat or “chisel.”  Figure 2-3 illustrates the increase in a cartel member’s profit due 
to chiseling. The representative shipping firm would operate at price of Pc and produce qcunits of 
output. The competitive output of the industry will occur at the intersection of this supply curve 
with the market demand curve. Establishing a cartel causes the production level to fall such that 
marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC), which guarantees that profits are maximized. 
The cartel increases its profits by lowering the aggregate cartel output to Qm. 
                                                 
12
Antitrust or competition laws are laws that prohibit anti-competitive behavior and unfair business practices. Conferences in 
ocean shipping have existed since the late 1800's on U.S. international routes. Since then, they have been granted varying degrees 
of antitrust immunity under the Shipping Act of 1916. 
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where MR equals MC, with the price at Pm. Assuming the cartel is made up of n identical 
firms, each firm would reduce its level of production to qm=Qm/n. However, the price level set by 
the cartel creates incentives for individual firms to increase output to q*. 
According to Prentice (1998), improvements to the containerized shipping services in 
recent decades have made it harder to keep cartel members from cheating, because they may 
easily offer more differentiated services that attract customers.  
Cartels must also control the number of entrants, often through liner conferences. There 
are different types of the conferences, identified by to the concept of entrants of the new 
members.As mentioned earlier, non-member firms’ or a close substitute’s, entrance into the 
market prevents a cartel from raising its prices. According to Sjostorom (1989), there is a 
significant difference between types of new entrants. Some entrants are called potential entrants 
while others are potential producers. Potential entrants are the firms that have not yet committed 
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Figure 2- 3 Cartel Members’ Incentive to “Chisel” 
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to sunk costs. Sunk costs are what a firm incurs in order to enter the industry, and these costs are 
avoidable only in the long run. Firms that have incurred those costs must decide whether to 
produce having incurred sank costs. When a potential producer starts to produce, it becomes an 
active producer. In the ocean shipping industry, a firm that decides to provide ocean shipping 
services must first purchase a ship, which is largely a sunk investment. Once the ship is 
purchased, the firm must decide whether to operate the ship and thereby incur the short-run costs 
such as crew and fuel costs. Before the ship is purchased, the firm is a potential entrant. After the 
investment in purchasing the ship, but before the firm goes through the variable costs level and 
decides whether to produce, the firm is a potential producer. When the firm begins to produce, it 
is an active producer. Therefore the difference between the potential entrants and the ship owners 
should be noted in other routes or laid-up vessels. Sjostrom(1989) makes the definition more 
precise by specifying some assumptions in costs of negotiations in the industry. As he mentions, 
in an industry in which it is costly to negotiate and renegotiate contracts before they are made 
binding, firms and their customers complete the contracts before any production occurs. As a 
result there are no sunk costs and consequently all potential entrants are automatically potential 
producers. Accordingly, when the market price falls below the firm’s minimum average cost, the 
firm can drop its offer and prevent any losses until the price increases again. However, in the 
liner shipping industry the initial investment costs of buying ships is high and it is a barrier for 
potential entrants. All other ships along different routes or laid-up ships along the same route are 
“potential producers,” while there may be some “potential entrants” that may find the route 
attractive enough to make some sunk investments and enter the route.  
Conferences were established to save shipping firms from collapsing, and therefore they 
set certain barriers to deter new entrants. Based on the available literature on conferences, there 
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are two types of conferences: “close” or “open” conferences. The Trade and Export Finance 
Online (TEFO) glossary defines an “open” conference as a “shipping conference in which there 
are no restrictions upon membership other than ability and willingness to serve the trade and 
abide by the rules of the conference,” while in a “closed” conference, potential entrants face 
barriers to enter. As Sjostrom (2004) mentions in the OECD (2001), by 1916 conferences around 
the world, except for routes to or from the United States, were closed. The U.S. Shipping Act of 
1916 requires conferences to be open on trade routes to or from the United States. This Act 
basically forbid conferences from restricting potential entrants; eventually, according to Herman 
(1983), since the Act was not entirely clear, open conferences could restrict entry by imposing 
entry fees and by challenging the ability of the entrant to provide common carrier service. 
McGee (1960) gives six examples of entrants blocked from the U.S. conferences that appealed to 
the U.S. Shipping Board (established by the 1916 Shipping Act); but their appeals were rejected. 
The shipping Acts were amended or elaborated upon in further Acts that will be discussed later 
in this chapter.13A historical review of the shipping conferences reveals that despite legal 
restrictions, their attempt to restrict entry into the industry was highly successful in preventing 
the entry of non-conference members. 
While conferences were trying to restrict conference membership and have more control 
over members, their market share along a particular route was always threatened by nonmember 
rivals. As a response to this threat, they used “predatory pricing” and “loyalty contract” 
practices, as Letwin (1965) and Yamey (1972) explain. Sjostorom (1989) has described 
conferences’ hiring “fighting” ships to put non-conference carriers out of business whenever 
                                                 
13 Section 2.4.3 Regulation on ocean shipping industry 
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there were no legal restrictions14. These fighting ships were hired or subsidized by the 
conference to follow a non conference vessel from port to port and undercut their rates. As soon 
as the “discounter” withdrew from the route, rates went up to the conference level again. 
“Deferred rebates” and “patronage contracts” were other tools that conferences used to reduce 
the incentive for shippers to switch to cheaper non-conference carriers. As Marx (1953) 
mentions, conferences used to have two kinds of loyalty contracts: the deferred rebate and the 
dual rate contract (sometimes called contract rates)15. In the deferred rebate system, if the shipper 
chose to use conference services for a certain length of time, he or she will receive a rebate of an 
agreed upon proportion of his or her freight bill during that time.16Under the dual rate contract 
system, the shipper is restricted to using the service with a lower freight rate from a specific 
conference, signing an agreement to deal completely with this conference. In turn, if the shipper 
uses a non-conference carrier, the conference imposes a fine. According to McGee (1960), the 
two important distinctions between these two systems relate to price fluctuations and 
enforcement costs. Under the deferred rebate system, the shipper loses interest on the price cut 
and the conference bears lower enforcement costs because it does not have to enforce the fine by 
going to court.17Perhaps because of these differences, discounts under deferred rebates tended to 
be larger than under dual rate contracts. Marx (1953) states that discounts under the deferred 
rebate system before legal restrictions, were typically double the size of the other methods. 
                                                 
14
For instance, based on the Merchant Shipping Act of 1982 in England, members of a conference shall not use 
fighting ships in the conference for the purpose of excluding, preventing or reducing competition. 
 
15 Loyalty contracts are designed to persuade customers to use a particular service provider. 
16 The deferred rebate system was prohibited in U.S. trade by the 1916 Shipping Act. 
17(McGee 1960, 232-35). 
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Anyhow, under both systems, the conference must incur the costs of determining whether the 
contract has been broken.  
In the following sections, some of the important policies and regulations that have 
influenced the efficiency of the conferences’ cartel behavior are briefly reviewed.18 These 
regulations are mostly these that have affected antitrust immunity and the cartel operation of 
liner shipping conferences in the North American routes.These have affected the entry of new 
members to the conference and conference price setting, eventually leading to cartels’ 
dissolution.    
2.4.3 Regulations in the Ocean Shipping Industry 
Following technological changes in the ocean shipping industry in the late 1860, hefty 
overhead costs and price wars caused many failures. Mergers and conferences formation 
occurred as a response to these. Ocean shipping service users and exporters started to benefit 
from low rates because of excess supply in the shipping market; in some cases they received 
preferential treatment. But with introduction of the conferences, they started to witness higher 
rates and increased market power within shipping conferences. Shipping service users started to 
complain about the power of the conferences and the limitations that they were putting on world 
trade. Eventually they managed to formulate the regulatory portions of the United States 
Shipping Act of 1916 to protect themselves from the higher prices dictated by shipping 
conferences. But conferences resisted these changes, and despite the legal prohibition looked into 
ways to maintain and even increase their market share. The Act was amended to eliminate 
ambiguities that contributed to the concentration of among shipping companies. The following 
                                                 
18Although this research looks at ocean globally,  the main focus will be the routes from North America and Canada.  
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sections touch on these Acts, from the Shipping Act of 1916 to 1998 (OSRA), the most recent 
and comprehensive Act and their impact on shipping conferences and their market power. 
 
2.4.3.1 The Shipping Act of 1916 
 Marx (1953) mentions the Americans shipping Act of 1916 granted anti-trust immunity 
to shipping companies on one hand but prohibits “deferred rebates,” “fighting ships,” 
discrimination against any shipper, and unfair or unjustly discriminatory contracts with any 
shipper on the other hand.  
According to Max, the most important restrictive aspect of the 1916 Shipping Act was to 
mandate conferences to be open conferences to and from North American seaborne routes. This 
meant cartel could not exclude outsiders from entering the cartels. Also, prohibiting the fighting 
ship system made price controls more difficult for the conferences.  As a result of these 
restrictions, conferences tried to take advantage of “loyalty contracts” to bind costumers to the 
conferences and restrict non-conference competitors. This was likely one of the reasons that the 
Act had to be reviewed and amended.  
2.4.3.2 The Shipping Act of 1984 
Although there had been several discussions of, and minor amendments to, the Shipping 
Act of 1916 after its inception, the most comprehensive modification of it was proposed in 1984. 
In a new amendment, all liners, including conference carriers that call at United States ports, 
were subject to the provisions of the 1984 Shipping Act. Under the regulatory structure defined 
in the Shipping Act of 1984, the conferences were forced to be open so that any carrier may join 
or exit a conference with limited notice, without explicit penalties. As Wilson&Casavant (1991) 
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state, this Shipping Act reduced conference market power by introducing a new provision 
representing “competitive intrusion”.19 
According to the 1984 Shipping Act, all conference and non-conference carriers were 
obligated to report their rates to the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). This obligation 
increased the control over conference and non-conference pricing and helped provide clear 
information to the market.20If any secret discounting from published rates by either a conference 
or independent carrier was detected by the FMC, the involved party was subject to a fine. The 
amendment also removed the freight rate change notice. According to the Act, conference 
members were not obligated to follow the conditional 10 days’ notice of violating conference 
rates publishing their own freight rate on a particular transaction. This rule allowed members to 
of deviate from conferences and increase the incentive to cheat via collusive arrangements, but 
as Clyde and Reitzes (1998) show, the conference still prohibited their members from 
independently entering into contractual agreements with shippers. Fox (1995) looked at this 
provision in the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 and investigated whether the Act made any 
difference to collusive agreements. Under this Act it is expected that public price-cutting 
undercuts conferences because it affects conferences’ enforcement costs. Her research rejected 
this result. According to her, the weak supervision of the FMC and/or the low ratio of fines to 
profit yields were causing this failure. Her results were replicated by Clyde and Reitzes (1998).  
They showed that from 1985 through 1988, the FMC collected approximately $6 million in fines. 
This amount was below 0.1% of the liner shipping industry’s revenue on U.S. international 
                                                 
19These provisions include the Mandatory Right to Independent Action (MIA) and the right to form Service 
Contracts (SC). For more information look  to the Shipping Act of 1984.   
20The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), an agency of the U.S. government, is charged with monitoring and 
enforcing the published rates. 
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routes over this period. This issue prompted another amendment to clarify the legislation and set 
boundaries for the conferences 
2.4.3.3 The Shipping Act of 1998 (OSRA)21 
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) represented a significant change in the 
regulation of the maritime shipping industry by the government of the United States. While some 
of the old practices were maintained in this Act, a number of the aspects of ocean shipping 
practices were changed. One of the major additions was to restrict the power of the shipping 
conferences by prohibiting them from involving themselves in negotiations for service contracts 
apart from collusive agreements. The Act clearly stated that conferences should not require 
members to reveal a negotiation or the terms and conditions of a contract. Conferences were also 
prohibited from adopting mandatory rules affecting member’s right to negotiate for or enter into 
service contracts. However, OSRA left the right of adopting voluntary guidelines relating to the 
terms and conditions of service contracts to the conferences.22 
Lewis and Vellenga (2000) highlight the changes in FMC’s role in the OSRA as another 
major difference between it and past Acts. According to OSRA, rate tariffs reflecting the regular 
(non-service contract) rates charged by the carrier will be published on the Internet instead of 
being filed with the FMC. As a result of this change, the freight rate has to be publicly available, 
but the FMC’s enforcement obligations are eliminated. It appears to add more transparency in 
the market and make entry easier. However, as Lewis and Vellenga state, OSRA’s elimination of 
the tariff-filing requirement and rate enforcement by the FMC raises the member price 
                                                 
21Public Law 105-258, 112 Stat. 902, Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, approved October 14, 1998 (hereafter 
 "OSRA"). 
22"FMC allows guidelines for contracts," American Shipper, 41(4), April 1999, p.10. 
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controlling costs for the conferences. They point out while OSRA is a logical continuation of the 
trend toward deregulation established by the Shipping Act of 1984, its main goal is to provide 
more choice and flexibility for shippers and ocean carriers to enter into contractual relationships 
with shippers for ocean transportation and intermodal services. While the previous legislation 
gave conferences the right to prohibit member firms from entering into service contracts, 
probably the most significant change made by the OSRA is to allow members of ocean carrier 
agreements (such as shipping conferences) to negotiate and enter into confidential service 
contracts with one or more shippers, and to do so independently of the other member carriers. 
Under OSRA, carriers can join together through alliances, or similar agreements, to sign service 
contracts, bypassing their conferences' jurisdiction over a given route. 
Reitzes&Sheran (2002) investigated the outcomes of the OSRA after two years and 
provided evidence of how it affected conferences’ behavior. Based on their report from the FMC, 
between May 1, 1999 and June 30, 1999 (the first two months under the OSRA) 15,000 service 
contracts were signed in comparison to 3,400 in the same period of the previous year. Despite the 
increase in contracts, several conferences broke up. Based on the FMC report in 2000, the 
number of conferences declined from 32 in 1997 to 22 by May 2000 (Reitzes&Sheran (2002)).  
As Reitzes&Sheran note after the OSRA took effect shippers are able to engage in 
contracts with single carriers that could cover multiple trade lanes instead of entering into 
contract agreements with multiple conferences in which each of them covers only a single trade 
lane. Hence, conference stability is affected apparently by the new granted right of individual 
carriers to enter into service contracts covering multiple trade routes. This is one of the important 
causes of the changes in the liner conferences from price-setting cartels to a more competitive 
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market. These changes turned the liner companies into a substitute option for the competitive 
tramp market and prepared the ground for different options for bulk wheat transportation.   
The main objectives of these Acts were to restrict the power of conferences by 
challenging the anti-trust immunity law in the ocean shipping industry.They enforce pressure 
through affecting cartel stability factors like increasing enforcement costs for the conference and 
eliminating entry barriers. Changes in conferences’ market behavior, anti-cartel Acts, and ant-
monopolistic activities helped non-member carriers to become serious competitors. As a result, 
liner shipping has become another option for shippers. 
2.4.4 Tramp Market: Definition and Theories 
The most common method of bulk movement, if there is not a need for specialized 
services, is to use tramp vessels. It means using one ship to carry cargo. The bulk shipping 
market is highly competitive and satisfies many of the characteristics of the perfect competition 
model. As Perloff and Carleton (2004) state, in a competitive market all firms produce 
homogeneous products. Perfect information exists for all of the buyers and sellers, neither the 
buyers nor the sellers incur costs to participate in the market, both are price-takers, and there are 
no externalities. According to the above conditions and the definition of services in the tramp 
market, the characteristics of the services offered in the bulk shipping industry, the firms in the 
industry, and the buyers of services amount to a close to perfect competitive market.  
The process of hiring a bulk ship to move commodity starts with “fixing” the ship. When 
a ship is chartered or a freight rate is agreed upon, the ship is said to be “fixed.” There is cargo to 
be shipped and ship owners have vessels to provide the service, and brokers put the deal 
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together. The following example shows a fixture arrangement.23 Assume a couple of bulk 
carriers, free of cargo, are in a Canadian port and are ready to be fixed along different routes 
from Canada. There are also cargo owners who decide on the type of shipping contract based on 
the quantity, timing, and physical characteristics of their cargo. There is a possibility that the two 
parties could create a contract together, but there is also possibility that the ship owner or cargo 
owner will appoint a shipbroker who may provide them with information on various routes and 
fix the cargo. Finding available cargo or ships, applicable fees, and freight rates are the duties of 
the shipbroker. Brokers compete and try to negotiate a better deal for their clients. As a result, 
the available information plays a significant role. 24 The availability and flow of the information, 
especially after the introduction of on-line information, make the markets very transparent. The 
service offered in the tramp bulk carrier market is almost homogeneous; however, the 
homogeneity of services in the industry depends on the speed, safety, timing, and availability of 
transporting specific commodities.25 Unlike containerized carrier, the bulk carriers are not 
specifically designed for carrying specific commodities, and in this context we assume that they 
offer homogenous service. 
Comparing to liner shipping, tramp shipping has relatively few barriers to entry. Entry 
costs are very low for active carriers along different routes, and many firms are competing for 
business (each ship is considered a separate competitive unit); the commercial structure of the 
                                                 
23“The Tramp Shipping Market.” produced by Clarkson Research Studies can be viewed online at 
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts. (accessed September 2005). 
 
24
Brokers tend to gather in shipping centers. London remains the largest, with other major centers in New York, 
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Piraeus, Oslo, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Bergen, etc. 
 
25The major bulk commodities are iron ore, grain, coal, phosphates and bauxite, which can be transported 
satisfactorily in conventional dry bulk carriers. 
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shipping business allows for the free entry and exit of companies. In addition, the costs of 
operating different types and sizes of vessels can be viewed in companies’ published reports and 
websites, 26 which make it easier for potential investors to estimate future profit levels. 
The freight rate and the need for specialized services are important factors that influence 
service users’ decision-making. When the prices of liner and tramp options are similar, the 
tendency toward containerized liners become pronounced because it is more like a vertically 
differentiated services and in such models apparently the more efficient service is preferred.27 
As discussed, the service-producing side has faced major changes and challenge in the 
past century. Changes include technical and industrial changes that have affected the shipping 
market’s structure and caused major policy changes that influenced their enrollment in the OFM 
and as a result have affected the OFM.  
2.5 Ocean Freight Options 
As Stopford (1997) states bulk cargo transport can be approached by the shipper in 
several different ways depending on the cargo itself and the nature of the commercial operation. 
Choices range from total involvement, by owning one’s own ships, to handing the whole job 
over to a specialist bulk shipper. Some large companies ship substantial quantities of bulk 
materials may run their own shipping fleets to handle a portion of their transport requirements. 
But a shipper with a long-term requirement for bulk transport and no tendency to be actively 
involved as a ship owner may decide to hire or fix a ship from a shipping company.  An 
                                                 
26For instance, the following link available to the general public under Shipping Facts: 
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/ (accessed in June 2011). 
27As per Perloff and Carlton (2004), different types of product or service differentiation exists. If the products 
possess different characteristics, for example different colors, they are differentiated “horizontally.” Some 
consumers will prefer one option and some may prefer the other. If the quality of the services or products is different 
with the same price, in this context the efficiency and quality of containerized handling and transportation, the more 
efficient service is preferred. This is called “vertical” differentiation. 
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individual firm selling agricultural products, such as wheat, does not have  market power in the 
wheat trade. Production is heavily dependent on seasonal factors and the volatility of the market 
plays a significant role for this firm. There are different freight contract possibilities for the firm. 
One of the main goals of the exporter firm is to find the best transportation plan to minimize 
transaction costs. The firm faces two principle costs: the value of the product and the 
transportation cost. In the case of transportation, a buyer usually faces three choices and each 
choice has important implications for the division of responsibilities between buyer and seller: 
Free on Board (FOB), Cost and Freight (CNF) and Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) are the options 
that will be described briefly.28 
2.5.1 Free on Board (FOB) 
United States Grain Council outlines the responsibility of each party in the F.O.B option 
as follows:  
In this option, the commodity is delivered "end spout." It means the seller is not responsible for 
the commodity once it is loaded in the vessel. In the case of wheat, as contractually agreed, the 
seller will produce a certain quantity of wheat, as weighed by the Grain Inspection Service, 
during a specific period and delivered to a specific port or ports. The seller may even be willing 
to agree to a specific elevator if the buyer desires it. This is generally the end of the seller's 
obligations. The buyer is responsible for moving the wheat to the destination country. In the case 
of a shipment moving by sea, this entails the chartering of an ocean going vessel. The buyer's 
responsibilities include appointing agents to oversee loading and documentation, monitoring the 
                                                 
28
The US Grain Council has provided an import manual in which each of these choices is explained; I have used it 
as the main source of the definitions in this section. URL: http://www.grains.org/importer-manual/chapter-1, last 
visited June 2011 
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vessel's progress as it sails, and settling claims with the vessel loader in addition to chartering the 
vessel.29 
2.5.2 Cost and Freight (CNF): 
In this case, the seller contractually agrees to deliver the commodity to the destination of 
the buyer's choice and the buyer is in charge of arranging for the availability of discharge 
facilities. The buyer usually has to specify, and guarantee, the port conditions (draft, available 
berth, and so forth) at the destination. Title passes upon the issuance of bills of lading even if the 
buyer has not actually paid for the commodity. Those bills of lading, along with the rest of the 
vessel's documentation, are what the seller will use to collect payment due under the contract. 
Since the buyer has bought the commodity delivered, the importer "owns" the commodity on 
board the vessel even though it is still weeks from its destination. Consequently, the buyer 
should insure the value of that cargo against losses.30 
2.5.3 Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF): 
This option is quite similar to CNF except that the seller is responsible for insuring the 
value of the cargo. This method is used for exporters who load cargo without a prearranged sale, 
hoping to find a buyer once the commodity is on the vessel. Therefore, the seller will be self-
insuring the cargo and will deliver it via CIF at the appropriate time.31 
In all of the above cases, the wheat may be transported by a competitive tramp carrier or 
a specialized container that belongs to a conference according to the needs of the buyer. 
Regardless of the contract shipping options and the type of services that the parties may choose, 
                                                 
29
U.S. Grains Council – Importer Manual, Chapter 5, p. 67. 
30
Same source as the foot note 30 and 31. 
31
Same source as the foot note 30 and 31.  
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they are normally price-takers in ocean freight markets. The transportation price will be added   
per tonne-age and mileage and all other costs will be added to the price of the wheat in producing 
company. Therefore our model will not be affected by the type of contract between the seller and 
the buyer, unless one of them has market power on the ocean freight transportation. This case is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and can be investigated in further studies. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
World trade growth is accelerating even more rapidly than it has in past centuries and as a 
result there is a growing demand for the derived maritime transportation demand. Grain traders, 
specifically wheat traders, select maritime freight as the most appropriate mode of transportation 
since there is an economy of scale and it minimizes the cost of trade. In terms of moving wheat, 
there are two different types of ocean transportation modes: containerized ships that are mostly 
under the regulation of the liner shipping industry, and conferences and bulk ships active either 
in the tramp shipping industry or the liner industry.  Whereas the bulk shipping market shows 
competitive characteristics, liner shipping conferences are more concentrated. Both of these 
services are used to ship wheat across the world, but as mentioned in the past chapter, there is a 
trend toward hiring containerized services since this market is moving toward competitiveness 
and offers more efficient services.  
The investigation about market structure of the liner and bulk shipping appeals that while 
the bulk shipping market is operating in a nearly competitive market, the liner shipping 
conferences have a more concentrated market. These conferences used to act as cartels. As 
discussed, research has addressed the market structure of shipping conferences and debated the 
efficiency of the cartels. Recent shipping acts, especially the OSRA, resulted in the failure of the 
cartels and limited their market power. They had to offer rates and services comparable with 
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those of conference operators from independent shipping lines to be able to stay in the business. 
This leads the industry to a more competitive operating system and more choices for consumers 
of transportation services. The regulations have affected anti-trust immunity in the industry and 
have reduced barriers to entry in such a way that the conference cartels have fallen apart. As a 
result, they are now a substitute mode of transportation for bulk carriers. Apart from the impact 
of the historical organizational structure that has increased the tendency toward hiring 
containerized liners, other factors like special consumer preferences and especially Identity 
Preservation (IP) are contribute to using container liners. This may have affected the use of more 
specified containers and, one can argue, the homogeneity of the shipping services offered by 
different companies. This concept is beyond the scope of this thesis and can be investigated in 
future studies. Easier handling and transportation, storage capability and port facilities are some 
other factors that were discussed in this chapter as motivates for ocean transportation service 
users to choose container liners. Assuming the entry of a competing containerized vessel along a 
specific route, the freight rate will fall. There is always a possibility that a decrease in the freight 
rate will affect the balance of the relative freight rates such that shippers switch from bulk ships 
to container ships because of vertical differentiation.    
Exporters and importers face different freight options such as CIF, FOB, and CNF. No 
matter which option is chosen, both parties try to minimize their trade costs, which allow for the 
hiring any of the freight options in this trade model without being concerned with structural 
changes in the model. Considering the tremendous number of bulk commodities, service users, 
especially grain and wheat producers, are generally price-takers in the ocean transportation 
market. 
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Chapter 3 is a review of the spatial trade models, resulting in a trade framework that 
shows the changes in bulk flow that come from the changes in relative freight rates along 
different routes globally.  Following  market behavior, the coming chapter will focus on the 
impact of freight rate fluctuations on bulk flow regardless of the source of fluctuation and 
assuming that the service users are price-takers. There will be an attempt to quantify the reaction 
of grain traders and follow the changes in grain movement because of the changes in ocean 
freight rates. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICALFRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
The Chapter 2 of this thesis examined the structure of the ocean transportation market 
and the various choices available to wheat trade parties for ocean shipping. Regardless of 
whether tramps or liners are used, wheat movers can be assumed to be price takers in this 
market. This chapter outlines a theoretical model to examine how the fluctuation in 
transportation costs may affect production, consumption, and trade flows. This theoretical model 
will be used as a framework to develop a simulation model of the international wheat market in 
Chapter 4. This simulation model will show whether the impact of transportation costs can be 
captured immediately and responded to maintain the market share. If so, the market players can 
use this tool to help with the exporters' decision-making as regards setting competitive prices and 
maintaining or increasing their share in regions in which they may have comparative advantage. 
In order to construct a theoretical trade model and answer the main question of this 
research, we need to define the vertical supply chain and clarify the role of ocean transportation 
in wheat flow across the world. To get to this point, we need to know more about the 
specifications of the traded commodity (in this context, wheat), its logistics, and identify the 
market players, supply chain levels, and related assumptions that can help us to narrow down the 
applicable models.  
First, an overview of the global wheat market and its logistics, with a focus on ocean 
transportation, will be provided. Next, the literature of trade theories that have considered the 
issue of transportation as a factor in commodity flow will be reviewed to find an appropriate 
framework to explain wheat trade patterns with respect to ocean transportation. The Armington 
framework will be discussed, as the seemingly appropriate framework for this study; finally, a 
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market simulation model of the wheat trade will be applied to three exemplar countries, 
considering ocean freight transportation as a viable mode of transportation. The last section of 
this chapter will summarize our findings. 
3.2 An Overview of the Wheat Market and Logistics 
The logistics concern the intermediate level in the supply chain of a product; in order to 
analyze and determine the logistics of a good and its impact on the different levels of the supply 
chain, we need to have some knowledge about the initial product, its market characteristics, and 
the various market players, as well as the logistical steps, market characteristics, and the final 
product.  The movement of wheat from the point of export to the importing destination is the 
process under investigation in this thesis. Wheat in the exporting and importing gates will be the 
initial and final product, respectively, and ocean transportation is the intermediate level on which 
we will focus in this thesis. In particular we must have some basic knowledge about the ocean 
freight process, which is the main subject of this research. In chapter 2, we explained the various 
available options from an economical point of view. We explained the market of each option and 
the availability of services. In this section, a brief explanation about the players in the world 
wheat market will be provided and then technologies at the processing level will be reviewed. 
We will also briefly examine the supply chain using either the bulk or container systems.  
One should note that the trade flow of a commodity depends on a variety of 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. In the case of wheat, these factors and their impacts 
have been the subject of many studies. Some microeconomic factors include characteristics that 
affect the supply and demand of wheat, such as quality, available substitutes, yield- and 
production-affecting factors, prices, and spatial considerations. The economic situation, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and per-capita income, and the country’s population growth are 
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examples of macroeconomic factors. Additional factors such as exchange rates, transportation 
and fuel rates, major players’ policies and international trade issues, and many other factors can 
be measured and focused on in research and calculations. In this research we only focus on a 
single factor, that of ocean transportation. Even the effects of the factors that influence the ocean 
transportation costs are considered exogenous and shown as changes in ocean freight rates in this 
research. A breakdown of the world wheat market will be provided in the next sections, keeping 
in mind those policies and other factors outside of transportation are not within the scope of this 
study.   
Wheat is produced and used in many regions of the world. To set up a global trade model 
for wheat, it is important to know the main players in the global wheat market. In the first part of 
this section we look briefly into world wheat production, consumption, export, and import.  
3.2.1 World Wheat Market Players 
Wheat is a common grain produced and used in much of the world. While wheat is 
consumed all over the world, some regions do not have the required conditions for growing this 
grain or do not have a comparative advantage in producing it. Therefore, wheat is heavily traded 
across the world, from regions that have excess supply to regions with excess demand.  The 
average global per-capita consumption of wheat has been reported at 79.1 kg annually (Canadian 
Wheat Board 2011-12 forecast report). The global trade in wheat, including flour and durum, is 
increasing. The available statistics for wheat show that some countries play a dual role, being 
both buyer and seller, in the wheat market. Some big producers are not necessarily big exporters, 
and some major exporting regions are among the biggest producers of wheat. 
As per statistics retrieved from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) International Grain Council in 2009, the first ten wheat producing countries in 
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order were China, India, Russia, United States, France, Canada, Germany, Pakistan, Australia, 
and Ukraine. The European Union (EU) is the largest wheat-producing region, with a total 
production of 138.7 million tons of product in 2009.  
As for wheat exports, in the context of a relatively open global market there is a large 
number of wheat producers competing for a share of the market while some are dominant 
players.  The United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Argentina are, and for 
many years have been the main players on the supply side and are the principal sources of wheat 
globally.32 As mentioned, some of these players play a dual role in the wheat market. For 
instance, the United States is one of the world’s largest wheat producing and exportingcountries, 
yet imports a significant amount of wheat.  We should note that not all of the big producers are 
necessarily big exporters of wheat, and big exporters are not necessarily producing the largest 
amount of wheat in the global market. Also, while some of the suppliers in exporting countries 
act as individual competitors in the market, in some other exporting countries (up to 2007) there 
are big single-seller desks like the Canadian Wheat Board and the former Australian Wheat 
Board or large multinational grain merchants such as Cargill. Different players, depending on 
their share in the market, may affect the global wheat market in different ways as a result of 
changes in their strategies and policies. However, in this context we ignore these types of 
impacts. 
All countries and regions in the world consume wheat for different purposes and with a 
variety of preferences. The domestic supply of wheat within a region is rarely the only source. 
With the exception of Canada and Australia, all regions of the world are dependent on both 
domestic and foreign sources of wheat. The demand side is also affected by factors that have 
direct and indirect impacts on the price of a specific type of wheat, as well as the price of 
                                                 
32Same source 
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substitute products (the same type of wheat produced in other regions, or another type of wheat 
or grain). In general, the availability of substitutes for different types of wheat, or even substitute 
starch sources such as rice, cultural differences in diet, and reliance on a single-buyer, such as in 
China are important factors that the literature shows has an effect on the demand for wheat in the 
market. 
The dual role of some regions as both exporters and importers is very important and 
worth giving special attention to in this context. As Sumner and Boltuck (2001) mention, this 
dual role may arise for different reasons. It can arise as a result of natural internal trading 
patterns that economize on shipping costs and reflect demand for distinct classes or quantities of 
wheat. For instance, many urban marketing areas within the United States are within a cheaper 
shipping distance to Canadian sources, turning the Canadian wheat into a more attractive good in 
that area compared to US-produced wheat. Similarly, many US wheat-growing sources are 
located within cheaper shipping distance to ocean ports than to domestic demand centers and are 
therefore more appropriate for export purposes. Besides, the type of the wheat cultivated in a 
specific region may not be the exact variety demanded by the consumers in that region. 
Included in the above paragraphs were a few highlights of the characteristics of the wheat 
market. The market players will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis, at which 
point we will divide the whole market into different regions and construct a framework for the 
empirical model. The next section will examine how ocean transportation affects wheat’s 
movement from one region to another and will provide some information about wheat logistics.  
3.2.2 Wheat Logistics 
The internal and external logistics of wheat has been a hot topic in wheat-related studies.  
Figure 1-1 in Chapter 1shows a simplified summary of wheat’s journey from farm gate to the 
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destination country and consumer. This thesis is mainly concerned with transportation from the 
exporting country’s port to the importing country’s port. The availability of the required facilities 
in the origin and destination ports, special requests from buyers, and the amount of cargo all 
affect ocean shipping choices. The following paragraphs will address some of the key points 
concerning the logistics of wheat. 
Generally wheat destined for export should move from primary elevators to terminal 
elevators in the exporting ports of the country. Depending on the location of the farm elevator 
and terminal elevator, there may be different options available. Trucks, rail cars, or barges are 
the main options.33 
In Canada’s case, the main exporting ports are Thunder Bay, Vancouver, Prince Rupert, 
and Churchill.34There have been several studies that address different aspects of the inland 
handling and transportation of wheat in Canada for instance Baylis (1998). After the wheat 
reaches the terminal elevator, the vessel is loaded. The type of loading vessels will depend on the 
size of the vessel, dock depth, and the number and variety of grains stored in the elevator. In 
some locations, the ship has to be half-loaded and the rest is loaded in deeper sections of the sea. 
The movement of wheat from Thunder Bay to the Atlantic is via the Great Lakes St. Lawrence 
Seaway System. This is an inland water route of about 2400 km. As per the Coasting Trade Act, 
if there is not a suitable Canadian vessel available, Canadian residents can apply for permission 
to bring a foreign flagged vessel into Canadian waters for a specific period. 35The cost associated 
                                                 
33
Handling from farm gate to primary elevator and from primary elevator to the terminal elevators are not in the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
34Grain and Oilseeds: Handling, Marketing, Processing, Volume I, 4th edition 1993  
35Canadian Transportation Agency, https://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/doc.php?sid=1086&lang=eng, Link accessed in July 
2011. 
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with this Act is not considered in this study and we assume that the movers can simply access 
flagged ships along different routes. Most of the grain is shipped via bulk carriers. 
As explained in Chapter 2, bulk and container carriers are different viable ocean 
transportation options to ship grain. Although bulk movement is the dominant mode of ocean 
transportation, one should be aware of the existence of, and increasing trend toward, 
containerized movement since the relatively stable and declining cost of container shipping has 
made it a more attractive option during the past decade. But despite the recent trend, there are 
some limitations for the containerized shipping method in the movement of grain. Container 
availability (both in terms of location and load unit), the seasonality of agriculture products, the 
availability of empty containers in the route, container size, port facility for loading and 
unloading, terminal issues, and container preparation36 are some factors that have limited the use 
of containers in moving agricultural products, especially grains. Nowadays 10 percent of 
Canadian grain is being shipped via containers, but bulk movement still remains the dominant 
mode of ocean transportation. We can tentatively accept that all ocean freight service users, of 
both liner ships and tramp bulk ships, are price takers. If comparing two services is the goal of a 
study, one need to examine all of the steps of handling and transportation, from farm gate to 
loading the vessel; according to Kosior (2002), the steps involved with handling and storage for 
the two methods are significantly different and they require different port facilities. Appendix A 
shows the flow map of shipping wheat via container and bulk carrier. 
After a review of the initial and final product and the mode of transportation, we will see 
how the transportation system enters trade models.  
 
                                                 
36 Many products require a container to be thoroughly cleaned before being loaded to avoid any form of shipment 
contamination. 
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3.3 Literature Review of Transportation Role in Trade Models 
The subject of the flow of commodities is neither a new nor an uncommon issue in 
geographic and trade economics literature. Many researchers ranging from regional scientists and 
geographers (Israd(1951); Bon(1984)) to international trade theorists (Frankel & Wei (1998); 
Krugman(1980)), transportation planners, and spatial interaction modelers, have worked on the 
issue and have developed and employed a variety of methods of modeling the movement of 
commodities. Intervening opportunities models (Fotheringham(1983), optimization 
models(Wilson (2005)), general equilibrium models such as inter- and multi-regional input-
output models, conventional gravity models (Celik&Guldmann (2002)), regression-based 
models, and Artificial Neural Network (ANN) models (Doughetry (1995),Cleik (2004)),  are all 
methods that have been applied to modeling commodity transportation. 
Ever since the role of transportation found its place in trade theories, economists have 
proposed various models to predict patterns of trade and analyze the effects of transportation. As 
Corden(1984) mentions in the older literature, either the transportation cost is missing and the 
researcher has regretted the absence of transportation costs in trade theory, or the researcher 
suggests the role it might play if it were introduced; unfortunately, in the past, it has not gone 
further than that.  Fujita et al. (1999) believe the lack of addressing this issue was not because of 
the economists’ lack of interest or knowledge, but because of a limitation in tools. The 
development of modeling tricks to analyze industrial organizations, international trade, and 
economic growth has made it an easier and more viable field within which to work and has made 
researchers more willing to work on trade now that they can consider transaction costs and their 
effects and combine these issues with economic geography. 
Geography and space entered into the framework of trade models after Enke (1951) and 
Samuelson’s iceberg theory (1952). Since then, the literature of trade theories can be divided 
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between spatial and non-spatial models. The first category, as mentioned, goes back to papers by 
Enke (1951) and Samuelson (1952) on Spatial Price Equilibrium (SPE). In this category, world 
trade in a single commodity or homogeneous commodity space is considered. The backbone of 
the model is classical demand and supply curves for the commodity in each country and bilateral 
transportation costs between countries. 
In the SPE problem, one seeks to calculate the commodity supply and demand prices and 
find the trade flows satisfying the equilibrium condition that the demand price is equal to the 
supply price plus the cost of transportation; there is no trade between the pair of supply and 
demand markets if the demand price is less than supply price plus the transportation cost. 
Samuelson (1952) showed that the prices and commodity flows satisfying the SPE 
conditions could be determined by solving a mathematical programming problem. He assumed 
that part of the goods to be delivered is consumed by the transportation cost. 
Fox (1953) and Judge and Takayama& Judge (1971) are sample papers based on the 
Samuelson-Enke SPE model.Fox(1953) presents the first empirical application of this approach, 
estimating an SPE model of the livestock feed industry in the United States. Takayama& Judge 
(1971) provide a textbook treatment of the approach and describe numerous extensions and 
generalizations. More recently, economists have developed several global spatial price 
equilibrium models, such as the World Dairy Markets Model (Cox et al. 1999) and the Global 
Forest Products Model such as that which Baughman (2004) presents. 
One of the main assumptions in  SPE-based models is that goods produced in different 
regions are perfect substitutes for one another, that each region has classical demand and supply 
curves for commodities, and that there are bilateral transportation costs between pairs of regions. 
SPE is a set of region-specific prices and quantities produced, consumed, and traded, such that 
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all markets clear and there is no arbitrage. This approach, while relatively easy to apply, has a 
major shortcoming as a consequence of the perfect substitution assumption. As Srivastava (1997) 
mentioned, the spatial and non-spatial models that consider domestically produced and imported 
goods perfect substitutes have not adequately explained historical trade flows. The reason is that 
two countries trade the same commodity not only because of the transportation cost differences, 
but also because of quality differences (and other differences) in the two products based on the 
source. 
There are some studies with a focus on grain and agricultural products and ocean freight. 
However despite the focus on agricultural product, identifying the overtime trend of ocean 
freight rates or costs has been the main objective of these studies. Wilson et al. (2005) used an 
optimization-based model and stated that changes in the world grain market affect the spatial 
distribution of grain flows. Based on spatial equilibrium theory and a transport optimization 
problem, Wilson et al. (2005) investigated the effects of ocean freight rate changes on the United 
States’ grain distribution. Identifying the ocean freight rate as a major factor in the shipment 
patterns of grain, they used a cross-sectional econometric model to evaluate structural changes 
and price differentials in ocean freight rates for grain shipments from U.S. ports to various major 
importing countries. They limited their cost factors to distance and ship size, and they considered 
other factors including shipping seasons, shipping frequencies, multiple destinations, commodity 
types, and port and storage characteristics of origins and destinations. Their results show that 
cost factors play a significant role in determining ocean freight rates. Like Jonalla et al. (2002), 
they found that the freight rate increases when the distance between the country of origin and the 
destination increases, and the ocean shipping industry charges different rates by season and 
commodity. They emphasized the structural changes in the ocean freight rate during the period 
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from 1987 to 1998. However, they do not make comparison among various countries, relative 
distances, and the sensitivity of the wheat flow to the changes in freight rate.   
Jonnala et al. (2002) follow a GARCH37 approach in modeling ocean freight rates for 
grain, empirically examining the major factors that affect them. By employing a directed 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic error process they developed ocean freight rate 
equations. Based on their results, the voyage distance, ship size, contract terms, flag, and season 
are important determinants of rates, as is ship tonnage contracted for hauling selected dry bulk 
commodities. Their results emphasized the direct relationship between distance and freight rate, 
but did not acknowledge the relative distances between countries and the impact changes in 
freight rate have on the relative advantages of rival countries. 
There are studies such as that of Reichert &Vachal (2003). In their report, prepared for 
the USDA, they examined various ocean transportation options based on available marketing 
solutions, specifically with an emphasis on the importance of grain identity preservation services 
offered by the exporter country or demanded by the consumer country. In the case of wheat, they 
mentioned that in the past 5 or 6 years prior to their research, approximately 25% of wheat was 
exported as “premium” and they predicted an increasing trend toward exporting premium wheat. 
Therefore, Reichert &Vachal (2003) established a cost analysis and made a comparison of bulk 
versus container movement. The logistics in grain transport, from farm storage up to its final 
destination, is compared in bulk shipping and container shipping. They mentioned that this 
process involves 21 days for the containerization of Canadian wheat and 97 days for bulk 
handling and transportation. While bulk shipping is traditionally a cheaper way of moving grain 
because of economies of scale, due to changes in ocean shipping acts, specifically the Ocean 
                                                 
37GARCH stands for Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and is an econometrics tool that 
has become widespread for dealing with time series heteroskedastic models. 
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Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA),38 and the presence of vessels with higher container 
capacity on major routes, container shipping is becoming a competitor to bulk grain shipping. 
However, while Reichert &Vachal, in their research on marketing “identity preserved” grain vs. 
generic marketing of raw grain, discuss the development of containerization in grain movement 
and look for ways to reduce costs through logistics, their focus is on economic decision models 
for marketing grain. As a result, while exploring the grain export steps from storage and handling 
to transportation and marketing, there is no discussion of the relative advantages that may exist 
because of location differences. 
There have been a number of recent reports and studies that have examined the efficiency 
of Canadian handling and transportation systems, including Baylis (1998), Khakbazan et al. 
(1997), Vercammen (1996), and John Head (1994). Despite the magnitude of ocean 
transportation costs in trade costs, there is not sufficient research on the impact of the ocean 
freight transportation market on grain (especially wheat) flow from Canada that investigates the 
particular opportunities that are created by differences in distance.       
In summary, there have been numerous studies that have modeled commodity flow, 
applying various transportation modeling methods in doing so. There are further studies that 
focus on ocean freight for grain, but there has been less work done to simulate the global grain 
trade and, especially, wheat trade considering the important role of ocean transportation as the 
intermediate level of wheat delivery and the immediate impact of changes in this level on the 
final product.  
The variety of transportation modeling methods raises questions about their relative 
reliability and efficiency, although these are outside of the scope of this research. But it is 
important to know that, as Celik (2004) mentions; there are no uniformly good or bad models for 
                                                 
38 To be discussed further in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2 
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replicating the flow of commodities. However, he argues that the acceptability of the method is 
highly correlated with the degree of homogeneity of the commodity under investigation. The 
more homogeneous the product group, the better the models predictions; in many cases it is not 
possible to obtain data with the desired level of disaggregation. Aside from aggregation 
problems, while the homogeneity assumption is a simplifying assumption that may help to adopt 
a standard transportation method, it may not always be an applicable solution. Therefore, in 
modeling the flow of wheat on a global scale, we should first investigate how the assumption of 
homogeneity may affect the purpose of our study and whether it is an appropriate assumption in 
our model.  
In the case of wheat, differentiations both by country of origin and by end use have been 
analyzed by many researchers. There is evidence that while the same type of wheat produced and 
cultivated in different regions may be considered close substitutes, they are unlikely to be a 
perfect substitute for each other. As Sumner et al. (1994) say, this is an accepted fact both in 
literature and trade. For instance, durum wheat produced in Canada has different qualities than 
durum wheat produced in Australia, resulting in different preferences for consumers across the 
world. Larue (1991) in the paper titled “Is wheat a homogeneous product?” provides a glossary 
of the studies that have looked at the differentiation of wheat in different ways. Based on this 
classification, most previous studies have assumed perfect substitutability across classes and 
origins of wheat. Some studies allow imperfect substitutability of wheat from different origins. 
However, most of these studies assume perfect substitutability among wheat classes originating 
from the same source country. Larue found that the assumption of one form of product 
differentiation or the other would be appropriate if countries specialize in one product type and 
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the given product type is exported by only one country. In the case of wheat, this is not 
applicable because most countries trade more than one class of wheat. 
Sumner et al. (1994) argued that differentiation of wheat is clearly evident given the fact 
that many countries both export and import wheat. According to Sumner et al., if the goods are 
perfect substitutes, exports and imports would not coexist except in marginal border trade, where 
one region of a country imports and another region of the same country exports. In this thesis, 
the main objective is to find a general framework for wheat flow globally; following Sumner et 
al, we accept the idea of differentiation for wheat.39 
Considering the importance of differentiation in the issue of wheat flow, there is a need to 
look for a model that includes this feature. As Sumner et al. (1994) mention, accepting the 
assumption of homogeneity or perfect substitution of wheat originated from different producing 
regions results in overestimations of trade flow predictions in the model. Referring to works that 
make use of this assumption, Sumner et al. show that such models do not match the actual trade 
flow patterns for most goods. For instance, the outcome of making such an assumption is to end 
up with many importers buying goods from only one country – the one for which the sum of 
production and transportation costs is the lowest – and similarly, many exporters sell goods to 
only one country. 
In the trade literature, classical trade models from the Ricardianmodel to the Heckscher-
Ohlin model40 assume that the goods of one producer perfectly substitute for those of another. In 
                                                 
39
Further in chapter 4, we will face a model with several variables that urge us to summarize the model by ignoring 
the fact that wheat has different types. This is just an assumption to help with ease of calculation and in practical 
studies a specific type of wheat can be investigated in the same framework. 
 
40 Build on David Ricardo's theory of comparative by predicting patterns of trade and production based on 
the factor endowments of a trading region, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin introduced the Heckscher–Ohlin model 
(H–O model). This is a general equilibrium mathematical model of international trade. Based on this model, 
countries will export products that use their abundant and accessible resources for production and import products 
that use the countries' scarce and expensive factor(s). 
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other words, they assume that all products are homogeneous. Assuming this is the situation, if 
the number of suppliers is sufficiently large, the market will approach perfect competition and 
the price across all suppliers will be equal. The result of accepting such an assumption in trade 
models is to label the market players either as  an importer or exporter of the specific product and 
not both. Another outcome of such models and assumptions is that since the prices are all equal 
and there are no other distinguishing characteristics of the goods produced by a supplier, it can 
be explained as a “pooled market,” in which case we only concern ourselves with the share that 
each supplier brings to the market and the share that each consumer takes from the market. This 
category can be treated as a non-spatial model. 
Relaxing the homogeneity assumption in some trade models heralded a new approach in 
trade literature. In this approach, goods are called “heterogeneous” and they are not perfect 
substitutes. The importance of product differentiation in international trade has been examined in 
both theoretical and empirical research. However, in trade theory, the departure from the 
assumption of perfect substitution goes back to Armington’s model (1969). The new structure 
presented by Armington may cause departures from known theoretical results, as mentioned by 
Lloyd and Zhang (2006). In fact, as they mention, the Armington structure changes some of the 
fundamentally properties and definitions of classical trade models. This issue will be discussed in 
the coming section. Davis and Kruse (1993), Sumner et al. (1994), Alston et al. (1990), and 
Babula (1987) are some samples for works that adopted Armington’s framework or have worked 
through improving the misspecifications that have occurred in adapting this method. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the characteristics of wheat and its market forbid us 
from using a model with an assumption of homogeneity. Even simplifying the model such that 
we do not consider the end use differentiation, we cannot ignore the fact that consumers around 
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the world have different preferences for wheat from different regions. This fact makes the 
Armington model an appropriate framework for modeling wheat flow. 
In the coming section, some key points of the Armington model is explained and then the 
model for wheat ocean freight and trade will be illustrated. 
. 
3.4 Armington Model Fundamentals 
Armington (1969) introduced a model with the assumption that final products traded 
internationally could be differentiated on the basis of the location of production. 
Lloyd and Zhang (2006) have reviewed the Armington framework and have brought it to 
a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework and looked at the multi-country 
models, attempting to provide a comparison between the properties of an Armingtonmodel on 
one hand and the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model on the other. They construct a mathematical 
illustration of the Armington model and compare the results of three-goods, three-country model 
by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) to a Heckscher-Ohlin model. Based on their 
results, a unilateral across-the-board cut in tariffs in the Armington model resulted in a larger 
shift in consumption from domestically produced goods to imported goods, a larger decline in 
terms of trade, and a smaller resource reallocation across industries. The following paragraphs 
show the mathematical model of the application of the Armington model on the demand and 
supply of traded products. 
To mathematically illustrate the Armington model, Lloyd and Zhang consider a world in 
which there are m  countries and n  goods. Each good is a “type” of good that may be produced 
in each country, thus there are mndifferentiated products by country of origin and consumers 
have preferences among them. 
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Let ni ,...,1=  denote the type of good and mj ,...,1=  the country of origin of good and 
kk ,...,2,1= the country in which the consumer is located. Then ijkX  denotes the consumption of 
the product from i ’s group when the product originated from country j  and the consumer is 
located in country k . For simplicity they assume that there is only one household in each country 
With the Armington differentiation, the utility function of the household of one country, country 
k, takes the following form: 
),...,;...;,...,;...;,...,( 11111 nmkknimkkimkkk XXXXXXUU = Equation 3- 1 
≡ ),...,,...,( 1 nkikk XXXU  
≡ )( kXU  
In this model, the utility function is assumed to be identical across countries and   ),...,( 1 imkkiik XXX =  
denotes the set of products of type i originating in the different countries and consumed in 
country k and kX is the set of quantities consumed in country k of all products in all groups.  
Also based on Armington (1969), the utility function is assumed to be weakly separable in the 
types of goods. Therefore for any country k, 
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Where the linearly homogeneous sub-functions
)( ik
i xv
 are indices of the consumption in the 
country of each type of good and are homogeneous separable. Therefore, with this type of utility 
function, the household can allocate its budget in two stages: initially at the top stage or level 
among the groups of products and then at the bottom stage or level among the products within a 
group. 
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 Therefore, one of the major assumptions of the Armington model is that the allocation of 
expenditures within a particular broad group is independent of the allocation to the other broad 
group. 
 Armington adopted a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form for the functions at 
the second level for the : 
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Equation 3- 3 
According to Lloyd and Zhang, in the original Armington model only the demand side is 
specified. On the supply side, the specification adopted is as general as possible with only one 
constraint: there are constant returns to scale everywhere and perfect competition in all markets. 
Despite the simple assumption on the supply side, the Armington framework and 
assumption still have affected some aspects of the regular Heckscher-Ohlin model and have an 
advantage over it. 
Armington’s model has some advantages over the Heckscher-Ohlin model as a 
framework for the wheat trade. Perhaps, as Sumner, Alston and Gray (1994) mentioned, the most 
apparent reason for this differentiation is the fact that exports and imports coexist. In such a 
situation there is no option other than to use an appropriate framework that considers the 
heterogeneity of the traded products. While the heterogeneity may arise from different reasons 
and sources, in this context, wheat from one region cannot be considered the same as that of 
another region. As Grennes et al. (1978) mention, several reasons may cause us to classify a 
group of goods in global trade as differentiated products according to their country of origin. 
Some of those reasons are as follows: 
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First, the good may be naturally heterogeneous and there may be differences in the 
average quality of goods aggregated to the national or regional level. In the case of wheat, this 
reason is quite acceptable in both trade and academic literature.  
The second reason mentioned in their work is “national factors,” meaning that some 
naturally homogeneous goods are viewed as heterogeneous goods by importers according to their 
country of origin.  
The third reason is related to relatively technical arguments about aggregation across 
countries, for example having different harvest times, which allow for imperfect competition. As 
Blanford (1988) mentions, some differentiation might be due to rigidities of commercial 
relationships, traditions in language and customs, or imperfect information, all of which may 
apply to wheat. Based on the preferences and premium prices and trade policies of wheat in 
different countries, this reason looks quite reasonable. 
In conclusion the Armington framework, which introduces product differentiation, looks 
like an appropriate model for world wheat trade flow. There are some critics like Chami Batista 
(2005) who mention that the econometrics estimation of elasticity in the Armington framework 
are larger than real elasticities, but as long as the framework is not made for estimation, it does 
not invalidate the approach. Another advantage of using the Armington framework for this 
research is that it allows us to use aggregated trade data. This point will be discussed later.  
In the next section, the Armington model is adapted to formulize the worldwide wheat 
trade issue with respect to ocean freight transportation.   
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3.5 The Model Description 
In this section a market-clearing model is developed to show how changes in transportation costs 
due to fluctuations in freight rates affect the quantities and prices of exported wheat in 
destination countries. 
First we must make some simplifying assumptions. The first fundamental assumption is 
related to defining the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the product and the level of aggregation. 
The various classes and qualities of wheat produced in a specific country, although different, will 
be aggregated in this context. The second main assumption refers to the level of substitution 
between wheat produced in different regions. Wheat produced by different countries, while 
generally close substitutes, is considered a differentiated product and an imperfect substitute. The 
assumption of differentiated wheat, as discussed before, is well accepted in trade and academic 
literature.  
In the framework of a preliminary model, a world consisting of four countries, as shown 
infigure 3.1, is considered. Country A and Country B are the exporter countries and country 1 
and 2 are the importers. The supply and demand equations are represented by functions that are 
linear in prices and quantities over the range of changes being analyzed. 
Again, for simplicity, we assume that country A and B only export their wheat to country 
1 and 2. There is no trade between country A and B and there is no trade between country 1 and 
2. While generally close substitutes, wheat from country A is unlikely to be a perfect substitute 
for wheat from another source (country B). In any region, we assume the supply of each type of 
wheat only depends on its own price. Therefore, the supply of wheat in each exporting country 
depends on the anticipated producer prices of wheat, which are the weighted average of 
corresponding market prices for wheat. We assume all the wheat producers are acting in a 
competitive market and they do not have a market power. 
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The supply function in country A and B are represented in the following set of equations: 
 
 
BBBB PSQ 1βα +=                                                                                                 Equation 3-4 
 
In these equations, iPS is the producer price of wheat produced in country i (i=A, B),  
is the quantity of wheat supplied in each region, the iα s are the intercepts, and ijβ s are the slopes 
of each supply function. 
 
 
 
 
While there is no interaction among wheat from different origins on the supply side, on 
the demand side different types of wheat (i.e. Canadian wheat, Australian wheat, etc.) are 
consumed as close substitutes; grains from different sources are less-than-perfect substitutes. The 
consumers in the importing country consume the wheat imported from either of these countries 
as a close substitute. The demand in importing country j will be a simultaneous system of 
A 
B 
1 
2 
AAaA PSQ 1βα +=
Figure 3-1 Exporters and Importer Location in a Hypothetical Two by Two Trade Model 
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demands for each importer country (j=1, 2) and we assume it is a function of own price effect as 
well as the cross price effect of the substitute types as well. 
In these demand equations, jiC  is the consumption of wheat originating from country i(i = 
A, B) in country j (j=1, 2). 1AAδ  ,
1
BBδ ,
2
AAδ , and
2
BBδ are the own price effects coefficients in 
importing demand countries and 1ABδ ,
1
BAδ ,
2
BAδ ,
2
ABδ  are the cross price effect coefficients  in 
related equations. 
111111
BABAAAAA PPC δδγ ++=                                                                            Equation 3- 5 
111111
BBBABABB PPC δδγ ++=  
222222
BABAAAAA PPC δδγ ++=  
222222
BBBABABB PPC δδγ ++=  
 
 In order to solve the system of supply and demand equations for equilibrium prices and 
quantities, there is a need for a set of market clearing conditions that reflect the total utilization 
of the product, freight rate fluctuations, and arbitrage conditions. 
On the price side, for wheat originating from a given source, differences in prices among 
consuming regions and between producers and consumers in the region where it is produced are 
specified as wedges due to transportation costs. As the last sections made clear, the focus of this 
thesis is ocean freight costs and all other internal transportation costs; transaction costs and 
policies that may affect grain prices are not considered. 
The set of equations in 3-6 shows the price of wheat originating from country A in 
countries 1 and 2. Likewise equation 3-7 shows the price of wheat originated from country B in 
consuming countries 1 and 2. 
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11 AAA TPSP +=                                                                                       Equation 3-6 
22 AAA TPSP +=  
 
11 BBB TPSP +=                                                                                       Equation 3- 7 
22 BBB TPSP +=  
 
For such a small model, we should use twelve linear equations described above, two 
supply, four demands, four prices, and two market clearing conditions, and solve the 
indentifiedsystem using linear algebra through matrix inversion and calculate the twelve 
unknown variables: six quantities and six prices.  
Now if we add the other importing regions to this our simple model, the results will be 
more complicated and almost impossible to solve without the help of proper computer 
software.41Increasing the number of regions, adds to the complexity of the model. This is 
because the prices and quantities are the function of too many different endogenous variables, 
which increases the dimensions of the matrix.  As we add more countries on the export and 
demand sides, and relaxing the assumption that the exporter country is not only an exporter and 
imports from other countries as well, we will face an ambiguous situation that must be solved 
with the use of specified parameters and quantities. Although building an analytic mathematical 
model looks impossible, building a simulation model based on the same structure will help us to 
change the exogenous variables and follow the changes. In the next chapter this model will be 
built and its validation will be investigated.  
                                                 
41 The maximum acceptable dimensions for the matrix in Mathcad are 10 by 10.  
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3.6 Summary and Results 
Keeping in view the importance of the role of transportation in trade, the wedges between the 
prices in exporting ports and importing ports created by ocean transportation expenses, and the 
geographical distribution of countries and ocean masses around the world, there is a need for a 
model that simulates the changes in wheat flow around the world considering the fluctuations in 
the ocean transportation rate. 
As per the literature review of the trade models in this chapter, we followed the progress 
of trade models in making use of geography and distance through spatial models and using the 
assumption of non-homogeneity of traded commodities. Among all the models discussed, the 
Armington framework, which looks at the wheat originating from different countries as 
differentiated products, fits our purpose. However, we needed to make it a spatial framework to 
illustrate the impact of changes in the freight rate on the traded quantity and prices. While the 
Armington framework may be criticized for its biased econometrics elasticity estimates, that 
does not invalidate its use in our market simulation models. Many researchers agree that the 
Armington framework is the best way of modeling differentiated products, especially the market 
simulation model. 
 So far there has been no attempt to simulate the international spatial wheat trade model 
such that it treats wheat from different origins as differentiated products. Therefore, as the first 
attempt I constructed a small trade flow model to explain the impact of freight rate fluctuations 
on wheat flow quantities and prices in the global market. The Armington framework develops a 
vertical linkage between the wheat in the country of origin’s port, ocean freight services, and the 
importer country’s port, and that can be used to examine the impact of shocks as a result of 
various variables that may affect the transportation links and consequently the freight rates.  
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The developed model based on a simplified world consisting of the two exporters and one 
importer resulted in solving an eight-by-eight matrix. Adding another importing country makes 
the calculations even more complicated and renders the parametric results even more ambiguous. 
The prices and quantities are the function of all own price and cross price demand elasticities, the 
supply elasticities, and all the transportation rates. To achieve  more practical result there is a 
need  to construct the market simulation model and insert the available base prices, quantities, 
and elasticities into the model to calculate how much prices and quantities change when the 
ocean freight rate changes.  
In Chapter 4, the same frame work will be adopted. In order to follow the impact of the 
freight rate changes on the wheat flow, actual prices and quantities, along with some parameters 
will be used to construct a simulation of the real world. 
  
 74 
 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKET SIMULATION MODEL 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to quantify the Armington framework developed in 
Chapter 3 to be used as a tool to examine the magnitude of the impacts of the changes in freight 
rate on global wheat flow. The result will help one to follow the pattern of changes in the price of 
wheat occurring as a result of freight rate changes.  
Following the aim of this research, the global market of wheat will be divided into 
different geographical regions and the market clearing conditions in the global market will be 
set, with consideration for the interaction among regions. The global model will be 
parameterized using elasticities from the literature, prices and quantities from 2007 data set, and 
ocean freight rates in the same year. Then, a model validation procedure will be followed to 
check whether the developed market simulation model will have the ability to reflect the real 
world situation and make predictions. Finally, the impact of changes in freight rates on global 
wheat flow will be simulated to examine different scenarios and the magnitude of the effects 
under each scenario. 
4.2. Market Simulation 
Based on definition any imitation of some real fact or process is a “simulation”. 
Simulations are used in many sciences, ranging from modeling natural systems, human systems, 
safety engineering, testing, training, to – the most important for us – economic models and 
conditions, in order to gain insight into their functions. Source information is fed into the 
simulator with consideration for the selected characteristics and behaviours. The simplifying 
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assumptions within the simulation are designed not to interfere with the basic aim of the 
simulation and the fidelity and validity of the simulation outcomes. 
As Csaki (1985) says, while a simulation model should be as simple and concise as 
possible, it should have the ability to reflect reality and should be able to predict future outcomes 
with precision. One of the objectives of this chapter is to construct a mathematical model that 
meets the requirements of a well-functioning simulation model and illustrates the global wheat 
spatial market. The global spatial market and trade will be simplified as much as possible to 
obtain a tool to observe changes in the quantity and price of wheat from origins according to 
freight rate fluctuations. To pursue this aim, we have to clarify the types of related parameters 
and data sets used in this simulation. Also, definitions and notations should be specified. First, 
the regions and rationale behind the categorizing regions will follow, the wheat market in 
selected regions will be briefly described, the overall supply and demand parameters will be 
verified and set in the model, and finally the selected scenarios and sensitivity analyses will be 
implemented and analyzed.  
4.2.1 Determining Key Players in the Global Wheat Market 
During the past few decades, the global wheat market has undergone significant changes. 
Some regions like China, one of the major wheat importing regions of the world, have turned 
into large wheat producers. China was among the top ten importers of wheat before 2000, but 
after 2000, with exception of 2004, China has not been among the top ten importers. While the 
major exporters of wheat have maintained their market position, more competition is predicted 
on the supply side of the market as per the USDA wheat market outlook for the period of 2011-
2020 (USDA, 2011). Some players like the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are submitting a place as 
market shareholders. On the other side, changes in import demand due to changes in natural 
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factors like population, income share, and wheat replacement have changed the players on the 
import side.  
This section is intended to clarify the regions of the global wheat market model such that 
it can address the probable changes that accompany maritime transportation costs, as well as 
changes in the pattern of the global wheat trade. In order to simplify the global wheat market and 
establish the simulation, the current major players in the global wheat market have been 
identified with consideration for the importance of maintaining consistency with the available 
data and creating a comprehensive categorization that resembles the global market. The 
following paragraphs will give a summary of this categorization of the export supply side and 
import demand side.  
Wheat Exporters in the Global Model: 
According to USDA (2011) and several issues of the International Grain Council (IGC) 
data set, during the past decade United States, Canada, Australia, the EU (27), the former Soviet 
Union (including three major wheat exporters: Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), and Argentina 
have accounted for about 90% of the global wheat export market. Therefore, in order to cover the 
major exporting regions in the global wheat market, the regions have been divided as shown in 
table 4-1 of this chapter. As seen in this table, some of the supplier regions consist of a single 
country, while others are a group of producing countries. To simplify our model, if the region 
consists of more than one country, the intra-region trade is assumed to be domestic production 
and consumption in the same region. This will not affect the model in terms of analysis and only 
helps to reduce the number of variables. According to trade data, the trade in other regions 
except the six above-mentioned areas is either intra-regional trade or so small that can be 
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reasonably categorized as Rest of the World (ROW) exports to the region with a minimum effect 
on the model.    
While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) represents more countries than 
those mentioned above,42 since the major producers are Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the 
total exports of these three countries have been considered the exports of this region. This is also 
consistent with the data available through IGC.  The rest of the wheat exported has been captured 
through adding the Rest of the World (ROW) section. 
 
 
Table 4-1Wheat Exporting Regions and Abbreviations Used in Simulation  
 
 
Based on the 2011 USDA market outlook report,it is predicted that the total share of the 
                                                 
42 The CIS consisted of ten former Soviet Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan at its inception. The nations of Azerbaijan and Georgia later 
joined the association in 1993.  
 
Exporting Regions Abb. Countries in Region 
Argentina AR   
Australia AU   
Canada CN   
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
CIS  Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan.Moldova,Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
EU(27) EU  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy ,Latvia, Lithuania, Lux
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spa
in, Sweden, United Kingdom  
United States US   
Rest of the World ROW All other countries not included in above classification 
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traditional wheat exporting regions, (the United States, Australia, Canada, the EU, and 
Argentina) will fall from 70% to 60% in the prediction period (2010-2020) due to increasing 
exports from the Black Sea area. Low cost of production, new investment in agricultural 
production and marketing, and favourable weather conditions for producing wheat in the area43 
are increasing production and export share factors in this region. Argentina’s share in the global 
wheat market is anticipated not to fall. But global changes, more ethanol in the EU, and oil seeds 
in Canada may also decrease the level of production, and consequently trade, from these regions. 
However, this research is only concerned with a static snapshot that considers the other changes 
constant and focuses on ocean transportation cost variations. 
 
Wheat Importers in the Global Model  
While all exporting regions are wheat consumers and have a local market, some of the 
exporting regions are also wheat importers.Unlike these regions, there are some regions that lack 
the necessary growing conditions to produce wheat and this factor may not change over time.  
Categorizing the wheat importing regions is more complicated than the supply side 
because of the number of regions involved and the dual role of some regions. There is no region 
that does not consume wheat, although there are some regions that only use wheat produced 
within the region. We must disregard intra-regional trade as a main assumption in this section. 
This assumption is made to reduce the number of variables in the simulation and to simplify the 
model. On the other hand, we have to keep the key self-sufficient region, Canada, among the 
regions to maintain consistency with the global equilibrium approach. Therefore table 4-2 
summarizes the wheat “consuming regions,” including the description of each region, instead of 
                                                 
43The drought in 2009-2010 has reduced the positive effects of this factor on wheat production in CIS region. 
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wheat “importing regions.”  Canada is the only region that does not import wheat from other 
countries. In Oceania, the main producer, Australia, also does not import a significant amount, 
but other countries in the region import wheat mostly from Australia. The following paragraphs 
briefly describe the role of each region in the global wheat market. 
 
European Union 
The EU was both an importer and exporter of wheat in 2007. In this market simulation 
model, as specified in the World Grain Statistics in 2007, EU (27) countries have been 
considered one importing and exporting region. While France, Germany, the UK, Poland, and 
Italy were the largest wheat producers in the EU in 2007, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands were 
the largest importers and France, the UK, and Germany are among the eight largest importers in 
the EU. On the export side, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, and Belgium are the largest wheat 
exporters in the EU. The combination of exports and imports in the EU easily shows the nature 
of dual exporter and importer countries in the wheat market and constitutes a good reason to 
consider differentiations based on the country of origin in the local wheat market. 
The geographical situation of the EU region is quite different from those of the North- 
and Central-American countries and regions. The countries in the EU mostly have land borders 
with each other and other European countries. However, for the purposes of this thesis, internal 
trade between EU members has been assumed to be domestic consumption of the region’s 
production, and its trade with other European countries has been considered a differentiated 
region. Also, we assumed that the active transportation mode is ocean transportation and the 
origin or destination port has been specified based on the closest geographic distance and 
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available data set in and out of the region. As shown in figure 4-1, Canada and the CIS region are 
the major exporters to this region. 
Other European Countries 
The rest of the European countries have been placed in this category. There is difference 
between the other European countries defined as exporting and importing region in this research. 
Since most of the wheat in this region is produced in Russian Federation, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, and almost all of the wheat exported across the globe is originated from mentioned 
countries, therefore, CIS which includes Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan and 
represents the exporting region. The demand and import of Other European countries (OE) 
including CIS region (except the European Union (EU)) are considered and is shown as OE in all 
figures and equations of this simulation. Again, as with the EU countries, the intra-regional trade 
among these countries has been considered domestic consumption and ocean transportation is 
assumed to be the main shipping mode. 
While the countries in this region have imported about 97% of the wheat imported from 
the CIS region, the remaining imported wheat in 2007 was imported from the EU, with about 1% 
coming from the US. The wheat produced in this region has been generally exported to countries 
in the EU region, South Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Near East Asia.  
 
Canada 
Canada is a large producer and exporter of wheat. While Canadian wheat is consumed in 
most countries of the world, the import of wheat from other regions to Canada is so negligible 
that it has been ignored in this market simulation model. While the quality of wheat produced in 
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Canada isdemanded in many regions, the geographic location of Canada relative to other 
importing countries is a disadvantage. Canada’s only land border is with the United States; 
therefore ocean freight is the best and only viable freight option to and from Canada. In this 
research the ocean freight rates from the West Coast (Pacific ports/Vancouver port) and East 
Coast (Atlantic ports/St. Lawrence) are considered the main exporting ports, based on the 
geographical distance from the destination country. In this model, Canada exports to all other ten 
regions. Export from Canada to Oceania is negligible. Figure 4-1 illustrates the export and 
domestic consumption share of different producing regions. 
United States 
The United States is also one of the major players in the wheat market. The US shares 
land borders with Canada and Central America; however, ocean freight remains the main mode 
of transportation for grain in this region. The US both exports and imports a large amount of 
wheat to and from different regions. US wheat is being consumed in all of our specified regions 
except Canada. In 2007, the US imported an enormous amount of wheat from Canada. 
The US is the second biggest source of wheat imported to Central America. Central America is 
considered a part of the Latin America region in this thesis. 
Latin America 
On the export side, Argentina is the main player and is considered the main exporter to 
various world regions from Latin America. On the import side, this region contains all the 
countries in South and Central America. However, the main data were gathered from Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Among the countries of 
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this region, Argentina and Brazil are the main producers and exporters of wheat and Brazil and 
Mexico are the main importers of wheat. The countries of this region import wheat from 
Argentina, Canada, and the US. Like the regions described previously, the intra-regional trade 
between countries of this region is included in the demand for domestic production and is not 
differentiated. Excluding the wheat produced and consumed inside the region, the main exports 
from this region are to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Regional Wheat Export Market According to Base Year Prices and Quantities (2007)
Source: World 
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Grain Statistics, International Grain Council 2007
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Table 4-2 Wheat Importing Regions and Abbreviations Used in Simulation
Importing Regions Abb. Countries included in region 
EU (27) EU   Since 2006/7, the  EU (27) includes  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
 Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom 
Rest of Europe OE  Other European countries including the CIS & Baltic 
Canada CN   
United States US   
Latin America LA  This region includes Latin Central American countries, as well as South 
American countries : Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic., El  Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and 
others 
Near East Asia  NE  Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and others 
Pacific Asia PA  China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
others. 
South Asia SA  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and others 
North Africa NA Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia 
Sub Saharan Africa SS  Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’lvoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and others 
Oceania  OC  Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and others 
Figure 4-2 Global Export Share
Source: World Grain Statistics, International Grain Council 2007
Near East Asia 
Asia has been divided into three different regions considering the geographical distance and 
major ocean freight routes to the regions. Near East Asia region contains Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, 
regionalso imports from Canada, United States, Australia
Pacific Asia 
The countries included in this region are China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, North 
Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa
producers in this category, such as China, this region is  a major importing region and does not have 
significant exports. China is the largest producer, and exporter, but has moved from being a major 
importer during the past years. Again, the intra
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the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
, and the EU. 
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Although there are large 
-regional trade is included as the domestic consumption 
US LA NE PA SA NA SS OC
Importing Region
AR AU CN EU US CIS
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of the region, which imports mainly from Australia, the US, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, from the 
CIS.  
South Asia 
The South Asian region includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as the main 
representatives of the countries of this region. Again, the wheat produced in this region is consumed 
domestically and the countries of this region mainly imported wheat from the EU, the CIS, and Canada 
in 2007. 
North Africa 
Based on the geographic reality of Africa and the availability of data, we have divided the 
countries located in Africa into two regions. North Africa contains the Northern countries: Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The wheat produced in this region is only consumed domestically 
and this region is a major importer of wheat. The EU, the CIS, and Canada were the main exporters to 
this region in 2007. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
The rest of the African countries are included in this region. The main countries in this category 
are: Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This 
region is also a major importing region. In 2007, this region imported mainly from the EU, the US, 
Argentina, Canada, and Australia 
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Oceania 
This region, which geographically does not have land borders with its wheat consumers, is 
another big player in the wheat market. Ocean freight is their only available transportation option. The 
main producer in this region is Australia. The region exports wheat to the EU, Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, Pacific Asia, and South Asia.   
All of the above regions are assumed to have a system of demand equation for different types of 
wheat that they mainly import. Considering the market clearing conditions and the geographic distances 
between regions, this system of demand will be constructed in the next section and the market clearing 
conditions will be set.  
 
4.2.2. Setting Supply and Demand Equations 
This section describes the parameters used to set the simulation model and examine alternative 
scenarios for global wheat flow when the ocean freight rate changes. In order to perform such an 
assessment, a series of supply and demand equations for wheat in different regions need to be specified. 
The supply and demand equations used in our model are linear and constructed based on 
Armington’sassumptions. The model is supposed to show the changes that follow from increases and 
decreases in freight rates. 
Demand Equations 
As described in Chapter 3, the demand in importing country j for wheat originating from 
country i  is a function of own price effects and cross price effects of the substitute types of wheat, 
which is wheat originating from other regions or produced in the same region. Considering the number 
of exporting regions, each importing region has a set of simultaneous demands consisting of eight 
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equations for wheat from different origins. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa (SS) imports wheat from 
all of the above-mentioned exporting regions. Therefore the wheat demand system in the SS region is 
expressed with the following set of equations: 
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Equation 4-1 
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iSSC − is the demand for wheat originating from region i (i=Argentina (AR), Australia (AU), 
Canada (CN), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), European Union (EU),  the United States 
(US), Rest of the World (ROW), and  Sub-Saharan Africa (SS)). 
i
iSS−γ is the constant parameter for linear demand, 
i
iSS−δ  is the own price or cross price 
coefficients of demand, and finally iSSP − is the price of wheat from different origins in the destination 
region. In this thesis, this price is calculated by the sum of FOB (Free On Board) per thousand-ton 
premium price of wheat offered to the Sub-Saharan Africa region from the exporting country’s port plus 
a per-thousand-ton ocean freight transportation price for delivering wheat from region i to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. To simplify the model, all other additional trade costs associated with other factors aside from 
ocean freight costs are not included. 
Supply Equations 
As described in Chapter 3, supply equations are not specified in the Armington framework. In 
the simulation model presented in this thesis, the supply equation is considered to be linear and the 
supply of wheat in each region depends on the production price of wheat in the same region. Therefore 
the general supply function for country i is specified as: 
Equation 4-2 
 
This equation iPS  expresses the producer price at the exporting farm gate (for instance, in the 
case of Canadian wheat, at the Saint Lawrence port) and iQ  is the total production of the region; iα is 
the intercepts, and iβ is the slope of the supply function. 
iiii PSQ βα +=
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Market Clearing Condition: 
As described in Chapter 3, adding a set of market clearing conditions for all of the markets will 
solve the system of equations and provide the equilibrium prices and quantities. These conditions should 
reflect the total utilization of the products in all markets with consideration for ocean transportation 
costs and arbitrage conditions. 
The market clearing conditions in each producing market will be expressed as follows. 
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Equation 4-3 
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As shown in the above market clearing conditions, there is a set of conditions for the ROW 
region. This is because the rest of the world regions relative to each region are different from the others. 
For example, a country in PA may import some wheat from a country in NE, while a country in SS may 
import from NA. Therefore a set of supply and demand equations for each market and its conditions is 
defined, and the market clearing conditions for each market are considered separately. In this model, 
i
ROWC stands for the demand for wheat originating from ROW in region i.  
The market clearing quantity in each producing region is equal to sum of the internal 
consumption of wheat in that region and the exported wheat from that region to other regions. 
 
Role of the Ocean Freight Rate 
As explained, ocean transportation is the shipping method used to transport wheat from all of the 
above-mentioned producing regions’ ports to the consuming regions’ ports. Therefore, the differences in 
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the price of wheat from a specific source among different regions are attributed to the freight rate 
differences between regions.    
In this research all other differences in costs associated with internal wheat movement or 
regions’ exporting and importing policies are not modelled. It means that the wedge between the export 
price and import price is the per-unit ocean freight rate.  This cost is treated as a pure average per-unit 
cost that is added to the export price. Thus: 
i
j
ii
j tPSP +=                                                                                                               
Equation 4-4 
i:  AR, AU, CN, EU, US, CIS, ROW 
j: EU, OE, CA, US, LA, NE, PA, SA, NA, SS, OC 
As per this equation, any changes in the freight rate will affect the price of wheat at its destination and it 
will impact the initial supply and driven demand of wheat in the origin and the destination. The amount 
of changes in quantity is associated with the sensitivity of demand in the region. Therefore the next 
important step is to set the supply and demand parameters. 
Supply and Demand Parameters 
The variables required to construct the supply and demand function of each region in this model 
include the prices and quantities of wheat produced in each region in the base year (2006/7).  
Wheat prices, quantities, and market shares for each region, as well as the per-unit ocean freight 
rate, can be obtained from different sources and publications. To maintain consistency in the data set, 
especially when there is a need for aggregation, we gathered the data from one specific source. The data 
gathered in this thesis are from the International Grain Council’s World Grain Statistics, 2007. Table 4-4 
shows the initial quantities and prices in the eleven wheat-consuming regions. The signs and notations 
have been chosen such that they clarify the origin and destination of wheat consumption; for instance, 
CUS-CN shows the consumption of Canadian wheat in the United States. Q stands for the quantity (000 
 93 
 
tons) and P is the average unit price of wheat in US dollars. Production in each region is denoted by Qi. 
For example, QCN denotes the wheat produced in Canada, which again has a quantity in metric tons and 
a production price in US dollars. The ocean freight rate is the annual average rate of bulk carriers along 
selected routes.  
Using the base year quantities, prices, freight rates, and own-price and cross-price elasticities, the 
slope and intercepts of the supply and demand equations are calculated. Table 4-3 shows the initial 
freight prices and figure 4-3compares the initial freight from exporting regions to various destinations. 
The overall elasticities of demand and supply for each region need to be borrowed from earlier studies 
and literature that have estimated them. Since different studies have used different data sources and 
different assumptions and stimulation procedures, to use the appropriate elasticities some judgment is 
required for the purpose of simulating alternative scenarios. Since an Armington framework has been 
chosen, we cannot consider the estimated elasticities from works that have treated the wheat produced in 
different regions as homogeneous products since they all suffer from aggregation bias. However, in the 
model presented in this thesis, the only differentiation we consider is based on the country of origin. 
Different types of wheat are not separated based on their end use since separating different classes of 
wheat, while not impossible in our framework, would increase the number of variables unnecessarily.  
Wheat from these sources is treated as less than perfect substitutes. As Sumner et al. (1994) 
maintain, this is an acceptable assumption as regards the behaviour of buyers. Such an assumption has 
been used in a large number of studies that have found imperfect substitution among types of wheat 
originating from different countries due to differences in wheat quality alone.44 
 
                                                 
44 Sumner et al. (1994) summarize some of the studies that support a differentiated product approach for wheat. As per their 
review, some of the past work treating wheat as differentiated products include Johnson(1971); Cappel and Rigaux (1974); 
Johnson, Grennes and Thursby (1977, 1979); Grennes, Johnson and Thursby (1978); Honma and Heady (1984); Abbotte and 
Paarlberg (1984); Figueroa (1986),  Figueroa and Webb (1986), Blanford (1988), Blanford(1988); AhmadiEsfahani (1989, 
1992), Kim and Lin (1990), Alston et al. (1990) Larue (1992), and Sumner et al. (1994).  
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Table 4-3 Freight Rates from Major Exporting Regions to different Consuming Regions ($/ 000 tonnes) 
FROM AR AU CN EU US CIS ROW 
TO $/000 t 
European Union (EU) $45,620 $58,388 $30,500 $0.00 $32,190 $31,370 $20,000 
Other European Countries(OE) $53,451 $45,485 $40,440 $31,370 $43,190 $0 $20,000 
Canada (CN) $37,900 $68,192 $0 $30,500 $28,040 $40,440 $20,000 
United States (US) $28,040 $69,957 $28,040 $32,190 $0 $43,190 $20,000 
Latin America (LA) $0 $48,676 $37,900 $45,620 $28,040 $53,451 $20,000 
Near East Asia (NE) $50,946 $43,850 $41,507 $47,388 $46,010 $37,996 $20,000 
Pacific Asia(PA) $80,091 $36,170 $56,400 $81,352 $55,870 $57,460 $20,000 
South Asia(SA) $59,354 $42,690 $42,828 $49,230 $57,460 $37,554 $20,000 
North Africa (NA) $45,778 $44,630 $50,500 $29,150 $47,020 $11,611 $20,000 
Sub Saharan Africa (SA) $26,927 $25,897 $36,571 $46,060. $51,490 $49,230 $20,000 
Oceania (OC) $59,461 $0 $68,192 $58,388 $77,413 $45,485 $20,000 
Source: World Grain Statistics, International Grain Council 2007 and authors calculations 
 
Figure 4- 3 Base Year Freight Rates from Major Exporting Ports to Importing Regions 
Source: World Grain Statistics, International Grain Council 2007 and authors calculations
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Table 4-4 2006/07 Prices and Quantities Used for Base Simulation  
 
EU 
Consuming 
region 
quantity 
000 tons 
price US $ per 
000 tons 
Freight rate calculation 
CEU_AR 14 $233,453 (a) From Argentina to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg 
CEU_AU 160 $315,138 (b)  
CEU_CN 1,938 $268,583 (a) From St. Lawrence to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg 
CEU_EU 112,274 $198,417(c)  
CEU_US 644 $254,190 (a) From US Gulf to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg 
CEU_CIS 2,107 $244,370 (a) From Black Sea 
CEU_ROW 388 $200,211 (b) Author’s estimation based on weighted average per 
unit freight cost to EU 
QEU 125,095 $198,417  
OE 
       
COE_AR 1 $241,284 (a)  
COE_AU 0 $302,235(b) Author estimations based on relative geographic 
distance and alternate routes 
COE_CN 3 $278,523 (a)         From St. Lawrence to Black sea 
COE_EU 751 $229,787 (a)  
COE_US 47 $265,190 (a) From US Atlantic  
COE_CIS 73,737 $213,000 (c)  
COE_ROW 59 $213,203(b)  
QOE 89,910 $213,000  
CN 
      
CCN_AR 0 $225,733(b) From Buenos Aires port to Halifax 
CCN_AU 0 $324,941(b) From Fremantle to Halifax 
CCN_CN 5,959 $238,083(c) Canadian FOB Export Price 
CCN_EU 0 $228,917 (a) Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg to St. Lawrence 
CCN-US 0 $250,040 (b) Average of alternate routes was considered 
CCN-CIS 0 $253,440 (a)  From St. Lawrence to Black sea 
CCN-ROW 0 $238,083(b)  
QCN 25,265 $238,083  
US 
      
CUS_AR 23 $215,873 (a) From US Gulf to Venezuela  
CUS_AU 0 $326,706(b) From Fremantle to US Gulf 
CUS_CN 2,862 $266,123(b) Average of alternate routes was considered 
CUS_EU 4 $230,607 (a) From US Gulf to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg 
CUS-US 24,661 $222,000 (c)  
CUS-CIS 
CUS-ROW 
17 
98 
$256,190 (a)                       
$225,795 (b) 
From US Gulf to Black sea 
 
QUS 49,316 $222,000  
Continued . . .  
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LA 
Consuming 
region 
quantity 
000 tons 
price US $ per 
000 tons 
Freight rate calculation 
CLA_AR 20,069 $187,833(c)  
CLA_AU 1 $305,426(b) From Australia to Brazil 
CLA_CN 3,867 $275,983 (a) From Venezuela to St. Lawrence 
CLA_EU 349 $244,037 (a) From Argentina to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg 
CLA_US 6,758 $250,040 (a) From Argentina to US Gulf 
CLA-CIS 122 $266,451 (a) From Argentina to Black sea 
CLA-ROW 664 $208,752 (a)  
QLA 22,635 $187,833  
NE 
      
CNE_AR 406 $238,779(b) From Argentina to Iran 
CNE_AU 1,206 $300,600(b) From Australia to Iran 
CNE_CN 923 $279,590(b) From Halifax to Iran 
CNE_EU 1,218 $245,805 (a) From Rotterdam to Iran 
CNE-US 1,890 $268,010 (a) From US Gulf to Yemen 
CNE_CIS 4,037 $250,995 (a) From Black sea to Persian Gulf-Iran 
CNE_ROW 1,794 $224,304 (a)  
CNE_NE 42,570 $225,172(d)  
QNE 42,570 $225,172  
PA 
      
CPA_AR 300 $267,923 (a) From Argentina to China 
CPA_AU 6,779 $292,920 (a) From Australia to China 
CPA_CN 4,163 $294,483 (a) From St. Lawrence to China 
CPA_EU 22 $279,769 (a) From EU to China 
CPA-US 8,493 $277,870 (a) From US Gulf to China 
CPA-CIS 421 $270,460 (a) From Black sea to China 
CPA_ROW 3,421 $276,680(b)  
CPA_PA 109,822 $283,575(d)  
QPA 109,822 $283,575   
SA 
      
CSA_AR 166 $247,186(b) From Argentina to Pakistan 
CSA_AU 1,580 $299,440 (a) From Australia to Pakistan 
CSA_CN 2,424 $280,911(b) From St, Lawrence to Pakistan 
CSA_EU 1,128 $247,647 (a) From EU Gulf to Pakistan 
CSA-US 304 $279,460 (a) From US Gulf to Pakistan 
CSA-CIS 4,208 $250,554 (b) From Black sea to Pakistan  
CSA_ROW 564 $240,010 (b)  
CSA_SA 97,330 $238,737 (d)  
Continued . . .  
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 QSA 97,330 $238,737  
NA 
Consuming 
region 
quantity 
000 tons 
price US $ per 
000 tons 
Freight rate calculation 
CNA_AR 124 $233,611(b) From Argentina to Egypt 
CNA_AU 283 $301,380 (a) From Australia to Egypt 
CNA_CN 1,869 $288,583 (a) From St. Lawrence to Algeria 
CNA_EU 5,870 $227,567 (a) From EU to Algeria 
CNA-US 2,860 $269,020 (a) From US Gulf to Algeria 
CNA-CIS 4,277 $224,610(b) From Black Sea to Algeria 
CNA_ROW 939 $234,932(b)  
CNA_NA 18,996 $239,754(d)  
QNA 18,996 $239,754  
SS 
 
      
CSS_AR 1,532 $214,760(b) From Argentina to South Africa 
CSS_AU 725 $282,647(b) From Australia to South Africa 
CSS_CN 1,241 $274,654(b) From St. Lawrence to South Africa 
CSS_EU 3,457 $244,477 (a) From EU to Sudan 
CSS-US 3,636 $273,490 (a) From US Gulf to South Africa 
CSS-CIS 983 $262,230(b) From Black Sea to South Africa 
CSS_ROW 439 $246,224(b)  
CSS_SS 5,228 $243,503(d)  
QSS 5,228 $243,503  
OC 
    
COC_AR 0 $247,294(b) From Argentina to Australia 
COC_AU 418 $256,750(c)  
COC_CN 16 $306,274(b) From St. Lawrence to Australia 
COC_EU 22 $256,805(b) From Amsterdam to Australia 
COC-US 23 $299,413(b) From US Gulf to Australia  
COC-CIS 1 $258,485(b) From Black Sea to Australia  
COC_ROW 9 $255,657(b)  
QOC 11,152 $256,750  
 
 Source: Canadian grain Council, 2007 and author’s calculations 
 
*The countries whose quantity of consumption of wheat from a specific origin is less than 1000 tons is considered zero is not 
included in the table. 
a) Price of wheat in destined regions are calculated based on the 2007 average FOB Export Price in the country of 
origin port plus ocean transportation costs from International Grain Council.. 
b) Freight rates are calculated by author’s estimations based on relative geographic distance and alternate routes 
c) The average farm gate price in producing region 
d) Author’s calculation based on the weighted average price of wheat from different origins. The transportation cost 
varies according to the region.    
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As indicated above, the slopes and intercepts are derived using base year prices and quantities, 
using equation 4-1 and 4-2. In order to get the own priceelasticities and cross price elasticities of 
demand equations for each region, we used the Armington formula. Considering the linear demand 
equations mentioned in Chapter 3, a series of demand equations can be set up having all demand 
elasticities and elasticities of substitution between wheat from different origins in each country. 
Inserting the appropriate variables in equation 4-5 calculates the own price elasticity of demand 
and equation 4-6 gives the cross price elasticity of demand.  
iixiixxx SS ηση +−−= )1(1                                                          
Equation 4- 5 
)( iiiyxy S ηση +=                                                           
Equation 4- 6 
 
Where Six indicates the share of consumption of wheat originating from country x in region i, iσ
is the elasticity of substitution and iη is the overall elasticity of demand in region i. 
The overall elasticity of demand in region i is the percentage change in total quantity demanded 
as a  result of one percent change in the aggregate price of all the products.  
d
d
i
Q
P
P
Q
∆
∆
=η
 
                                                           Equation 4- 7 
To consider an appropriate approximation for the overall elasticity of demand, as Sumner et al. 
(1994) suggested, we considered the overall demand of wheat to be demand derived from the demand 
for milling and pasta-making.  
The elasticity of substitution in demand measures the degree to which the two (or more) goods’ 
ratio in region ichanges in reaction to changes in the ratio of their prices. 
)/(%
)/(%
yx
i
PP
YX
∆
∆
=σ
                                                           
Equation 4- 8 
 99 
 
 
According to Sumner et al. (1994), borrowing elasticities from the literature is an important and 
confusing task due to the factors that affect the estimations and elasticity of substitution for wheat from 
different origins. These factors include the original functional form used by the researcher, different 
aggregation of data, and the use of different data series. They show that many previous estimates may 
have been underestimated because of the use of the wrong functional form. Also, using annual data in 
most studies yields much smaller values for the elasticity of substitution than in cases in which quarterly 
data were used. Moreover, aggregation issues are the other factor that may have affected the study and 
estimations. Regularly, if the researcher aggregates the data without any partitioning according to end 
use, the estimations of elasticity of substitution will be smaller than if they were estimated separately 
according to types, because the elasticity of substitution are smaller when commodities are more 
heterogeneous. The finer the commodity classes, they will be more homogeneous and as a result the 
elasticity of substitutions rises. Thus, if we face a category of a specific type of wheat like durum or 
milling wheat, it has greater substitution elasticity than the total wheat. 
As Sumner et al. (1994) suggest the appropriate elasticity of substitute for the wheat not 
differentiated by the end use, is around 6 or more (Calculated by Alston et al. (1990)).Therefore, in our 
initial equilibrium, the base elasticity of substitution in aggregated wheat is considered 6=iσ , and the 
robustness of this model will be examined by replicating the model changing the elasticity of 
substitution to 3, 9 and 12. In terms of overall demand elasticity, as per Sumner et al. (1994), we assume
15.0−=iη . 
Given the base prices and quantities in 2006-07 and an overall demand elasticity of 15.0−=iη
table 4-5 shows the demand elasticities implied by applying 6=iσ . As shown by Sumner et al (1994), in 
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such Armingtonframework that has allowed for imperfect substitution for the types of wheat, there is no 
need to use price transmission elasticity modification to reduce the calculated elasticity.  
 
Table 4-5 Armington Own Price and Cross Price Elasticity of Demand in Importing Regions 
 
Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta=-0.15 
Sigma=6 
EUROPEAN UNION DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in EU Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share         
AR 0.000 -5.999 0.008 0.096 5.589 0.032 0.105 0.019  
AU 0.001 0.001 -5.992 0.096 5.589 0.032 0.105 0.019  
CN 0.016 0.001 0.008 -5.904 5.589 0.032 0.105 0.019  
EU 0.955 0.001 0.008 0.096 -0.411 0.032 0.105 0.019  
US 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.096 5.589 -5.968 0.105 0.019  
CIS 0.018 0.001 0.008 0.096 5.589 0.032 -5.895 0.019  
ROW 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.096 5.589 0.032 0.105 -5.981  
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -6.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.004 5.787 0.005  
AU 0.000 0.000 -6.000 0.000 0.059 0.004 5.787 0.005  
CN 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.000 0.059 0.004 5.787 0.005  
EU 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.941 0.059 5.787 0.005  
US 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 -5.996 5.787 0.005  
CIS 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.004 -0.213 0.005  
ROW 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.004 5.787 -5.995  
CANADA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in CN Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -6.000 0.000 5.850 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
AU 0.000 0.000 -6.000 5.850 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
CN 1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
EU 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.850 -6.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
US 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.850 0.000 -6.000 0.000 0.000  
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.850 0.000 0.000 -6.000 0.000  
ROW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.000  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in US Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.001 -5.995 0.000 0.605 0.001 5.215 0.004 0.021  
AU 0.000 0.005 -6.000 0.605 0.001 5.215 0.004 0.021  
CN 0.103 0.005 0.000 -5.395 0.001 5.215 0.004 0.021  
EU 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.605 -5.999 5.215 0.004 0.021  
          
          
Continued . . .  
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta=-0.15 
Sigma=6 
Demand Elasticities in US Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share         
EU 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.605 -5.999 5.215 0.004 0.021  
US 0.891 0.005 0.000 0.605 0.001 -0.785 0.004 0.021  
CIS 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.605 0.001 5.215 -5.996 0.021  
ROW 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.605 0.001 5.215 0.004 -5.979  
LATIN AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in LA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.631 -2.312 0.000 0.711 0.064 1.242 0.022 0.122  
AU 0.000 3.688 -6.000 0.711 0.064 1.242 0.022 0.122  
CN 0.121 3.688 0.000 -5.289 0.064 1.242 0.022 0.122  
EU 0.011 3.688 0.000 0.711 -5.936 1.242 0.022 0.122  
US 0.212 3.688 0.000 0.711 0.064 -4.758 0.022 0.122  
CIS 0.004 3.688 0.000 0.711 0.064 1.242 -5.978 0.122  
ROW 0.021 3.688 0.000 0.711 0.064 1.242 0.022 -5.878  
NEAR EAST ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.008 -5.956 0.131 0.100 0.132 0.205 0.437 0.194 4.608 
AU 0.022 0.044 -5.869 0.100 0.132 0.205 0.437 0.194 4.608 
CN 0.017 0.044 0.131 -5.900 0.132 0.205 0.437 0.194 4.608 
EU 0.023 0.044 0.131 0.100 -5.868 0.205 0.437 0.194 4.608 
US 0.035 0.044 0.131 0.100 0.132 -5.795 0.437 0.194 4.608 
CIS 0.075 0.044 0.131 0.100 0.132 0.205 -5.563 0.194 4.608 
ROW 0.033 0.044 0.131 0.100 0.132 0.205 0.437 -5.806 4.608 
NE 0.788 0.044 0.131 0.100 0.132 0.205 0.437 0.194 -1.392 
PACFIC ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in PA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -5.987 0.297 0.183 0.001 0.372 0.019 0.150 4.815 
AU 0.051 0.013 -5.703 0.183 0.001 0.372 0.019 0.150 4.815 
CN 0.031 0.013 0.297 -5.817 0.001 0.372 0.019 0.150 4.815 
EU 0.000 0.013 0.297 0.183 -5.999 0.372 0.019 0.150 4.815 
US 0.064 0.013 0.297 0.183 0.001 -5.628 0.019 0.150 4.815 
CIS 0.003 0.013 0.297 0.183 0.001 0.372 -5.981 0.150 4.815 
ROW 0.026 0.013 0.297 0.183 0.001 0.372 0.019 -5.850 4.815 
PA 0.823 0.013 0.183 0.183 0.001 0.372 0.019 0.150 -1.185 
SOUTH ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in SA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -5.991 0.086 0.132 0.061 0.017 0.229 0.031 5.287 
AU 0.015 0.009 -5.914 0.132 0.061 0.017 0.229 0.031 5.287 
CN 0.023 0.009 0.086 -5.868 0.061 0.017 0.229 0.031 5.287 
EU 0.010 0.009 0.086 0.132 -5.939 0.017 0.229 0.031 5.287 
US 0.003 0.009 0.086 0.132 0.061 -5.983 0.229 0.031 5.287 
CIS 0.039 0.009 0.086 0.132 0.061 0.017 -5.771 0.031 5.287 
ROW 0.005 0.009 0.086 0.132 0.061 0.017 0.229 -5.969 5.287 
Continued . . .  
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta=-0.15 
Sigma=6 
Source Share Demand Elasticities in SA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
SA 0.904 0.009 0.086 0.132 0.061 0.017 0.229 0.031 -0.713 
NORTH AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.004 -5.979 0.047 0.310 0.975 0.475 0.710 0.156 3.155 
AU 0.008 0.021 -5.953 0.310 0.975 0.475 0.710 0.156 3.155 
CN 0.053 0.021 0.047 -5.690 0.975 0.475 0.710 0.156 3.155 
EU 0.167 0.021 0.047 0.310 -5.025 0.475 0.710 0.156 3.155 
US 0.081 0.021 0.047 0.310 0.975 -5.525 0.710 0.156 3.155 
CIS 0.121 0.021 0.047 0.310 0.975 0.475 -5.290 0.156 3.155 
ROW 0.027 0.021 0.047 0.310 0.975 0.475 0.710 -5.844 3.155 
NA 0.539 0.021 0.047 0.310 0.975 0.475 0.710 0.156 -2.845 
SUB SAHARAN AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in SS Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.089 -5.480 0.246 0.421 1.173 1.234 0.334 0.149 1.774 
AU 0.042 0.520 -5.754 0.421 1.173 1.234 0.334 0.149 1.774 
CN 0.072 0.520 0.246 -5.579 1.173 1.234 0.334 0.149 1.774 
EU 0.201 0.520 0.246 0.421 -4.827 1.234 0.334 0.149 1.774 
US 0.211 0.520 0.246 0.421 1.173 -4.766 0.334 0.149 1.774 
CIS 0.057 0.520 0.246 0.421 1.173 1.234 -5.666 0.149 1.774 
ROW 0.025 0.520 0.246 0.421 1.173 1.234 0.334 -5.851 1.774 
SS 0.303 0.520 0.246 0.421 1.173 1.234 0.334 0.149 -4.226 
OCEANIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OC Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -6.000 5.001 0.191 0.263 0.275 0.012 0.108  
AU 0.855 0.000 -0.999 0.191 0.263 0.275 0.012 0.108  
CN 0.033 0.000 5.001 -5.809 0.263 0.275 0.012 0.108  
EU 0.045 0.000 5.001 0.191 -5.737 0.275 0.012 0.108  
US 0.047 0.000 5.001 0.191 0.263 -5.725 0.012 0.108  
CIS 0.002 0.000 5.001 0.191 0.263 0.275 -5.988 0.108  
ROW 0.018 0.000 5.001 0.191 0.263 0.275 0.012 -5.892  
 
Source: Simulation Calculations 
 
 
In terms of supply elasticity, the overall elasticity of the wheat production in each region is a 
function of variety of production factors. It is assumed the producers are all price takers and operate in a 
competitive market both in input and output market. This assumption does not harm the model in this 
thesis and in future studies different assumption on supply side can be examined on such a simulation. 
As mentioned by Sumner et al. (1994), considering the key factors deriving the supply response, the 
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long run supply function can be assumed to be highly elastic. However, due to the biases in econometric 
estimations because of the variety of unpredictable factors in agriculture production, expectations, 
uncertainties, and the difficulty of modeling the supply in long run, using estimation for the elasticity of 
supply specially is critical for the models that are concerned with investigating the policy changes. 
Therefore in this research, the supply elasticity from Sumner et al. (1994) has been adopted that has 
accounted for these biases. The supply elasticity of different producing regions is assumed to be 0.5.  
    Considering the market clearing condition and the geographic distances between regions, the 
market clearing quantity and prices are calculated.The model includes constraints to obtain the market 
clearing conditions for wheat market in all eleven regions. Through the process of simulation, the model 
calculates the prices of all the products in all the regions that provide the market clearing conditions. In 
the next step it is verified whether the simulation is working accurately, or on the other word the model 
validation is tested. 
4.3. Model validation 
As Srivastava (1997) mentions there is not a fully established methodology for simulation, and 
especially the market simulation models. Based on Trade Analysis Simulation System (TASS) 
developed by Agriculture Canada (1988), sensitivity analysis, using of reliable parameters and 
inspection of obvious errors are some solutions to validate a model. One of the key tests emphasized by 
TASS to get a reliable simulation model is replacing the original base year data. This is known as Base 
Year Calibration. Following this solution and obtaining the based year data successfully, supports the 
conclusion that the model has been specified correctly. The other suggestion in this method is to 
compare the results of the developed model with results of similar models. However this suggestion 
does not seem applicable since other studies may not look at the same question and scenario and even 
may not have been constructed under the same circumstances and assumptions. Also they may have use 
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different based year data and different set of initial assumptions. While it may be hard to find another 
study that works as a comparison scope, it may be helpful solution to look at the results in detail where 
they appear to be unusual or inconsistent in terms of the direction and magnitude of outcomes.  
In this study the following verification procedure has been followed: 
All the intercepts and coefficients were calculated by the steps explained in last section. Then the base 
year prices and freight rates were used in all the equations to estimate the quantities using the calculated 
intercepts and coefficients. The calculated quantities for all countries and regions came out exactly the 
same as in the base year. A detailed sensitivity analysis is also carried out in the following sections to 
analyze the impact of changes in all the parameters one by one on the important variables in different 
regions, and examine the robustness of the model toward these parameters. As a result the whole spatial 
market simulating model seems to work properly. A variety of simulations (corresponding to different 
combination of parameters) are summarized in tables in next section of this research and the appendices. 
As the next step the impact of changes in freight rate in the wheat flow between regions is investigated 
and then some robustness analysis is added to see how the variation of different parameters affects the 
results.     
4.4. Scenarios 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the result of the changes in the freight 
rate on the world wheat flow. In this section, the developed base simulation in this thesis is used to 
follow the result of changing ocean freight on flow of wheat. The scenarios developed in this section are 
described as follows:  
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Scenario A)Increasing freight rates in all routes simultaneously in base model: 
The freight rates are increased in all routes for 10%, 50 %, and 100 %  given the initial base year 
prices and quantities, elasticity of substitution equals to 6, own price elasticity of -0.15, and 
supply elasticity of 0.5. 
 
Scenario B)Model reaction to the changes in demand elasticity and elasticity of Substitution: 
 The impact of the changes in the freight rate are examined with elasticity of substitution and 
over all elasticity of demand for wheat changes. 
 
Scenario C)The Impact of the freight rate changes to or from a specific region: 
i. The impact of the changes to a specific importing regions 
ii. The impact of the changes from a specific exporting region 
 
Scenario A:IncreasingFreightRates in all Routes Simultaneously 
Under this scenario it is assumed that the freight rates in all routes increase proportionally. 
Table A-1 in Appendix B provides the equilibrium quantity demanded, supplied, and prices for all the 
regions under the assumption of 10%, 50%, and 100% increase in freight rates. 
Table 4-6 shows the percentage changes in quantities and prices, after a50% and 100% shock in 
freight rates. Figure 4-4 compares the impact of 50% and 100% increase in freight rates on quantity of 
supply in different regions, and wheat supply prices across the producing regions. This increase in 
freight rate affects the supply of wheat in country of origin. Depending on elasticity of supply in region, 
the percentage of the change in production and prices varies. As illustrated in the graph, some regions 
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are forced to decrease their production and the supply price to compensate the increase in freight rate, 
while the others increase the supply due to a price increase.As shown in the figure, most of the 
importing regions will increase their domestic production in reacting to the freight rate increases. 
Among the producing regions, only the Latin America (LA) has slightly increased the price and supply 
of wheat after the increase in freight rate. One should note that considering the natural delay in the 
reaction of agricultural production to price changes, the producing region cannot react to the price 
changes immediately. In short term the regions will probably use their stocks and after reaching the 
maximum level of the stock, they will not be able to increase the supply quantity more. Considering the 
dynamic nature of freight rates and delay in reacting to price changes in agricultural products, producers 
can only be inspired by predicting the changes and forecast the trend in long term and adjust the supply 
quantity accordingly. In short run, they can only react to the price changes by adjusting the supply to 
different regions and playing with the stock level to react to immediate price changes. Among producing 
regions, Canada and United States show the biggest price reduction followed by Oceania. SS and NE on 
the other hand, show the biggest supply price and quantity increase.  
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Figure 4-4 Impact of 50% Freight Rate Increase on Supply Price and Quantity using Base Elasticities 
Source: Simulation Results 
 
 
Figure 4-4to 4-6 show the impact of the increasing freight rate on prices and quantities of the wheat 
originated from different source. As it is shown the compatibility of the wheat produced in different 
exporting regions in consuming regions varies. Again, as shown in these graphs, although the freight 
rate costs has gone up with equal coefficient in different regions, the price of wheat in the destination 
varies from region to region. This is coming from the fact of different distances and accumulated 
transportation costs as a result of it, and different demand coefficients. In addition, the premium price of 
wheat in different regions varies. Therefore, the price and quantity of exported wheat from one region 
changes from region to region. 
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Figure 4- 5 Impact of 50% Freight Increase in all Routes on the Global Wheat Quantity 
 
Source: Simulation Results 
 
 Figure 4- 6 Regional Change in Wheat Price after 50% Freight Rate Increase in all Routes 
                                                            Source: Simulation Results 
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Figure 4-6 compares the changes in prices in different consuming regions. It also implies  the 
opportunities and advantages that are created or lost in each region for the exporter after increasing 
freight rates. One can compare the changes from base simulation and use the result of the simulation to 
make marketing decisions. For instance, as per the result of this simulation, after a 50% increase in 
freight rates toSouth Asia (SA), the changes in price of wheat originated from AR and EU are the largest 
and the changes in price of Canadian wheat is the smallest followed by Australian wheat. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates the SA regional wheat market and the share of wheat produced in different regions 
before the price changes. The wheat originated from CIS and Canada is the dominant importing wheat to 
the region, followed by Australia. Although after the shock in freight market, there is an opportunity to 
compete with other regions for Canada to obtain and maintain a bigger share in this market.   
 
 
Figure 4- 7 Comparison of Import Share of Different Originated Wheat in South Asia According to Base 
Price and Quantities and 50% Increase in Freight Rates 
Source: International Grain Council (2007) and Simulation results 
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Table 4-6 Percentage Changes in Wheat Quantity and Prices after a 50%, and 100% Increase in Freight 
Rate Using Armington Base Simulation Assumptions 
 
 
Quantities Prices Quantities Prices 
EU Markets % change % Change % change % Change 
Domestic demand T= 100% Sigma=6 T=50 % Sigma=6 
CEU_AR -100.0% 20.0% -66.52% 9.99% 
CEU_AU -83.6% 12.3% -41.81% 6.16% 
CEU_CN -9.4% -0.3% -4.70% -0.17% 
CEU_EU 2.6% -3.0% 1.31% -1.51% 
CEU_US -32.4% 3.4% -16.19% 1.69% 
CEU_CIS -66.5% 9.0% -33.24% 4.49% 
CEU_ROW -1.2% -2.4% -0.59% -1.18% 
     
QEU -1.5% -3.0% -0.75% -1.51% 
OE Market    
Domestic Demand    
COE_AR -100.0% 22.6% -78.70% 11.29% 
COE_AU 0.0% 8.6% 0.00% 4.29% 
COE_CN -38.4% 3.2% -19.22% 1.62% 
COE_EU -88.8% 11.0% -44.42% 5.52% 
COE_US -64.3% 7.4% -32.15% 3.70% 
COE_CIS 1.7% -4.4% 0.83% -2.21% 
COE_ROW -1.9% -3.8% -0.95% -1.91% 
Supply     
QOE -2.2% -4.4% -1.10% -2.21% 
     
CA Market    
Domestic Demand    
CCA_AR 0.0% 17.2% 0.00% 8.62% 
CCA_AU 0.0% 15.0% 0.00% 7.48% 
CCA_CN 2.0% -13.2% 0.99% -6.60% 
CCA_EU 0.0% 10.7% 0.00% 5.35% 
CCA_US 0.0% 1.8% 0.00% 0.89% 
CCA_CIS 0.0% 12.2% 0.00% 6.12% 
CCA_ROW 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Domestic Supply    
QCA -6.6% -13.2% -3.30% -6.60% 
US  Market    
Domestic Demand    
CUS_AR -100.0% 13.5% -69.39% 6.73% 
CUS_AU 0.0% 15.4% 0.00% 7.71% 
CUS_CN -39.4% -1.3% -19.72% -0.63% 
Continued . . .  
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 % change % Change % change % Change 
 T= 100% Sigma=6 T=50 % Sigma=6 
CUS_EU -100.0% 11.4% -61.24% 5.68% 
CUS_US 7.4% -10.6% 3.69% -5.31% 
Domestic Supply    
Qus -5.3% -10.6% -2.66% -5.31% 
LA  Market    
Domestic Demand    
CLA_AR 6.2% 0.5% 3.10% 0.27% 
CLA_AU -51.3% 9.5% -25.66% 4.76% 
CLA_CN -7.7% 2.4% -3.83% 1.18% 
CLA_EU -90.2% 16.2% -45.08% 8.12% 
CLA_US -3.6% 1.8% -1.78% 0.89% 
CLA_CIS -92.5% 16.5% -46.25% 8.26% 
CLA_ROW 0.7% 1.3% 0.33% 0.66% 
Domestic Supply    
QLA 0.3% 0.5% 0.14% 0.27% 
NE Market    
Domestic Demand    
CNE_AR -84.1% 21.8% -42.06% 10.88% 
CNE_AU -11.5% 8.1% -5.75% 4.04% 
CNE_CN 18.0% 3.6% 9.02% 1.81% 
CNE_EU -55.9% 16.8% -27.96% 8.42% 
CNE_US -8.8% 8.4% -4.39% 4.18% 
CNE_CIS -24.1% 11.4% -12.06% 5.69% 
CNE_ROW 3.8% 7.6% 1.91% 3.81% 
CNE_NE 3.8% 7.6% 1.90% 3.79% 
Domestic Supply    
QNE 3.8% 7.6% 1.90% 3.79% 
     
PA  Market    
Domestic Demand    
CPA_AR -100.0% 30.3% -73.34% 15.14% 
CPA_AU -2.0% 5.7% -0.99% 2.83% 
CPA_CN -19.1% 8.5% -9.54% 4.24% 
CPA_EU -100.0% 26.9% -64.07% 13.47% 
CPA_US -36.0% 11.6% -17.98% 5.81% 
CPA_CIS -71.9% 17.8% -35.97% 8.88% 
CPA_ROW 2.6% 5.2% 1.30% 2.61% 
CPA_PA 2.5% 5.0% 1.25% 2.49% 
Domestic Supply    
QPA 2.5% 5.0% 1.25% 2.49% 
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SA  Market Quantities Prices Quantities Prices 
 % change % Change % change % Change 
Domestic Demand T= 100% Sigma=6 T=50 % Sigma=6 
CSA_AR -100.0% 24.4% -59.45% 12.21% 
CSA_AU -23.5% 7.7% -11.73% 3.86% 
CSA_CN 0.0% 4.1% -0.02% 2.03% 
CSA_EU -77.2% 17.5% -38.58% 8.73% 
CSA_US -48.2% 12.1% -24.12% 6.06% 
CSA_CIS -40.1% 11.2% -20.05% 5.62% 
CSA_ROW 2.2% 4.4% 1.10% 2.19% 
CSA_SA 2.2% 4.3% 1.08% 2.16% 
Domestic Supply    
Qsa 2.2% 4.3% 1.08% 2.16% 
NA  Market    
Domestic Demand    
CNA_AR -82.5% 19.9% -41.25% 9.96% 
CNA_AU -20.8% 8.2% -10.39% 4.12% 
CNA_CN -9.0% 6.5% -4.51% 3.25% 
CNA_EU -22.0% 10.0% -11.01% 5.00% 
CNA_US -19.4% 8.6% -9.69% 4.29% 
CNA_CIS 33.6% 0.8% 16.81% 0.40% 
CNA_ROW 2.8% 5.7% 1.41% 2.83% 
CNA_NA 2.8% 5.5% 1.39% 2.77% 
Domestic Supply    
QNA 2.8% 5.6% 1.39% 2.78% 
SS  Market    
Domestic Demand    
CSS_AR -3.5% 12.9% -1.77% 6.45% 
CSS_AU 43.1% 2.2% 21.55% 1.08% 
CSS_CN 47.2% 1.8% 23.59% 0.88% 
CSS_EU -32.5% 16.2% -16.26% 8.11% 
CSS_US -2.5% 10.1% -1.26% 5.04% 
CSS_CIS -29.8% 15.0% -14.89% 7.52% 
CSS_ROW 5.0% 9.9% 2.48% 4.95% 
CSS_SS 5.0% 10.0% 2.50% 5.01% 
Domestic Supply    
Qss 5.0% 10.0% 2.50% 5.01% 
OC  Market    
Domestic Demand    
COC_AR 0.0% 24.4% 0.00% 12.18% 
COC_AU 21.2% -7.7% 10.62% -3.85% 
COC_CN -92.4% 11.9% -46.18% 5.95% 
COC_EU -100.0% 20.2% -73.26% 10.12% 
COC_US -100.0% 17.9% -64.33% 8.93% 
Continued . . .  
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OC Market Quantities Prices Quantities Prices 
 % change % Change % change % Change 
 T= 100% Sigma=6 T=50 % Sigma=6 
COC_CIS -100.0% 13.8% -53.85% 6.90% 
COC_ROW -1.9% -3.9% -0.97% -1.93% 
     
Domestic Supply    
Qoc -3.9% -7.7% -1.93% -3.85% 
     
 
Scenario B:Model Reaction to the Changes in Demand Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution: 
To conduct a test to examine the impact of variation of the different parameters in the model, a 
sensitivity analysis needs to be done. The overall elasticity of demand (η ), and the elasticity of 
substitutions (δ ) are varied in this section and the simulation is resolved for each change to obtain the 
market clearing solution. 
In this scenario, the elasticity of substitution between wheat originated from different region 
ischanged from 6 to 12 (higher bound), and from 6 to 3 (lower bound), and the overall elasticity of 
demand is changed from -0.15 to -0.2 (higher bound) and to -0.1 (lower bound).To measure the 
magnitude of the effect, the model has been solved for lower bound and higher bound elasticity and 50% 
freight rate increase in all routes. Table A-2 shows the own price and cross price elasticities using lower 
bound and higher bound overall demand elasticity and elasticity of substitution, using base prices, 
quantities, and shares in different markets. Table 4-7 shows the result of the changes in flow and price of 
the wheat in different regions with 50%increase in the freight rates in all routes.In addition to elasticity 
of substitution and overall elasticity, the magnitude of the changes in own price and cross price 
elasticityalso dependson the share of the imported wheat in each destination. It is expected as the 
elasticity of substitution increase, and the different originated wheat get closer substitute, the reaction to 
the freight rate fluctuations become larger.  
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The lower bound simulation is a replication of lower elasticity of substitution between the 
different originated wheat . Therefore the different originated wheat arenot treated as substitutes and the 
importing countries show less sensitivity to price changes that are the result of higher freight rates. In 
this scenario, the magnitude of the changes in quantities is smaller than the time that the elasticities are 
higher. When the model is solved with higher bound elasticities, which in case of elasticity of 
substitution means greater sensitivity toward substituting different type of wheat, it shows that the model 
reacts even more to the changes. This is because the consuming region can replace the more expensive 
wheat with the less expensive one. Our model is capable of showing this result. Table 4-7 shows the 
changes in flow and prices of the wheat in different regions, with higher bound and lower bound 
elasticity.  
Consider the Pacific Asia (PA) region. United States, Australia, and Canada are the first three 
importers to the region according to the base year prices and quantities.  After a 50% increase in the 
freight rate, with the higher bound over all elasticity and elasticity of substitution, Argentina loses its 
compatibility. The region does not import from Argentina at all, while with lower bound elasticity not 
only the region imports from Argentina, but even the amount of import increases comparing to the base 
amount and quantity when the freight rate increases. This is because with higher elasticity of 
substitution, the region is more sensitive between the wheat from different origins, and replaces the less 
expensive type of the wheat. The domestic production has increased in all cases, but with different rates. 
Again, the most increase is associated with the higher elasticity of substitution and over all elasticity of 
demand.   
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Table 4-7 Wheat Flow and Price Comparison between Base Model (Sigma=6, Eta= -1.5), Higher Bound Elasticity (Sigma= 12, Eta= -
0.2), and Lower Bound Elasticity (Sigma= 3, Eta= -0.1),T=50% 
 
MODEL 
PARAMETERS 
BASE ELASTICITIES 
T= 0 % 
BASE ELASTICITIES 
T= 50% 
HIGH BOUND ELASTICITIES 
T= 50% 
LOW BOUND ELASTICITIES 
T=50% 
 Quantities Prices Quantities Prices Quantities Prices Quantities Prices 
EU Markets QEU-i PEU-i QEU-i PEU-i QEU-i PEU-i QEU-i PEU-i 
Domestic demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CEU_AR 14 $233,452 5 $256,642 -5 $255,854 9 $257,508 
CEU_AU 160 $315,136 93 $334,437 16 $334,718 128 $334,552 
CEU_CN 1,938 $268,582 1,846 $267,957 1,750 $266,751 1,876 $269,848 
CEU_EU 112,274 $198,418 113,767 $195,223 115,289 $193,974 113,019 $196,371 
CEU_US 644 $254,189 539 $258,323 434 $257,098 587 $260,128 
CEU_CIS 2,107 $244,370 1,406 $255,158 681 $254,149 1,757 $256,297 
CEU_ROW 388 $200,210 386 $197,667 384 $196,371 387 $198,829 
Domestic Supply         
QEU 125,095 $198,418 124,088 $195,223 123,694 $193,974 124,450 $196,371 
OE Market QOE-i POE-i QOE-i POE-i QOE-i POE-i QOE-i POE-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
COE_AR 1 $241,283 0 $268,389 -1 $267,601 1 $269,255 
COE_AU 0 $302,233 0 $315,083 0 $315,364 0 $315,198 
COE_CN 3 $278,522 2 $282,867 2 $281,661 3 $284,758 
COE_EU 751 $229,788 418 $242,278 92 $241,029 584 $243,426 
COE_US 47 $265,189 32 $274,823 17 $273,598 39 $276,628 
COE_CIS 73,737 $213,000 74,359 $208,103 74,874 $207,094 74,051 $209,242 
COE_ROW 59 $213,203 58 $208,959 58 $207,795 59 $210,241 
Domestic Supply         
QOE 89,910 $213,000 88,876 $208,103 88,663 $207,094 89,117 $209,242 
CA Market QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CCA_AR 0 $225,732 0 $245,062 0 $244,274 0 $245,928 
CCA_AU 0 $324,939 0 $349,142 0 $349,423 0 $349,257 
CCA_CN 5,959 $238,082 6,019 $222,207 6,045 $221,001 5,994 $224,098 
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Model 
PARAMETERS 
Base Elasticities 
t= 0 % 
Base Elasticities 
T= 50% 
High BoundElasticities 
T= 50% 
Low Bound Elasticities 
T=50% 
CCA_EU 0 $228,918 0 $240,973 0 $239,724 0 $242,121 
CA Market QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i QCA-i PCA-i 
CCA_US 0 $250,039 0 $252,098 0 $250,873 0 $253,903 
CCA_CIS 0 $253,440 0 $268,763 0 $267,754 0 $269,902 
CCA_ROW 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 
Domestic Supply         
QCA 25,265 $238,082 24,423 $222,207 24,359 $221,001 24,523 $224,098 
US  Market QUS-i PUS-i QUS-i PUS-i QUS-i PUS-i QUS-i PUS-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CUS_AR 23 $215,872 7 $230,272 -10 $229,484 15 $231,138 
CUS_AU 0 $326,704 0 $351,790 0 $352,071 0 $351,905 
CUS_CN 2,862 $266,122 2,298 $264,267 1,723 $263,061 2,579 $266,158 
CUS_EU 4 $230,608 2 $243,508 -1 $242,259 3 $244,656 
CUS_US 24,660 $221,999 25,572 $210,038 26,392 $208,813 25,129 $211,843 
CUS_CIS 17 $256,190 6 $272,888 -5 $271,879 12 $274,027 
CUS_ROW 99 $225,497 97 $215,732 96 $214,236 97 $217,762 
Domestic Supply         
Qus 49,316 $221,999 47,987 $210,038 47,851 $208,813 48,188 $211,843 
LA  Market QLA-i PLA-i QLA-i PLA-i QLA-i PLA-i QLA-i PLA-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CLA_AR 20,069 $187,832 20,685 $188,212 21,143 $187,424 20,466 $189,078 
CLA_AU 1 $305,423 1 $319,869 0 $320,150 1 $319,984 
CLA_CN 3,867 $275,982 3,721 $279,057 3,625 $277,851 3,763 $280,948 
CLA_EU 349 $244,038 192 $263,653 41 $262,404 271 $264,801 
CLA_US 6,758 $250,039 6,642 $252,098 6,627 $250,873 6,646 $253,903 
CLA_CIS 122 $266,451 66 $288,280 10 $287,271 94 $289,419 
CLA_ROW 664 $208,747 666 $209,985 665 $209,162 667 $210,872 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
QLA 22,635 $187,832 22,658 $188,212 22,610 $187,424 22,710 $189,078 
NE Market QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CNE_AR 406 $238,778 235 $264,632 98 $263,843 311 $265,498 
CNE_AU 1,206 $300,597 1,136 $312,630 1,093 $312,911 1,156 $312,745 
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Model 
PARAMETERS 
Base Elasticities 
t= 0 % 
Base Elasticities 
T= 50% 
High BoundElasticities 
T= 50% 
Low Bound Elasticities 
T=50% 
CNE_CN 923 $279,590 1,007 $284,468 1,172 $283,262 936 $286,359 
CNE_EU 1,218 $245,807 880 $266,306 665 $265,056 1,016 $267,453 
NE Market QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i QNE-i PNE-i 
CNE_US 1,890 $268,009 1,809 $279,054 1,902 $277,829 1,788 $280,859 
CNE_CIS 4,036 $250,996 3,557 $265,096 3,432 $264,087 3,689 $266,236 
CNE_ROW 1,798 $224,208 1,832 $232,638 1,837 $233,817 1,826 $231,023 
CNE_NE 42,569 $225,162 43,366 $233,595 43,474 $234,732 43,221 $232,057 
Domestic Supply         
QNE 42,569 $225,162 43,366 $233,595 43,474 $234,732 43,221 $232,057 
PA  Market QPA-i PPA-i QPA-i PPA-i QPA-i PPA-i QPA-i PPA-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CPA_AR 300 $267,922 80 $308,348 0 $307,559 184 $309,214 
CPA_AU 6,779 $292,917 6,714 $301,110 6,837 $301,391 6,669 $301,225 
CPA_CN 4,163 $294,482 3,773 $306,807 3,749 $305,601 3,845 $308,698 
CPA_EU 22 $279,771 8 $317,252 0 $316,002 14 $318,400 
CPA_US 8,493 $277,869 6,980 $293,843 6,267 $292,618 7,479 $295,648 
CPA_CIS 421 $270,460 271 $294,293 157 $293,284 336 $295,432 
CPA_ROW 3,422 $276,665 3,466 $283,796 3,474 $285,004 3,458 $282,417 
CPA_PA 109,822 $283,573 111,175 $290,560 111,405 $291,749 110,912 $289,202 
Domestic Supply         
QPA 109,822 $283,573 111,175 $290,560 111,405 $291,749 110,912 $289,202 
SA  Market QSA-i PSA-i QSA-i PSA-i QSA-i PSA-i QSA-i PSA-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CSA_AR 166 $247,185 68 $277,242 -15 $276,454 113 $278,108 
CSA_AU 1,580 $299,437 1,396 $310,890 1,271 $311,171 1,467 $311,005 
CSA_CN 2,424 $280,911 2,429 $286,449 2,685 $285,244 2,347 $288,341 
CSA_EU 1,128 $247,648 696 $269,068 400 $267,819 880 $270,216 
CSA_US 304 $279,459 231 $296,228 191 $295,003 258 $298,033 
CSA_CIS 4,208 $250,554 3,377 $264,433 2,995 $263,424 3,675 $265,573 
CSA_ROW 565 $239,909 572 $245,107 573 $246,534 570 $243,630 
CSA_SA 97,329 $238,735 98,367 $243,823 98,652 $245,223 98,077 $242,404 
       
 
 
Continued . . .  
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Model 
PARAMETERS 
Base Elasticities 
t= 0 % 
Base Elasticities 
T= 50% 
High BoundElasticities 
T= 50% 
Low Bound Elasticities 
T=50% 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
Qsa 97,329 $238,735 98,367 $243,823 98,652 $245,223 98,077 $242,404 
NA  Market QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CNA_AR 124 $233,610 73 $256,880 23 $256,091 98 $257,746 
NA  Market QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i QNA-i PNA-i 
CNA_AU 283 $301,377 254 $313,800 214 $314,081 269 $313,915 
CNA_CN 1,869 $288,582 1,785 $297,957 1,748 $296,751 1,799 $299,848 
CNA_EU 5,872 $227,568 5,225 $238,948 4,781 $237,699 5,494 $240,096 
CNA_US 2,861 $269,019 2,584 $280,568 2,387 $279,343 2,679 $282,373 
CNA_CIS 4,278 $224,611 4,998 $225,518 5,812 $224,509 4,598 $226,658 
CNA_ROW 934 $235,157 947 $241,812 946 $241,397 947 $241,918 
CNA_NA 18,996 $239,765 19,260 $246,414 19,248 $246,104 19,257 $246,332 
Domestic Supply         
QNA 18,996 $239,765 19,260 $246,414 19,248 $246,104 19,257 $246,332 
SS  Market QSS-i PSS-i QSS-i PSS-i QSS-i PSS-i QSS-i PSS-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
CSS_AR 1,532 $214,759 1,505 $228,603 1,492 $227,814 1,514 $229,469 
CSS_AU 725 $282,644 881 $285,700 1,010 $285,981 807 $285,815 
CSS_CN 1,241 $274,653 1,534 $277,063 1,858 $275,858 1,371 $278,955 
CSS_EU 3,457 $244,478 2,895 $264,313 2,439 $263,064 3,155 $265,461 
CSS_US 3,636 $273,489 3,590 $287,273 3,641 $286,048 3,567 $289,078 
CSS_CIS 983 $262,230 837 $281,948 708 $280,939 904 $283,087 
CSS_ROW 439 $246,238 450 $258,432 450 $258,316 449 $258,132 
CSS_SS 5,228 $243,504 5,359 $255,697 5,358 $255,587 5,356 $255,385 
Domestic Supply         
Qss 5,228 $243,504 5,359 $255,697 5,358 $255,587 5,356 $255,385 
OC  Market QOC-i POC-i QOC-i POC-i QOC-i POC-i QOC-i POC-i 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
COC_AR 0 $247,293 0 $277,404 0 $276,616 0 $278,270 
COC_AU 418 $256,747 462 $246,855 502 $247,136 441 $246,970 
COC_CN 16 $306,274 9 $324,494 2 $323,289 12 $326,386 
COC_EU 22 $256,807 6 $282,806 -9 $281,556 14 $283,954 
Continued . . .  
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Model 
PARAMETERS 
Base Elasticities 
t= 0 % 
Base Elasticities 
T= 50% 
High BoundElasticities 
T= 50% 
Low Bound Elasticities 
T=50% 
COC_US 23 $299,412 8 $326,157 -5 $324,932 15 $327,963 
COC_CIS 1 $258,485 0 $276,331 0 $275,322 1 $277,470 
COC_ROW 9 $255,326 9 $250,394 9 $250,385 9 $250,766 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 000 t $/t 
Qoc 11,152 $256,747 10,937 $246,855 10,943 $247,136 10,940 $246,970 
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Scenario C: The Impact of the Freight Rate Changesto or from aSpecific Region: 
Two different hypothetical situations are examined in this scenario: 
i. The impact of the changes to a specific importing regions 
ii. The impact of the changes from a specific exporting region 
From time to time there is a peak in ocean freight rates to one or from some regions. For instance 
in the 1990s, Japan was importing lots of raw material due to their increasing industrial 
productions. This increased the demand for seaborne bulk transportation and consequently 
increased the freight rates to and from Japan. In the recent years, there has been an increase in 
bulk services along the routes to and from China. In the first hypothetical situation of this 
section, it is assumed that there is an increase in the demand for bulk shipment due to increase of 
demand for another bulk cargo, like increasing demand for iron in China (Pacific 
Asia).Therefore, we assume the freight rates from other regions to Pacific Asia increase by 50 %. 
This change of demand is being investigated during the short term before the vessels from other 
routes can enter the new high demand routes and adjust the prices. Therefore, in a short period 
the freight rates to Pacific Asia increases, while freight rate in other directions stays the same. 
Table 4-8 summarize the impact of this change on bulk flow to Pacific Asia. In this analysis, we 
assumed that the ROW will be the countries with shortest or no seaborne distance to the 
importing region. With such an increased freight rates, the import price of different regions 
varies. The Wheat imported from EU region shows the highest price change, followed by AR 
and CIS. Except the import from US and CN, the wheat originated from all other regions in PA 
drops down. The total import drops by 14.4% and the use of domestic wheat increases by 4%. 
Again, this drop varies from region to region and the amount of drop depends on a number of 
parameters and cannot be only related to the geographical distance. 
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Figure 4-8 Impact of 50% Increase in Freight Rates of the Routes to Pacific Asia in Flow of 
Wheat to Pacific Asia 
Source: Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-8 Impact of a 50%Increase in Freight Rate in all Routes to Pacific Asia on Wheat Import 
and Price 
 
 Quantity 
000t 
Price 
$/000t 
% ∆ Q % ∆ P 
CPA-AR 138 $303,277 -54% 13% 
CPA-AU 6,476 $306,379 -4% 5% 
CPA-CN 3,203 $317,079 -23% 8% 
CPA-EU 9 $318,752 -59% 14% 
CPA-US 6,625 $299,332 -22% 8% 
CPA-CIS 272 $297,679 -35% 10% 
CPA-ROW 3,486 $287,077 2% 4% 
CPA-PA 111,792 $293,748 2% 4% 
 
 
 
-70%
-60%
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
AR AU CN EU US CIS ROW PA
% Change in Wheat Flow After 50% Increase in Freight Rates in all Routes to PA
Figure 4- 9 Comparison of  the % Share of Wheat from Different Regions to PA 
50% Increase in Freight Rates of all Routes to PA Using the Base model Parameters (Sigma=6, 
Source: Simulation Results
 
In the second hypothetical situation, it is assumed that because of the increasing demand 
for the bulk shipping services from a specific origin, in this example Canada, the freight 
from Canada to different destinations 
entrance of the new vessels to the area cannot affect the peak in freight rates.
As per the result of the simulation, this change in freight rates reduces the total amount of 
wheat exported from Canada by 
different regions. After a 50% increase in freight rates from Canada, Oceania (OC) followed by 
Pacific Asia (PA) and North Africa (NA) have the most increased prices. The wheat shipped to 
the Other European Countries (OE), Latin America (LA), Near East (NE), Pacific Asia (PA), 
North Africa (NA), Sub Saharan Africa (SS), and Oceania OC fall  while the amount shipped to 
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Eta=-0.15) 
 
increase. Again we assume that it is short term and 
 
5%. It also changes the distribution of wheat exported to 
AU CN EU US CIS
 
before and after 
rates 
ROW
European Union (EU), and United States (US), and the Canadian Domestic consumption
increased. 
Table 4-9 Impact of a 50% Increase in Freight Rates 
(Base Model Elasticities : Sigma= 6, Eta=
 Q
CEU-CN 
COE-CN 
CCN-CN 
CUS-CN 
CLA-CN 
CNE-CN 
CPA-CN 
CSA-CN 
CNA-CN 
CSS-CN 
COC-CN 
 
Figure 4- 10 Impact of 50% Increase in Freight Rates 
Export 
 
The export to Oceania shows the largest percentage decrease followed by Pacific Asia.
However this can be analysed and used further if combined by the role of the importing region in 
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on Price and Quantity in all Routes from 
Canada 
-0.15) 
 
uantity 
000 t 
Price 
$/000 t 
∆Q% ∆P% 
2,045 $266,225 5% -1% 
3 $281,135 -5% 1% 
6,025 $220,475 1% -7% 
3,090 $262,535 8% -1% 
3,801 $277,325 -2% 0% 
869 $282,736 -6% 1% 
3,403 $305,075 -18% 4% 
2,240 $284,718 -8% 1% 
1,612 $296,225 -14% 3% 
1,232 $275,332 -1% 0% 
11 $322,763 -29% 5% 
of all Routes from Canada 
from Canada by Regions 
CN US LA NE PA SA NA SS OC
 
 
on Wheat 
 
total Canadian wheat market. Figure 
including Canadian domestic consumption from Canadian wheat
increase in freight rates.   
Figure 4- 11 Comparison of the Canadian Wheat 
50% Increase in Freight Rates of all Routes from Canada Using the Base model Parameters 
Source: Simulation Results
 
Based on the results of the simulation developed in this research, and shown in 
diagram, PA is among the big importers of the Canadian wheat, while Oceania is not a 
significant importer. After a 50% increase in freight rates, Canada has decreased th
region, while increasing the export to EU, US, and LA. 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter developed the empirical
Armington framework, it allowed the two way trade and differentiation between different 
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4-11 compares the portion of the export share to each region 
 before and after regional 
Exports to Different Regions 
(Sigma=6, Eta=-0.15) 
 
 
 trade model to simulate the global wheat market. Using 
CN US LA NE PA SA NA SS
T=0 in Routes From Canada
 
before and after 
above 
export to PA 
OC
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originated wheat. The world was divided into eleven consuming and seven producing regions in 
a way that while covering all the wheat consuming regions, none of the main players in the 
wheat market get neglected. A vertical model considering ocean transportation as the major 
transporting mode was established. 
In order to examine the impact of variation in various parameters on the results of this study a 
sensitivity analysis was carried out. The overall elasticity of demand for wheat, and elasticity of 
substitution for different types of wheat were changed to a lower bound and an upper bound and 
the model was re-solved each time to obtain the market clearing solution. As per the results 
obtained from this analysis, the endogenous variables vary as predicted in the theoretical 
framework. With decreasing overall elasticity of demand and elasticity of substitution of variety 
of wheat originated in different regions, the model shows less change in flow of wheat from 
region to regions, while increasing the elasticities and elasticity of substitution show larger 
replacements of different type of wheat in different regions. This proves that the results obtained 
through this model are sensitive to this variation.  
The impact of the changes in freight rate on global wheat flow was examined. As per the result 
in Chapter 3 the sign and direction of the changes on freight rate depends on a series of variables 
and cannot be predicted. The model should be solved each time for the new set of equilibrium 
quantities and prices.    
Chapter 5 will summarise the overall conclusion, the limitations of this study, and future research 
possibilities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Summary and Conclusions 
Ocean transportation is and always has been the dominant method of wheat movement 
across the world. According to trade literature, historical changes in transportation rates and 
descending freight rates as a result of technological changes have significantly increased global 
trade; during the past decade, however, the trend has changed. From 1997 to 2007, the average 
per-unit ocean freight rate increased along various routes by more than 200%. Despite the 
increasing transportation costs, trade of all types of wheat has increased from a total of 99 
million tons to 110 million tons. This is an approximate 11% increase in wheat exports during 
the past 10 years, while total wheat production across the world has gone from 610 million tons 
in 1997 to 597 million tons in 2007, showing a total reduction of -0.02%. Considering the fact 
that more than 80% of the wheat produced in various regions has been shipped via ocean 
shipping and the fact that ocean transportation accounts for almost one fifth of the average wheat 
price in some places, the question is whether the changes in ocean freight rates have affected 
wheat flow globally, and, if so, how.  
To answer the above question, this study realizes the need for a model that is appropriate 
for illustrating the wheat global trade model considering the vertical connections of the supply 
chain in a way that also values and entails the spatial characteristic of the global trade model, as 
well as the product differentiation, and allows for two-way trades. Moreover, such a model needs 
to be general enough to consider all producing and consuming regions and their interactions and 
reactions caused by shocks to ocean transportation costs. Familiarization with the ocean 
transportation market, the intermediate production level, and the wheat market and players was 
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necessary. Chapter 2 of this thesis summarized the main characteristics, ongoing changes, and 
market structure of the ocean freight market and concluded that bulk movement is the main 
mode of ocean transportation. The results of this chapter indicate that although bulk shipping 
seems the most economical way of transporting such a bulky product like wheat across the globe, 
wheat movers also have the option of using containerized carriers. However despite of the recent 
trend toward more specialized services and containerized shipment, bulk movement is still the 
dominant ocean shipping method. Regardless of the type of services being chosen, grain movers 
are price takers in the ocean transportation market. These findings became the main structural 
assumptions from which to build a vertical trade model in the rest of this thesis. The model was 
based on using bulk carriers, the freight rates were assumed to be exogenous, and service users 
were assumed to be price takers.     
Spatial trade models were reviewed in Chapter 3 and the Armington framework was 
selected as the appropriate framework as it can accommodate the spatial characteristics of this 
model, the heterogeneity of wheat originating from different regions, and two-way trade. One of 
the main findings of this chapter was that in such a model the changes in the price of wheat 
originating from region i in region j is a function of a variety of factors. These include all the 
own price effects and cross price effects of wheat originating from different regions; therefore, to 
determine the magnitude of the change and the sign and direction of it is impossible unless 
solving the market clearing condition for all the markets.   
In Chapter 4, a global simulation model for wheat trade was constructed based on the 
Armington framework described in Chapter 3, with the intention of investigating the impact of 
changes in the freight rate on the world wheat market. The global wheat-consuming countries 
were divided into  eleven main regions according to geographic distances and availability of 
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data: European Union, other European countries, Canada, United States, Latin America, Near 
East Asia, Pacific Asia, South Asia, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, and Oceania. The 
producing regions were divided into six major regions: Argentina, Australia, Canada, European 
Union, United States, and CIS region. The rest of the world’s exports fell under the category 
entitled “Rest of the World (ROW).” The ROW exporting region to each consuming region was 
assumed to be a different region due to the different average wheat price and distances. The price 
and freight rates associated with each of the ROW countries were calculated based on the 
weighted average price of wheat and the freight rates to each specific consuming region. 
However, due to the small fraction of wheat exported from ROW countries, a more simplified 
model with unified ROW will not impact the outcome of the model in a drastic way. To maintain 
the consistency in the model, the data set was used from one source. All of the initial base 
quantities, prices, and available freight rates were borrowed from the World Grain Statistics, 
International Grain Council 2008. The year 2006-2007 was selected as the base year and all 
further calculations were based on the base year prices and quantities. If the freight rate along a 
specific route was not available through this source, it was calculated based on the geographic 
distance between the ports and relative prices along other routes. This model treated wheat prices 
and ocean freight rates as exogenous variables.  
The elasticities to build the demand and supply parameters were borrowed from the 
available wheat trade model literature and the market clearing conditions were determined by 
incorporating freight rates into the exporting region (Free On Board) FOB prices.  
Several scenarios were examined to verify the functionality, validation of the model, and 
the impact of the freight rate on wheat flow across the world. The first scenarios included a 10%, 
50% and 100% increase in freight rates with demand elasticity of -0.15 and elasticity of 
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substitution equal to 6 (base model elasticities), which captured the changes in flow of wheat to 
and from different regions. After a 50% increase in freight rates of all routes, the export from 
Canada, Australia, and Rest of the world to Sub Saharan Africa increased, but the export to most 
of the regions decreased. The model is a tool to compare the price and quantity changes and 
compare the comparative advantages and disadvantages that are created by changes in wedges 
due to freight rate fluctuation. For instance, based on the model, Canada has the opportunity to 
export more to Near East Asia and Sub Saharan Africa. The major exporters to this region are 
CIS region, United States, followed by Canada and Australia. After this change in freight rates 
all other regions have decreased the export to NE except Canada. The result implied that shorter 
geographical distances and lower freight rates do not necessarily result in increasing export to the 
regions with lower per unit freight rates. This is why before any decision making, it is reasonable 
to adopt such a tool that is capable of measuring the reactions to price changes that are associated 
with freight rates considering different demand and supply parameters. 
Another result from this section showed that regional wheat prices changes varied from   
-2.5% to 30.2%. Although this decrease in price is mainly associated with region supply price, 
but in some occasions it is associated with adjusting the FOB (Free on Board) price, it means that 
despite of the increase in freight rates, some regions were forced to reduce the premium price to 
stay in business (e.g. after a 50% increase in freight rates in base model, the price of Canadian 
wheat in United States dropped by -1.4%). It also showed that low premium prices did not 
necessarily contributed to maintain or increase the market share associated with each exporting 
region. For instance, although the price of wheat produced in European Union and Argentina 
initially were lower than the price of some other regions like Canada, the results showed an 
export share loss after increasing freight rates for them in some regions. In some regions, the 
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percentage of this loss was even larger than regions with more expensive premium prices like 
Canada. It may be due to varying preferences and a low sensitivity on the part of the consuming 
region toward the price of wheat from certain origins.   
The overall increase in freight rates showed changes in trade patterns, and the magnitude 
of these changes varied from region to region. The tool developed based on Armington model in 
this thesis is capable of capturing the fluctuations, measuring changes and the competitive 
advantages that are created because of the freight rate changes. 
Sensitivity analysis was carried out to examine the robustness of the model in terms of 
the borrowed elasticity parameters from the literature. The results confirmed that the simulation 
results were robust in terms of demand own price elasticity and elasticity of substitution. As the 
elasticity and elasticity of substitution increased, the model showed less sensitivity to freight rate 
changes and vice versa.  
 In the last scenario, regional shocks were examined. First the freight rates to a specific 
destination were increased. Pacific Asia was the selected region. A 50% increase in freight rates 
of the route to PA intensified the wedges between the FOB prices and import price of the wheat 
from Argentina and CIS. But the import price of Canada and United states showed the smaller 
change (8%) and therefore the wheat imported from these two regions to PA increased. The 
result indicated that Australia, originally the largest market share holder in this region, had to 
decrease the amount of wheat exported to this region. 
The second hypothetical situation examined the increase in freight rates from a specific 
region. The freight rate from Canada to all destinations was increased by 50%. This resulted in a 
redistribution of the wheat exported from Canada to all the other regions. The export to Oceania 
showed the largest percentage decrease followed by Pacific Asia. Based on the results of the 
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simulation developed in this research, and shown in above diagram, after a 50% increase in 
freight rates, Canada has decreased the export to PA region, while increasing the export to EU, 
US, and LA.  
The model in this research was developed and used to verify the impact of changes in 
freight rates under described scenarios. As per explained in Chapter 4 and implied here these 
freight rate fluctuations may be an overall change along all routes or a change along a specific 
route. The major implication of this study is to use the developed model as a tool to be used for 
wheat exporter and importers to measure the price changes that are associated with the changes 
in freight rates. As explained earlier, even if there is a change in the freight rate of a specific 
route, it  affects all of the players and the flow of wheat along different routes across the world. 
Although the change may be minor, the model has the capacity of reflecting that impact. The 
market clearing condition solve for each scenario indicates that after each shock in freight 
market, the prices adjust such that the markets clears again and new quantities that are the 
outcome of the new solutions, reflect these changes. However it should be considered that wheat 
is a major product used in all regions of the world, and not all regions have the opportunity to 
produce the quality and quantity of wheat demanded in the region. The sensitivity toward 
transportation costs is only one of the causes of the price and quantity changes. Also one should 
note that all generally all dominant wheat exporters in the world are scattered across the globe. 
Therefore, regardless of the magnitude of the change in freight rates, the consumer region has no 
choice but to adapt or revise its strategic planning in regard to long run changes.  
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5.2. Study Limitations 
This study developed a Market Simulation Model of the global wheat market and 
established a vertical link between wheat in consumer and producer ports, and considered wheat 
from different origins differentiated products. However, due to the large number of variables and 
the need to simplify, all wheat types produced in a specific region were aggregated under one 
category. This simplification helped to reduce the number of parameters and variables, and did 
not harm the study. However, the model has the capacity to expand and consider this type of 
differentiation. The other problem arising from the same aggregation was in deciding the prices 
of different types of wheat. A weighted average of the prices of different types of milling wheat 
was used in regions in which data was available.   
Another limitation of the study was in using base year prices and quantities and borrowed 
elasticities from the literature to estimate the intercepts and coefficients. The calculated 
intercepts and coefficients were highly dependent on base year data and elasticity assumptions. 
However, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to address this issue. Using fixed elasticities of 
demand and supply was other limitation of this study, which mostly used the estimations 
suggested by Alston et al. (1990). However, the sensitivity analysis carried out later showed that 
the results were robust to the elasticities and variations in these elasticities did not result in 
drastic changes in the endogenous variables.   
Another limitation of this study was in the availability of freight rates along all routes, 
and the availability of two or more routes to some destinations. To stay consistent, if there were 
two routes and therefore different freight rates available from an origin to a destination, the route 
with the lower freight rate was used in the model. This eliminated the risk of choosing one route 
over the other by this model. This was left as a suggestion for further studies. In addition, there 
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were no data available for some routes and the author had to do some calculations and make 
judgments based on the prices of other routes to get estimations that closely approximated 
reality.  
5.3. Need for Further Research 
The model developed in this thesis served as a preliminary model to capture the impact of 
freight rates on wheat flow. Some major assumptions were made to build the model and the 
relaxation of some of those assumptions would open up new research options that would benefit 
stakeholders in the wheat and grain industries through maintaining their market shares and 
minimizing their transportation costs.  
There has been an increase in wheat prices and freight rates during the past few years, 
and also an increase in demand for wheat. This study has displayed the basics for developing a 
tool that measures the changes that arise from freight rate fluctuations. However, to come up 
with a more applicable tool, a model that calculates the willingness to pay in each region may 
help to improve the applicability of this model. 
As mentioned in the limitations of the study, the model did not incorporate different route 
selections. Developing this work with more powerful software would help to increase the 
number of variables. In addition, the increasing popularity of containerized services, and 
associated economic and logistical ramifications, cannot be fully evaluated with the numerous 
simplifying assumptions employed in this research. Future research that incorporates different 
shipping options, and considers port facilities, product differentiation, and consumer preferences, 
is a primary recommendation following from the results of this thesis.  
The wheat reallocation and simulation model developed in this thesis has significant 
potential to be further developed for related studies that focus on wheat and grain transportation. 
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One of the major assumptions in constructing the market clearing conditions of this thesis is the 
assumption of perfect competition on the wheat exporter side. This is a simplifying assumption, 
but further investigation is warranted through setting one by one market clearing condition and 
bringing the market power of some of the wheat producers like CWB to the table with more 
powerful data analysis software. 
This study looked into annual data sets. Developing a month-to-month or seasonal model 
for wheat flow with different port options may be of interest to stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX A- Logistics Flow map: Bulk vs. Container from Primary Elevator to Customer Plant 
 
 
Source: Kosior 2002, 7th Annual Fields on Wheels Conference, URL last accessed on July 2011: 
http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/management/ti/media/docs/7th_annual_FOW_02.pdf 
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APPENDIX B- Empirical Model Simulations 
Table A-1 Equilibrium Quantity Demanded, Supplied, and Prices for all Regions under the Base Assumptions for 10%, 50%, and 
100% Increase in Freight Rates 
 
ELASTICITY OF 
SUBSTITUTION 
6 6 6 
DEMAND ELASTICITY -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
SUPPLY ELASTICITY 0.5 0.5 0.5 
%Freight Rate 
Increase 
10% 50% 100% 
EU Markets Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi 
Domestic demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CEU_AR 12.14 $238,116.76  5 $256,775 0 $280,099 
CEU_AU 146.63 $319,016.38  93 $334,539 26 $353,942 
CEU_CN 1919.88 $268,491.39  1,847 $268,127 1,756 $267,671 
CEU_EU 112,567.97 $197,820.26  113,746 $195,426 115,218 $192,434 
CEU_US 623.19 $255,048.61  540 $258,488 436 $262,787 
CEU_CIS 1966.98 $246,566.34  1,407 $255,350 706 $266,331 
CEU_ROW 387.57 $199,738.18  386 $197,849 383 $195,487 
 Quantities Pcd Quantities Pcd Quantities Pcd 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QEU 124,906.89 197,820.26 124,152 $195,426 123,209 $192,434 
             
             
OE Market Quantities POEi Quantities POEi Quantities POEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COE_AR 0.84 $246,731.15  0 $268,522 0 $295,761 
COE_AU 0.00 $304,822.98  0 $315,184 0 $328,135 
COE_CN 2.88 $279,425.39  2 $283,037 2 $287,551 
COE_EU 684.25 $232,327.26  417 $242,481 84 $255,174 
COE_US 43.98 $267,148.61  32 $274,988 17 $284,787 
COE_CIS 73859.55 $212,059.34  74,350 $208,295 74,962 $203,591 
Continued…. 
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COE_ROW 58.89 $212,389.15  58 $209,132 58 $205,061 
 Quantities Pus Quantities Pus Quantities Pus 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOE 89,711.47 $212,059.34 88,917 $208,295 87,924 $203,591 
CA Market Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CCA_AR 0.00 $229,624.76  0 $245,195 0 $264,659 
CCA_AU 0.00 $329,799.89  0 $349,243 0 $373,548 
CCA_CN 5970.79 $234,941.39  6,018 $222,377 6,077 $206,671 
CCA_EU 0.00 $231,370.26  0 $241,176 0 $253,434 
CCA_US 0.00 $250,483.61  0 $252,263 0 $254,487 
CCA_CIS 0.00 $256,543.34  0 $268,955 0 $284,471 
CCA_ROW 0.00 $238,083.00  0 $238,083 0 $238,083 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QCA 25,098.31 $234,941.39 24,432 $222,377 23,598 $206,671 
US  Market Quantities POEi Quantities POEi Quantities POEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CUS_AR 19.81 $218,778.76  7 $230,405 0 $244,939 
CUS_AU 0.00 $331,741.72  0 $351,891 0 $377,079 
CUS_CN 2749.02 $265,785.39  2,298 $264,437 1,733 $262,751 
CUS_EU 3.51 $233,229.26  2 $243,711 0 $256,814 
CUS_US 24842.24 $219,639.61  25,570 $210,203 26,479 $198,407 
CUS_CIS 14.82 $259,568.34  6 $273,080 0 $289,971 
CUS_ROW 98.35 $223,573.53  97 $215,880 95 $206,264 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QUS 49,053.83 $219,639.61 48,006 $210,203 46,695 $198,407 
LA  Market Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CLA_AR 20193.25 $187,934.76  20,690 $188,345 21,312 $188,859 
CLA_AU 0.95 $308,332.96  1 $319,970 0 $334,517 
CLA_CN 3837.34 $276,631.39  3,719 $279,227 3,571 $282,471 
Continued…. 
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CLA_EU 317.51 $248,002.26  192 $263,856 34 $283,674 
CLA_US 6733.99 $250,483.61  6,638 $252,263 6,518 $254,487 
CLA_CIS 110.71 $270,855.74  66 $288,472 9 $310,493 
CLA_ROW 664.53 $209,020.71  666 $210,116 668 $211,484 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QLA 22,641 $187,935 22,628.03 $187,717.32  22,631.50 $187,774.94  
NE Market Quantities PAUi Quantities PAUi Quantities PAUi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNE_AR 372 243,976 235 $264,765 64 $290,751 
CNE_AU 1,192 303,024 1,136 $312,731 1,067 $324,865 
CNE_CN 939 280,599 1,006 $284,638 1,089 $289,685 
CNE_EU 1,150 249,947 877 $266,509 537 $287,211 
CNE_US 1,873 270,252 1,807 $279,219 1,724 $290,429 
CNE_CIS 3,939 253,854 3,549 $265,289 3,063 $279,582 
CNE_ROW 1,805 225,915 1,832 $232,744 1,867 $241,280 
CNE_NE 42,730 226,870 43,376 $233,701 44,183 $242,241 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QNE 42,730 $226,870 43,376 $233,701 44,183 $242,241 
PA  Market Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CPA_AR 256 $276,034 80 $308,481 0 $349,040 
CPA_AU 6,766 $294,576 6,712 $301,211 6,645 $309,505 
CPA_CN 4,083 $296,981 3,766 $306,977 3,368 $319,471 
CPA_EU 19 $287,308 8 $317,455 0 $355,139 
CPA_US 8,187 $281,097 6,965 $294,008 5,438 $310,147 
CPA_CIS 391 $275,265 270 $294,485 118 $318,511 
CPA_ROW 3,431 $278,107 3,467 $283,874 3,511 $291,084 
CPA_PA 110,095 $284,986 111,189 $290,636 112,557 $297,700 
       
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Continued…. 
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Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QPA 110,095 $284,986 111,189 $290,636 112,557 $297,700 
             
             
SA  Market Quantities PSAi Quantities PSAi Quantities PSAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSA_AR 146 $253,224 67 $277,376 0 $307,566 
CSA_AU 1,543 $301,748 1,395 $310,991 1,209 $322,545 
CSA_CN 2,424 $282,053 2,423 $286,619 2,423 $292,328 
CSA_EU 1,041 $251,973 693 $269,271 258 $290,894 
CSA_US 289 $282,846 231 $296,393 157 $313,327 
CSA_CIS 4,039 $253,369 3,364 $264,626 2,521 $278,698 
CSA_ROW 567 $240,961 572 $245,169 578 $250,430 
CSA_SA 97,539 $239,764 98,379 $243,882 99,428 $249,029 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSA 97,539 $239,764 98,379 $243,882 99,428 $249,029 
             
             
NA  Market Quantities PNAi Quantities NAi Quantities PNAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNA_AR 114 $238,264 73 $256,880 22 $280,149 
CNA_AU 277 $303,862 254 $313,800 224 $326,222 
CNA_CN 1,853 $290,457 1,785 $297,957 1,701 $307,331 
CNA_EU 5,742 $229,844 5,225 $238,948 4,579 $250,328 
CNA_US 2,805 $271,328 2,584 $280,568 2,306 $292,117 
CNA_CIS 4,422 $224,792 4,998 $225,518 5,717 $226,426 
CNA_ROW 937 $236,488 947 $241,812 960 $248,467 
CNA_NA 19,049 $241,094 19,260 $246,414 19,523 $253,063 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
 19,049 $241,094 19,260 $246,414 19,523 $253,063 
SS  Market Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi 
Continued…. 
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Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSS_AR 1,527 $217,555 1,506 $228,736 1,480 $242,713 
CSS_AU 756 $283,276 882 $285,802 1,039 $288,959 
CSS_CN 1,300 $275,170 1,534 $277,233 1,826 $279,813 
CSS_EU 3,344 $248,486 2,891 $264,516 2,325 $284,554 
CSS_US 3,627 $276,279 3,590 $287,438 3,543 $301,387 
CSS_CIS 954 $266,212 836 $282,140 689 $302,051 
CSS_ROW 441 $248,706 450 $258,579 461 $270,920 
CSS_SS 5,254 $245,972 5,360 $255,844 5,493 $268,184 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSS 5,254 $245,972 5,360 $255,844 5,493 $268,184 
             
             
OC  Market Quantities POCi Quantities POCi Quantities POCi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COC_AR 0 $253,342 0 $277,538 0 $307,782 
COC_AU 427 $254,789 462 $246,956 507 $237,165 
COC_CN 15 $309,952 9 $324,664 1 $343,054 
COC_EU 19 $262,048 6 $283,009 0 $309,211 
COC_US 20 $304,794 8 $326,322 0 $353,233 
COC_CIS 1 $262,093 0 $276,523 0 $294,561 
COC_ROW 9 $254,359 9 $250,494 9 $245,662 
 Quantities   Quantities   Quantities   
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOC 11,109 $254,789 10,939 $246,956 11,150.88 $256,698.32  
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Table A-2 Implied Demand Elasticities, Base year Quantity and Prices, Lower Bound  Over all Demand Elasticity and Elasticity of 
Substitution 
 
Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
EUROPEAN UNION DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in EU Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share  
AR 0.000 -3.000 0.004 0.048 2.770 0.016 0.052 0.010  
AU 0.001 0.000 -2.996 0.048 2.770 0.016 0.052 0.010  
CN 0.016 0.000 0.004 -2.952 2.770 0.016 0.052 0.010  
EU 0.955 0.000 0.004 0.048 -0.230 0.016 0.052 0.010  
US 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.048 2.770 -2.984 0.052 0.010  
CIS 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.048 2.770 0.016 -2.948 0.010  
ROW 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.048 2.770 0.016 0.052 -2.990  
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -3.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.002 2.869 0.002  
AU 0.000 0.000 -3.000 0.000 0.029 0.002 2.869 0.002  
CN 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.000 0.029 0.002 2.869 0.002  
EU 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.971 0.029 2.869 0.002  
US 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 -2.998 2.869 0.002  
CIS 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.002 -0.131 0.002  
ROW 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.002 2.869 -2.998  
CANADA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in CN Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -3.000 0.000 2.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
AU 0.000 0.000 -3.000 2.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
CN 1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
EU 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.900 -3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
US 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.900 0.000 -3.000 0.000 0.000  
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.900 0.000 0.000 -3.000 0.000  
ROW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.000  
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in US Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share  
AR 0.001 -2.998 0.000 0.300 0.000 2.585 0.002 0.010  
AU 0.000 0.002 -3.000 0.300 0.000 2.585 0.002 0.010  
CN 0.103 0.002 0.000 -2.700 0.000 2.585 0.002 0.010  
EU 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.300 -3.000 2.585 0.002 0.010  
US 0.891 0.002 0.000 0.300 0.000 -0.415 0.002 0.010  
CIS 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.300 0.000 2.585 -2.998 0.010  
ROW 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.300 0.000 2.585 0.002 -2.990  
LATIN AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in LA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.631 -1.172 0.000 0.352 0.032 0.616 0.011 0.060  
AU 0.000 1.828 -3.000 0.352 0.032 0.616 0.011 0.060  
CN 0.121 1.828 0.000 -2.648 0.032 0.616 0.011 0.060  
EU 0.011 1.828 0.000 0.352 -2.968 0.616 0.011 0.060  
US 0.212 1.828 0.000 0.352 0.032 -2.384 0.011 0.060  
CIS 0.004 1.828 0.000 0.352 0.032 0.616 -2.989 0.060  
ROW 0.021 1.828 0.000 0.352 0.032 0.616 0.011 -2.940  
NEAR EAST ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.008 -2.978 0.065 0.050 0.065 0.101 0.217 0.096 2.284 
AU 0.022 0.022 -2.935 0.050 0.065 0.101 0.217 0.096 2.284 
CN 0.017 0.022 0.065 -2.950 0.065 0.101 0.217 0.096 2.284 
EU 0.023 0.022 0.065 0.050 -2.935 0.101 0.217 0.096 2.284 
US 0.035 0.022 0.065 0.050 0.065 -2.899 0.217 0.096 2.284 
CIS 0.075 0.022 0.065 0.050 0.065 0.101 -2.783 0.096 2.284 
ROW 0.033 0.022 0.065 0.050 0.065 0.101 0.217 -2.904 2.284 
NE 
0.788 0.022 0.065 0.050 0.065 0.101 0.217 0.096 -0.716 
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
PACFIC ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Source Share Demand Elasticities in PA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -2.993 0.147 0.090 0.000 0.185 0.009 0.074 2.387 
AU 0.051 0.007 -2.853 0.090 0.000 0.185 0.009 0.074 2.387 
CN 0.031 0.007 0.147 -2.910 0.000 0.185 0.009 0.074 2.387 
EU 0.000 0.007 0.147 0.090 -3.000 0.185 0.009 0.074 2.387 
US 0.064 0.007 0.147 0.090 0.000 -2.815 0.009 0.074 2.387 
CIS 0.003 0.007 0.147 0.090 0.000 0.185 -2.991 0.074 2.387 
ROW 0.026 0.007 0.147 0.090 0.000 0.185 0.009 -2.926 2.387 
PA 0.823 0.007 0.090 0.090 0.000 0.185 0.009 0.074 -0.613 
SOUTH ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in SA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -2.996 0.043 0.065 0.030 0.008 0.113 0.015 2.621 
AU 0.015 0.004 -2.957 0.065 0.030 0.008 0.113 0.015 2.621 
CN 0.023 0.004 0.043 -2.935 0.030 0.008 0.113 0.015 2.621 
EU 0.010 0.004 0.043 0.065 -2.970 0.008 0.113 0.015 2.621 
US 0.003 0.004 0.043 0.065 0.030 -2.992 0.113 0.015 2.621 
CIS 0.039 0.004 0.043 0.065 0.030 0.008 -2.887 0.015 2.621 
ROW 0.005 0.004 0.043 0.065 0.030 0.008 0.113 -2.985 2.621 
SA 0.904 0.004 0.043 0.065 0.030 0.008 0.113 0.015 -0.379 
NORTH AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.004 -2.990 0.023 0.154 0.483 0.236 0.352 0.077 1.564 
AU 0.008 0.010 -2.977 0.154 0.483 0.236 0.352 0.077 1.564 
CN 0.053 0.010 0.023 -2.846 0.483 0.236 0.352 0.077 1.564 
EU 0.167 0.010 0.023 0.154 -2.517 0.236 0.352 0.077 1.564 
US 0.081 0.010 0.023 0.154 0.483 -2.764 0.352 0.077 1.564 
CIS 0.121 0.010 0.023 0.154 0.483 0.236 -2.648 0.077 1.564 
ROW 0.027 0.010 0.023 0.154 0.483 0.236 0.352 -2.923 1.564 
NA 0.539 0.010 0.023 0.154 0.483 0.236 0.352 0.077 -1.436 
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
SUB SAHARAN AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Source Share Demand Elasticities in SS Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.089 -2.742 0.122 0.209 0.581 0.612 0.165 0.074 0.879 
AU 0.042 0.258 -2.878 0.209 0.581 0.612 0.165 0.074 0.879 
CN 0.072 0.258 0.122 -2.791 0.581 0.612 0.165 0.074 0.879 
EU 0.201 0.258 0.122 0.209 -2.419 0.612 0.165 0.074 0.879 
US 0.211 0.258 0.122 0.209 0.581 -2.388 0.165 0.074 0.879 
CIS 0.057 0.258 0.122 0.209 0.581 0.612 -2.835 0.074 0.879 
ROW 0.025 0.258 0.122 0.209 0.581 0.612 0.165 -2.926 0.879 
SS 0.303 0.258 0.122 0.209 0.581 0.612 0.165 0.074 -2.121 
OCEANIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OC Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -3.000 2.479 0.095 0.130 0.136 0.006 0.053  
AU 0.855 0.000 -0.521 0.095 0.130 0.136 0.006 0.053  
CN 0.033 0.000 2.479 -2.905 0.130 0.136 0.006 0.053  
EU 0.045 0.000 2.479 0.095 -2.870 0.136 0.006 0.053  
US 0.047 0.000 2.479 0.095 0.130 -2.864 0.006 0.053  
CIS 0.002 0.000 2.479 0.095 0.130 0.136 -2.994 0.053  
ROW 0.018 0.000 2.479 0.095 0.130 0.136 0.006 -2.947  
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Table A-3 Implied Demand Elasticities, Base year Quantity and Prices, Higher Bound Over all demand elasticity and Elasticity of 
substitution 
 
Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.2 
Sigma=12 
EUROPEAN UNION DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in EU Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share  
AR 0.000 -11.999 0.016 0.195 11.273 0.065 0.212 0.039  
AU 0.001 0.001 -11.984 0.195 11.273 0.065 0.212 0.039  
CN 0.016 0.001 0.016 -11.805 11.273 0.065 0.212 0.039  
EU 0.955 0.001 0.016 0.195 -0.727 0.065 0.212 0.039  
US 0.005 0.001 0.016 0.195 11.273 -11.935 0.212 0.039  
CIS 0.018 0.001 0.016 0.195 11.273 0.065 -11.788 0.039  
ROW 0.003 0.001 0.016 0.195 11.273 0.065 0.212 -11.961  
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -12.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.007 11.673 0.009  
AU 0.000 0.000 -12.000 0.000 0.119 0.007 11.673 0.009  
CN 0.000 0.000 0.000 -12.000 0.119 0.007 11.673 0.009  
EU 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 -11.881 0.119 11.673 0.009  
US 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 -11.993 11.673 0.009  
CIS 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.007 -0.327 0.009  
ROW 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.007 11.673 -11.991  
CANADA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in CN Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -12.000 0.000 11.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
AU 0.000 0.000 -12.000 11.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
CN 1.000 0.000 0.000 -0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
EU 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.800 -12.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
US 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.800 0.000 -12.000 0.000 0.000  
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.800 0.000 0.000 -12.000 0.000  
ROW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -12.000  
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in US Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
Source Share  
AR 0.001 -11.990 0.000 1.221 0.002 10.519 0.007 0.042  
AU 0.000 0.010 -12.000 1.221 0.002 10.519 0.007 0.042  
CN 0.103 0.010 0.000 -10.779 0.002 10.519 0.007 0.042  
EU 0.000 0.010 0.000 1.221 -11.998 10.519 0.007 0.042  
US 0.891 0.010 0.000 1.221 0.002 -1.481 0.007 0.042  
CIS 0.001 0.010 0.000 1.221 0.002 10.519 -11.993 0.042  
ROW 0.004 0.010 0.000 1.221 0.002 10.519 0.007 -11.958  
LATIN AMERICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in LA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.631 -4.560 0.000 1.434 0.129 2.505 0.045 0.246  
AU 0.000 7.440 -12.000 1.434 0.129 2.505 0.045 0.246  
CN 0.121 7.440 0.000 -10.566 0.129 2.505 0.045 0.246  
EU 0.011 7.440 0.000 1.434 -11.871 2.505 0.045 0.246  
US 0.212 7.440 0.000 1.434 0.129 -9.495 0.045 0.246  
CIS 0.004 7.440 0.000 1.434 0.129 2.505 -11.955 0.246  
ROW 0.021 7.440 0.000 1.434 0.129 2.505 0.045 -11.754  
NEAR EAST ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NE Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.008 -11.911 0.263 0.202 0.266 0.413 0.881 0.392 9.295 
AU 0.022 0.089 -11.737 0.202 0.266 0.413 0.881 0.392 9.295 
CN 0.017 0.089 0.263 -11.798 0.266 0.413 0.881 0.392 9.295 
EU 0.023 0.089 0.263 0.202 -11.734 0.413 0.881 0.392 9.295 
US 0.035 0.089 0.263 0.202 0.266 -11.587 0.881 0.392 9.295 
CIS 0.075 0.089 0.263 0.202 0.266 0.413 -11.119 0.392 9.295 
ROW 0.033 0.089 0.263 0.202 0.266 0.413 0.881 -11.608 9.295 
NE 
0.788 0.089 0.263 0.202 0.266 0.413 0.881 0.392 -2.705 
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
PACFIC ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Source Share Demand Elasticities in PA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -11.973 0.600 0.368 0.002 0.751 0.037 0.303 9.713 
AU 0.051 0.027 -11.400 0.368 0.002 0.751 0.037 0.303 9.713 
CN 0.031 0.027 0.600 -11.632 0.002 0.751 0.037 0.303 9.713 
EU 0.000 0.027 0.600 0.368 -11.998 0.751 0.037 0.303 9.713 
US 0.064 0.027 0.600 0.368 0.002 -11.249 0.037 0.303 9.713 
CIS 0.003 0.027 0.600 0.368 0.002 0.751 -11.963 0.303 9.713 
ROW 0.026 0.027 0.600 0.368 0.002 0.751 0.037 -11.697 9.713 
PA 0.823 0.027 0.368 0.368 0.002 0.751 0.037 0.303 -2.287 
SOUTH ASIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in SA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.002 -11.982 0.173 0.266 0.124 0.033 0.461 0.062 10.663 
AU 0.015 0.018 -11.827 0.266 0.124 0.033 0.461 0.062 10.663 
CN 0.023 0.018 0.173 -11.734 0.124 0.033 0.461 0.062 10.663 
EU 0.010 0.018 0.173 0.266 -11.876 0.033 0.461 0.062 10.663 
US 0.003 0.018 0.173 0.266 0.124 -11.967 0.461 0.062 10.663 
CIS 0.039 0.018 0.173 0.266 0.124 0.033 -11.539 0.062 10.663 
ROW 0.005 0.018 0.173 0.266 0.124 0.033 0.461 -11.938 10.663 
SA 0.904 0.018 0.173 0.266 0.124 0.033 0.461 0.062 -1.337 
NORTH AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in NA Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.004 -11.958 0.095 0.626 1.967 0.958 1.433 0.315 6.365 
AU 0.008 0.042 -11.905 0.626 1.967 0.958 1.433 0.315 6.365 
CN 0.053 0.042 0.095 -11.374 1.967 0.958 1.433 0.315 6.365 
EU 0.167 0.042 0.095 0.626 -10.033 0.958 1.433 0.315 6.365 
US 0.081 0.042 0.095 0.626 1.967 -11.042 1.433 0.315 6.365 
CIS 0.121 0.042 0.095 0.626 1.967 0.958 -10.567 0.315 6.365 
ROW 0.027 0.042 0.095 0.626 1.967 0.958 1.433 -11.685 6.365 
NA 0.539 0.042 0.095 0.626 1.967 0.958 1.433 0.315 -5.635 
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Implied Demand Elasticities 
Eta= -0.1 
Sigma=3 
SUB SAHARAN AFRICA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Source Share Demand Elasticities in SS Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.089 -10.951 0.496 0.849 2.366 2.489 0.673 0.300 3.578 
AU 0.042 1.049 -11.504 0.849 2.366 2.489 0.673 0.300 3.578 
CN 0.072 1.049 0.496 -11.151 2.366 2.489 0.673 0.300 3.578 
EU 0.201 1.049 0.496 0.849 -9.634 2.489 0.673 0.300 3.578 
US 0.211 1.049 0.496 0.849 2.366 -9.511 0.673 0.300 3.578 
CIS 0.057 1.049 0.496 0.849 2.366 2.489 -11.327 0.300 3.578 
ROW 0.025 1.049 0.496 0.849 2.366 2.489 0.673 -11.700 3.578 
SS 0.303 1.049 0.496 0.849 2.366 2.489 0.673 0.300 -8.422 
OCEANIA DOMESTIC MARKET 
Demand Elasticities in OC Domestic Market with Respect to the Price of 
AR 0.000 -12.000 10.087 0.386 0.531 0.555 0.024 0.217  
AU 0.855 0.000 -1.913 0.386 0.531 0.555 0.024 0.217  
CN 0.033 0.000 10.087 -11.614 0.531 0.555 0.024 0.217  
EU 0.045 0.000 10.087 0.386 -11.469 0.555 0.024 0.217  
US 0.047 0.000 10.087 0.386 0.531 -11.445 0.024 0.217  
CIS 0.002 0.000 10.087 0.386 0.531 0.555 -11.976 0.217  
ROW 0.018 0.000 10.087 0.386 0.531 0.555 0.024 -11.783  
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Table A-4 Equilibrium Quantity Demanded, Supplied, and Prices for all Regions under the Higher Bound Demand Elasticity and 
Elasticity of Substitution Assumptions for 50%, and 100% Increase in Freight Rates 
ELASTICITY OF 
SUBSTITUTION 
12 12 12 
DEMAND 
ELASTICITY 
-0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
SUPPLY 
ELASTICITY 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
%Freight Rate 
Increase 
0% 50% 100% 
EU Markets Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi 
Domestic demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CEU_AR 14 $233,452 0 $278,255 0 $255,854 
CEU_AU 160 $315,136 0 $354,300 16 $334,718 
CEU_CN 1,938 $268,582 1,562 $264,921 1,750 $266,751 
CEU_EU 112,273 $198,418 118,304 $189,529 115,289 $193,974 
CEU_US 644 $254,189 224 $260,007 434 $257,098 
CEU_CIS 2,107 $244,370 0 $263,928 681 $254,149 
CEU_ROW 388 $200,211 381 $192,531 384 $196,371 
 Quantities PEU Quantities PEU Quantities PEU 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QEU 125,095 $198,418 122,293 $189,529 123,694 $193,974 
OE Market Quantities POEi Quantities POEi Quantities POEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COE_AR 1 $241,283 0 $293,918 0 $267,601 
COE_AU 0 $302,233 0 $328,494 0 $315,364 
COE_CN 3 $278,522 1 $284,801 2 $281,661 
COE_EU 751 $229,788 0 $252,269 92 $241,029 
COE_US 47 $265,189 0 $282,007 17 $273,598 
COE_CIS 73,737 $213,000 76,011 $201,188 74,874 $207,094 
COE_ROW 59 $213,203 58 $202,388 58 $207,795 
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 Quantities Pus Quantities Pus Quantities Pus 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOE 89,910 $213,000 87,417 $201,188 88,663 $207,094 
       
CN Market       
Domestic Demand Quantities PCNi Quantities PCNi Quantities PCNi 
CCA_AR 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CCA_AU 0 $225,732 0 $262,815 0 $244,274 
CCA_CN 0 $324,940 0 $373,907 0 $349,423 
CCA_EU 5,959 $238,082 6,130 $203,921 6,045 $221,001 
CCA_US 0 $228,918 0 $250,529 0 $239,724 
CCA_CIS 0 $250,039 0 $251,707 0 $250,873 
CCA_ROW 0 $253,440 0 $282,068 0 $267,754 
 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 
       
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QCA 25,265 $238,082 23,452 $203,921 24,359 $221,001 
       
US  Market Quantities PUSi Quantities PUSi Quantities PUSi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CUS_AR 23 $215,872 0 $243,095 0 $229,484 
CUS_AU 0 $326,705 0 $377,437 0 $352,071 
CUS_CN 2,862 $266,122 584 $260,001 1,723 $263,061 
CUS_EU 4 $230,608 0 $253,909 0 $242,259 
CUS_US 24,660 $221,999 28,123 $195,627 26,392 $208,813 
CUS_CIS 17 $256,190 0 $287,568 0 $271,879 
CUS_ROW 99 $225,639 94 $202,832 96 $214,236 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QUS 49,316 $221,999 46,387 $195,627 47,851 $208,813 
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LA  Market Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CLA_AR 20,069 $187,832 22,218 $187,015 21,143 $187,424 
CLA_AU 1 $305,424 0 $334,876 0 $320,150 
CLA_CN 3,867 $275,982 3,383 $279,721 3,625 $277,851 
CLA_EU 349 $244,038 0 $280,769 41 $262,404 
CLA_US 6,758 $250,039 6,496 $251,707 6,627 $250,873 
CLA_CIS 122 $266,451 0 $308,090 10 $287,271 
CLA_ROW 664 $208,749 665 $209,574 665 $209,162 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QLA 22,635 $187,832 22,586 $187,015 22,610 $187,424 
       
NE Market Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNE_AR 406 $238,778 0 $288,908 98 $263,843 
CNE_AU 1,206 $300,598 980 $325,224 1,093 $312,911 
CNE_CN 923 $279,590 1,421 $286,935 1,172 $283,262 
CNE_EU 1,218 $245,806 113 $284,306 665 $265,056 
CNE_US 1,890 $268,010 1,914 $287,648 1,902 $277,829 
CNE_CIS 4,036 $250,995 2,829 $277,179 3,432 $264,087 
CNE_ROW 1,798 $224,253 1,875 $243,381 1,837 $233,817 
CNE_NE 42,569 $225,165 44,378 $244,298 43,474 $234,732 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QNE 42,569 $225,165 44,378 $244,298 43,474 $234,732 
PA  Market Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CPA_AR 300 $267,922 0 $347,196 0 $307,559 
CPA_AU 6,779 $292,918 6,894 $309,864 6,837 $301,391 
PA  Market Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi 
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CPA_CN 4,163 $294,482 3,335 $316,721 3,749 $305,601 
CPA_EU 22 $279,770 0 $352,235 0 $316,002 
CPA_US 8,493 $277,869 4,041 $307,367 6,267 $292,618 
CPA_CIS 421 $270,460 0 $316,108 157 $293,284 
CPA_ROW 3,422 $276,672 3,525 $293,336 3,474 $285,004 
CPA_PA 109,822 $283,573 112,988 $299,925 111,405 $291,749 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QPA 109,822 $283,573 112,988 $299,925 111,405 $291,749 
SA  Market Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSA_AR 166 $247,185 0 $305,722 0 $276,454 
CSA_AU 1,580 $299,438 962 $322,904 1,271 $311,171 
CSA_CN 2,424 $280,911 2,946 $289,578 2,685 $285,244 
CSA_EU 1,128 $247,648 0 $287,989 400 $267,819 
CSA_US 304 $279,459 77 $310,547 191 $295,003 
CSA_CIS 4,208 $250,554 1,782 $276,295 2,995 $263,424 
CSA_ROW 565 $239,957 581 $253,112 573 $246,534 
CSA_SA 97,330 $238,735 99,974 $251,710 98,652 $245,223 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSA 97,330 $238,735 99,974 $251,710 98,652 $245,223 
NA  Market Quantities PNAi Quantities PNAi Quantities PNAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNA_AR 124 $233,610 0 $278,572 23 $256,091 
CNA_AU 283 $301,378 146 $326,784 214 $314,081 
CNA_CN 1,870 $288,582 1,627 $304,921 1,748 $296,751 
CNA_EU 5,872 $227,568 3,691 $247,829 4,781 $237,699 
CNA_US 2,861 $269,019 1,913 $289,667 2,387 $279,343 
CNA_CIS 4,278 $224,610 7,345 $224,409 5,812 $224,509 
CNA_ROW 934 $235,049 959 $247,744 946 $241,397 
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CNA_NA 18,996 $239,760 19,499 $252,449 19,248 $246,104 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QNA 18,996 $239,760 19,499 $252,449 19,248 $246,104 
SS  Market Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSS_AR 1,532 $214,759 1,452 $240,870 1,492 $227,814 
CSS_AU 725 $282,645 1,295 $289,318 1,010 $285,981 
CSS_CN 1,241 $274,653 2,475 $277,063 1,858 $275,858 
CSS_EU 3,457 $244,478 1,421 $281,649 2,439 $263,064 
CSS_US 3,636 $273,489 3,645 $298,607 3,641 $286,048 
CSS_CIS 983 $262,230 432 $299,648 708 $280,939 
CSS_ROW 439 $246,231 460 $270,400 450 $258,316 
CSS_SS 5,228 $243,503 5,487 $267,672 5,358 $255,587 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSS 5,228 $243,503 5,487 $267,672 5,358 $255,587 
OC  Market Quantities POCi Quantities POCi Quantities POCi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COC_AR 0 $247,293 0 $305,938 0 $276,616 
COC_AU 418 $256,748 586 $237,524 502 $247,136 
COC_CN 16 $306,274 0 $340,304 2 $323,289 
COC_EU 22 $256,806 0 $306,306 0 $281,556 
COC_US 23 $299,412 0 $350,453 0 $324,932 
COC_CIS 1 $258,485 0 $292,158 0 $275,322 
COC_ROW 9 $255,484 9 $245,285 9 $250,385 
 Quantities  Quantities  Quantities  
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOC 11,152 $256,748 10,734 $237,524 10,943 $247,136 
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Table A-5 Equilibrium Quantity Demanded, Supplied, and Prices for all Regions under the Lower Bound Demand Elasticity and 
Elasticity of Substitution Assumptions for 50%, and 100% Increase in Freight Rates 
 
ELASTICITY OF 
SUBSTITUTION 
3 3 3 
DEMAND ELASTICITY -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
SUPPLY ELASTICITY 0.5 0.5 0.5 
%Freight Rate 
Increase 
0% 100% 50% 
EU Markets Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi Quantities PEUi 
Domestic demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CEU_AR 14 $233,452 5 $281,564 9 $257,508 
CEU_AU 160 $315,135 96 $353,970 128 $334,552 
CEU_CN 1,938 $268,583 1,814 $271,114 1,876 $269,848 
CEU_EU 112,274 $198,419 113,764 $194,323 113,019 $196,371 
CEU_US 644 $254,188 529 $266,068 587 $260,128 
CEU_CIS 2,107 $244,370 1,407 $268,224 1,757 $256,297 
CEU_ROW 388 $200,209 385 $197,450 387 $198,829 
 Quantities Pcd Quantities Pcd Quantities Pcd 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QEU 125,096 $198,419 123,804 $194,323 124,450 $196,371 
OE Market Quantities POEi Quantities POEi Quantities POEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COE_AR 1 $241,283 0 $297,227 1 $269,255 
COE_AU 0 $302,232 0 $328,164 0 $315,198 
COE_CN 3 $278,523 2 $290,994 3 $284,758 
COE_EU 751 $229,789 418 $257,063 584 $243,426 
COE_US 47 $265,188 31 $288,068 39 $276,628 
COE_CIS 73,737 $213,000 74,365 $205,484 74,051 $209,242 
COE_ROW 59 $213,203 58 $207,279 59 $210,241 
 Quantities Pus Quantities Pus Quantities Pus 
 Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOE 89,910 $213,000 88,324 $205,484 89,117 $209,242 
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CA Market Quantities PCNi Quantities PCNi Quantities PCNi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CCA_AR 
CCA_AU 
0 $225,732 0 $266,124 0 $245,928 
0 $324,938 0 $373,576 0 $349,257 
CCA_CN 5,959 $238,083 6,029 $210,114 5,994 $224,098 
CCA_EU 0 $228,919 0 $255,323 0 $242,121 
CCA_US 0 $250,038 0 $257,768 0 $253,903 
CCA_CIS 0 $253,440 0 $286,364 0 $269,902 
CCA_ROW 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 0 $238,083 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QCA 25,265 $238,083 23,781 $210,114 24,523 $224,098 
             
US  Market Quantities PUSi Quantities PUSi Quantities PUSi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CUS_AR 23 $215,872 8 $246,404 15 $231,138 
CUS_AU 0 $326,703 0 $377,107 0 $351,905 
CUS_CN 2,862 $266,123 2,295 $266,194 2,579 $266,158 
CUS_EU 4 $230,609 2 $258,703 3 $244,656 
CUS_US 24,660 $221,998 25,598 $201,688 25,129 $211,843 
CUS_CIS 17 $256,190 6 $291,864 12 $274,027 
CUS_ROW 99 $225,242 95 $210,282 97 $217,762 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QUS 49,316 $221,998 47,060 $201,688 48,188 $211,843 
LA  Market Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CLA_AR 20,069 $187,832 20,863 $190,324 20,466 $189,078 
CLA_AU 1 $305,423 1 $334,545 1 $319,984 
CLA_CN 3,867 $275,983 3,658 $285,914 3,763 $280,948 
CLA_EU 349 $244,039 192 $285,563 271 $264,801 
CLA_US 6,758 $250,038 6,534 $257,768 6,646 $253,903 
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LA  Market Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi Quantities PLAi 
CLA_CIS 122 $266,452 66 $312,387 94 $289,419 
CLA_ROW 664 $208,743 671 $213,002 667 $210,872 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QLA 22,635 $187,832 22,785 $190,324 22,710 $189,078 
 
NE Market 
Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi Quantities PNEi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNE_AR 406 $238,778 215 $292,217 311 $265,498 
CNE_AU 1,206 $300,597 1,107 $324,893 1,156 $312,745 
CNE_CN 923 $279,590 948 $293,128 936 $286,359 
CNE_EU 1,218 $245,807 813 $289,100 1,016 $267,453 
CNE_US 1,890 $268,009 1,687 $293,709 1,788 $280,859 
CNE_CIS 4,036 $250,996 3,342 $281,475 3,689 $266,236 
CNE_ROW 1,798 $224,130 1,853 $237,917 1,826 $231,023 
CNE_NE 42,569 $225,158 43,873 $238,955 43,221 $232,057 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QNE 42,569 $225,158 43,873 $238,955 43,221 $232,057 
PA  Market Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi Quantities PPAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CPA_AR 300 $267,922 68 $350,505 184 $309,214 
CPA_AU 6,779 $292,917 6,559 $309,533 6,669 $301,225 
CPA_CN 4,163 $294,483 3,528 $322,914 3,845 $308,698 
CPA_EU 22 $279,772 7 $357,028 14 $318,400 
CPA_US 8,493 $277,868 6,466 $313,428 7,479 $295,648 
CPA_CIS 421 $270,460 251 $320,404 336 $295,432 
CPA_ROW 3,422 $276,652 3,493 $288,181 3,458 $282,417 
CPA_PA 109,822 $283,572 112,002 $294,832 110,912 $289,202 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QPA 109,822 $283,572 112,002 $294,832 110,912 $289,202 
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SA  Market Quantities PSAi Quantities PSAi Quantities PSAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSA_AR 166 $247,185 59 $309,031 113 $278,108 
CSA_AU 1,580 $299,437 1,354 $322,573 1,467 $311,005 
CSA_CN 2,424 $280,911 2,269 $295,771 2,347 $288,341 
CSA_EU 1,128 $247,649 633 $292,783 880 $270,216 
CSA_US 304 $279,458 212 $316,608 258 $298,033 
CSA_CIS 4,208 $250,554 3,142 $280,592 3,675 $265,573 
CSA_ROW 565 $239,824 574 $247,436 570 $243,630 
CSA_SA 97,329 $238,734 98,826 $246,075 98,077 $242,404 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSA 97,329 $238,734 98,826 $246,075 98,077 $242,404 
NA  Market Quantities PNAi Quantities PNAi Quantities PNAi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CNA_AR 124 $233,610 72 $281,881 98 $257,746 
CNA_AU 283 $301,377 256 $326,453 269 $313,915 
CNA_CN 1,869 $288,583 1,729 $311,114 1,799 $299,848 
CNA_EU 5,871 $227,569 5,117 $252,623 5,494 $240,096 
CNA_US 2,861 $269,018 2,497 $295,728 2,679 $282,373 
CNA_CIS 4,278 $224,611 4,919 $228,705 4,598 $226,658 
CNA_ROW 934 $235,346 960 $248,491 947 $241,918 
CNA_NA 18,997 $239,771 19,517 $252,894 19,257 $246,332 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QNA 18,997 $239,771 19,517 $252,894 19,257 $246,332 
SS  Market Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
CSS_AR 1,532 $214,759 1,496 $244,179 1,514 $229,469 
CSS_AU 725 $282,644 890 $288,987 807 $285,815 
CSS_CN 1,241 $274,654 1,500 $283,256 1,371 $278,955 
CSS_EU 3,457 $244,479 2,853 $286,443 3,155 $265,461 
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SS  Market Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi Quantities PSSi 
CSS_US 3,636 $273,488 3,498 $304,668 3,567 $289,078 
CSS_CIS 983 $262,230 826 $303,944 904 $283,087 
CSS_ROW 439 $246,250 460 $270,015 449 $258,132 
CSS_SS 5,228 $243,504 5,483 $267,266 5,356 $255,385 
 Quantities Prd Quantities Prd Quantities Prd 
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QSS 5,228 $243,504 5,483 $267,266 5,356 $255,385 
OC  Market Quantities POCi Quantities POCi Quantities POCi 
Domestic Demand 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
COC_AR 0 $247,293 0 $309,247 0 $278,270 
COC_AU 418 $256,747 465 $237,193 441 $246,970 
COC_CN 
COC_EU 
16 $306,274 8 $346,497 12 $326,386 
22 $256,807 5 $311,100 14 $283,954 
COC_US 23 $299,411 8 $356,514 15 $327,963 
COC_CIS 1 $258,486 0 $296,455 1 $277,470 
COC_ROW 9 $255,044 9 $246,488 9 $250,766 
 Quantities   Quantities   Quantities   
Domestic Supply 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 000 t $/000t 
QOC 11,152 $256,747 10,727 $237,193 10,940 $246,970 
 
 
